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 2 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the role of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office and 
its perception of, and attitude towards, the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1953. In these 
formative years after World War II many assumptions and policies were shaped that 
proved decisive for years to come. The Northern Department of the Foreign Office was at 
the centre of British dealings with the Soviet Union after 1945 in an atmosphere of cooling 
diplomatic relations between both camps. Keeping channels of communications open in 
order to exploit every opportunity for negotiation and the settlement of post-war issues, 
officials built up an extensive expertise of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Their focus 
on all aspects of Soviet life accessible to them, for example, Soviet domestic and 
international propaganda, revealed in their view a significant emerging future threat to 
British interests in Europe and worldwide. This view provided the basis of the analysis of 
new information and the assessment of the best possible policy options for the British 
government. The Northern Department tried to exploit those traits of Soviet policy that 
could persuade the USA and Western Europe to follow British foreign policy initiatives 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the early Cold War while attempting to balance those 
weaknesses that could harm this effort.  
 
 
The focus of the Department often varied as a result of Soviet action. Some issues, like the 
Cominform were of momentary importance while other issues, like the Communist threat 
and the issue of Western European defence remained on the agenda for many years. A 
realistic approach to foreign policy allowed officials to exploit and counter-act those Soviet 
foreign policies seen as most threatening to Britain and those most likely to aid Britain’s 
recovery of her much desired world role. While the initial optimism after 1945 soon faded 
and consolidation on both sides was followed by confrontation, officials in London and the 
embassy in Moscow tried to maintain diplomatic relations to aid Western recovery efforts 
and support the new foreign policy doctrine of containment. When by the early 1950s 
entrenchment was speeding up in East and West, the Northern Department nevertheless 
utilised the available information to support British foreign policy worldwide as well as 
strengthen the domestic effort to explain the increasing international tension to the British 
people. Realism on the part of officials, and awareness of the information and options 
available to them meant that a Britain closely allied to the USA but one that continued to 
talk to the Kremlin was seen as the best way to achieve a continued world role for Britain 
and a safe Europe. 
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The Foreign Office in the historiography  
Detailed study of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office in the crucial 
years after World War II offers a fascinating insight into the work of a Foreign Office  
department that was little known yet highly influential. This was a time when Britain as 
well as the USA and the Soviet Union tried to understand, and exploit, their place in the 
new post-war world order. For the Foreign Office the years after 1945 were challenging. 
Under a new Labour administration it came under pressure from other Whitehall 
ministries, like the Treasury, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ministry of Defence, to give 
more consideration to their opinions in the planning and execution of British foreign 
policy. Facing an increasingly difficult international scene, Foreign Office officials were 
determined to make the best use of the information and influence available to them to 
suggest and support policy initiatives which in their view offered the most realistic path for 
Britain to maintain and enhance its interests worldwide.1 Information was crucial; then as 
now the relationship between original information and intelligence, and its eventual use by 
the government has to be borne in mind when assessing the appropriateness and efficiency 
of British foreign policy. Despite its central place in the assessment and formation of 
British foreign policy versus an increasingly confident and dominant Soviet adversary the 
Northern Department, as the central point for information, analysis and discussion of 
foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, has received surprisingly little attention from 
historians.  
 
 
Although the available literature on the Foreign Office continues to grow, it is significantly 
under-researched for a government department of its size and importance. Many works on 
British foreign policy concentrate on the Cabinet level of debate and decision-making. 
Others discuss British foreign policy within closely defined parameters, such as the Cold 
War, decolonisation and imperial decline or the emergence of the European Union.  Few 
place the Foreign Office at the heart of their argument and thus lose out on fully exploring 
and discussing the impact of it for British foreign policy. A few books  
 
                                                 
1
 Interference from outside departments is an issue which continues to exasperate Foreign Office staff, 
Christopher Meyer, former British ambassador to the USA in The Sunday Times, 18.10.2009. 
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published in the decades after 1945, nevertheless, made a tentative start.2 Access to 
documents was difficult or impossible, and the discussion of important memoranda and 
developments was thus very limited. These studies were, however, extremely useful for 
their descriptions of the internal processes both in the Foreign Office and the British 
embassies abroad. Written at the height of the Cold War and within the orthodox 
discussion of British foreign policy the Foreign Office, possibly inadvertently, came off 
lightly. Later studies have benefited greatly from the continued release of files to The 
National Archives in Kew and the Freedom of Information initiative, and have offered new 
ways of understanding the process of foreign policy formation in Britain. As a result a 
more thorough re-evaluation of the role of the Foreign Office has been going on since the 
1980s.  
 
 
Despite prevailing restrictions on the study of original documents Victor Rothwell in 
Britain and the Cold War, 1941 to 1947, written in 1982, offered the first comprehensive 
new assessment of the Foreign Office.3 Set, as the title suggests, within the historiography 
of the Cold War and revisionist attempts to situate Britain’s role and responsibility within 
that conflict, it was a landmark study. Starting his examination during the war when Britain 
had no choice but to edge closer to cooperation with the Soviet Union, he stopped when 
most historians agree the Cold War became a reality and the short years of cooperation 
finally ended. After the praising and often rather admiring words of previous historians, 
Rothwell was critical of the Foreign Office. Particularly the continued efforts to come to 
some form of modus vivendi with Stalin after 1945, officials’ apparent passiveness and the 
perceived failure to realise that there was no monolithic Communist world movement 
aroused his disapproval.4 This, in his view, held Britain back from a more decisive foreign 
policy. While Rothwell was quite severe on Foreign Office officials for failing to note and 
fully consider Soviet motivations behind Soviet foreign policy, and for misjudging 
American willingness to resist Soviet expansion, he did not explain the basis of this 
thinking by officials. Ideology or Foreign Office awareness of Soviet domestic affairs were 
not discussed; neither were the important roles of political warfare and propaganda. 
                                                 
2
 Lord Strang, The Foreign Office (Allen and Unwin, London, 1955); J. Connell, The Office (Allan Wingate, 
London, 1958); D. Bishop, The Administration of British Foreign Relations (Syracuse University Press, 
Syracuse, 1961); D. Busk, The Craft of Diplomacy (Pall Mall Press, London, 1967); E. Plischke (ed.), 
Modern Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington,  1979); Z. Steiner, The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World  (Times Books, 
London, 1982); R. Bullen (ed.), The Foreign Office 1782-1982 (University Publications of America, 
Frederick, Md, 1984). 
3
 V. Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, 1941-1947 (Jonathan Cape, London, 1982). 
4
 Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, p. 161, 205, 364.  
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Overall, few of these officials were present in the pages and their important contributions 
to British foreign policy seemed to go unnoticed. 
 
 
Documents released in the past fifteen years have added much to the discussion and have 
thus contributed to a more nuanced picture of the background of British foreign policy 
decisions. By the 1990s a new generation of British historians studying British foreign 
relations emerged. Taking advantage of a less restricted access to archives and new trends 
in the historiography about Britain during the Cold War, they kick-started a new debate 
through close study of newly declassified material. John Zametica, Anne Deighton, John 
Saville, Sean Greenwood, Gaynor Johnson and Ritchie Ovendale were among those who 
followed in Rothwell’s footsteps and contributed hugely to the present understanding of 
the Foreign Office.5 Zametica and Johnson with their edited collections have offered much 
to the debate by focusing on individuals and specific departments. Zametica and 
Greenwood writing about Frank Roberts, Rothwell about Robin Hankey and Peter Boyle 
and Ritchie Ovendale about Oliver Franks and William Strang respectively, have finally 
brought these important Foreign Office staff to the forefront of the debate.6  
 
 
Deighton, Greenwood and Saville have, like Rothwell, taken a broad view of British 
foreign policy and the role of the Foreign Office and chose, in line with the ongoing 
reassessment of the British role during the post-war years, the Cold War and the post-war 
Labour government as the external parameters of their discussion. Deighton’s Britain and 
the First Cold War, published in 1990, provided a collection of essays by specialists in the 
field. Within the new post-revisionist context this book declared an end to the bipolarity of 
much of the Cold War historiography and reclaimed an important role for Britain in this 
conflict.7 But with a leading role came questions about Britain’s responsibility for the 
cooling of relations with the Kremlin and thus the role of the Foreign Office came under 
new scrutiny. Not surprisingly, views on officials vary. Raymond Smith sees them as 
                                                 
5
 J. Zametica (ed.), British Officials and British Foreign Policy 1945-1950 (Leicester University Press, 
Leicester, 1990); A. Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1990); J. 
Saville, The Politics of Continuity: British Foreign Policy and the Labour Government 1945-46 (Verso, 
London, 1993); S. Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War 1945-1991 ( Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000); G. 
Johnson (ed.), The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century ( Routledge, London, 
2005). 
6
 Zametica, Rothwell, Boyle and Ovendale in  Zametica, British Officials; Greenwood, ‘Frank Roberts and 
the ‘other’ Long Telegram: The view from the British Embassy in Moscow, March 1946’ JCH 25 (1990), pp. 
103-122.  
7
 Deighton, Britain and the First Cold War.  
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‘hawks’ who ‘offered the most unqualified and unremittingly hostile view of the Soviet 
Union.’ Deighton herself, discussing British policy towards Germany, noted more 
positively that officials were important in the development and adoption of new policy 
ideas.8 Sean Greenwood in Britain and the Cold War, published ten years later, appears to 
agree with Smith noting that the Foreign Office was ‘russophobe’ and that one of its 
important committees, the Russia Committee, was ‘packed with born-again hardliners.’9 
John Saville, continuing that revisionist line, is even more critical of the Foreign Office.10 
According to him, from the top, Ernest Bevin, to the bottom, the officials in the 
departments, the British failed to see the signs and were too inflexible.11 The assumption of 
aggressive tendencies by the Soviet Union, he stated, was endemic. The ‘collective mind’ 
of the Foreign Office, in his argument, was prejudiced in favour of preserving the Empire 
and Britain’s world role.12 What is missing from some of these accounts is an analysis of 
the information officials based their advice on. While there may well have been personal 
opinions opposed to cooperation with the Kremlin, it does not do these men justice to 
argue that their advice would have gone against information available at the time. 
 
 
Research by other historians on new departments and committees set up to deal with the 
changed international scene added much to this more detailed picture of the Foreign 
Office. Here the Information Research Department (IRD) in particular has received a lot of 
attention from historians.13 Its importance lay with its central position in the execution of 
British foreign policy at a time when psychological warfare and extensive propaganda 
campaigns were at the heart of it. To look closer at departments, committees and 
individuals is important as it illuminates the hopes and fears of policy makers at the time. 
The shift towards first covert and then overt propaganda campaigns, for example, 
                                                 
8
 Smith and Deighton in Deighton, Britain and the First Cold War, p.40, 49, and 53ff.  
9
 Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, p. 33, 42. 
10
 Saville, The Politics of Continuity. 
11
 Saville, The Politics of Continuity, pp. 6ff, 66, 93. 
12
 Saville, The Politics of Continuity, p. 6, 20, 51, 54. 
13
 L. Smith, ‘Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research Department: 1947-1977’ JIS 9 (1) 
(1980), pp. 67-83; R. Merrick, ‘The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War, 1946-
1947’ JCH 20  (1985), pp. 453-468; R. Aldrich, ‘Putting Culture into the Cold War: The Cultural Relations 
Department (CRD) and British Covert Information Warfare’ INS 18 (2) (2003), pp. 109-133 and  The Hidden 
Hand: America, Britain and Cold War Secret Intelligence (John Murray, London, 2002), pp. 443-464; T. 
Shaw, ‘The IRD of the British Foreign Office and the Korean War, 1950-53’ JCH  34 (2) (1999), pp. 263-
281; J. Vaughan, ‘Cloak without Dagger: How the IRD fought Britain’s Cold War in the Middle East, 1948-
56’ CWH 4 (3) (2004), pp. 56-84; W.S. Lucas & C.J. Morris, ‘A Very British Crusade: The Information 
Research Department and the Beginning of the Cold War’ in R. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy 
and the Cold War, 1945-51 (Routledge, London, 1992), pp. 85-110; Foreign Office, History Notes: IRD, 
Origins and Establishment of the Foreign Office Information Research Department 1946-1948 Nr.9 (Foreign 
Office, August 1995). 
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illustrates the fact that this conflict was deemed serious and potentially long-lasting enough 
to warrant such an investment. This focus on propaganda and political warfare incidentally 
added much to the debate about the cultural and social aspects of the Cold War. The 
cultural turn of the 1990s, although concentrating on other avenues of historical enquiry, 
has not bypassed political history completely. New information and arguments provide 
much needed insight into the use of soft versus hard power in the implementation of 
foreign policy during the Cold War. 
 
 
The release of more documents has also encouraged the growth of more research into the 
still relatively unexplored world of intelligence and counter-intelligence. Even though this 
might appear to be of limited impact on the study of foreign relations, the new information 
has been invaluable. Richard Aldrich’s The Hidden Hand set a very high benchmark for 
those who follow. Apart from the sheer breadth of his research, the attention paid to the 
structural set up of the Foreign Office, Whitehall and various other government 
departments provided a lot of detail on their internal organisation. The understanding of the 
more obscure details of the Cold War, he argued, is essential to the understanding of this 
conflict.14 The supervision of parts of the intelligence service during the war as well as the 
running of the Political Warfare Executive gave the Foreign Office status, experience and 
know-how that was quite unmatched. Aldrich’s discussion of the IRD, for example, was 
invaluable in understanding the procedural problems of carrying out the long desired 
propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union that started in early 1948.15 Other studies 
which concentrated on very specific organisational structures in the Foreign Office have 
also greatly contributed to the better understanding of its early Cold War organisational 
change.16 They support the notion that Britain’s harder line with regards to the Soviet 
Union really started with the formation of the IRD.17 
 
 
Due to the nature of the released documents, present interests in intelligence and security 
questions, and in general the possibilities of the Freedom of Information initiatives, much 
of the newer historiography has concentrated on different avenues of investigation to 
                                                 
14
 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 5.  
15
 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, pp. 122-142.  
16
 Aldrich, ‘Putting Culture into the Cold War’; Shaw, ‘The Information Research Department’;  Merrick, 
‘The Russia Committee’; Smith, ‘Covert British Propaganda’; G. Bennett, Churchill’s Man of Mystery: 
Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence (Routledge, London, 2007). 
17
 R. Smith, ‘A Climate of Opinion: British Officials and the Development of British Soviet Policy, 1945-47’ 
IA 64 (4) (1988), pp. 631-647. 
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explain and illuminate British foreign policy during the early Cold War. This reflects 
changes in the historical profession and the issues debated which now increasingly use the 
newer disciplines of intelligence, social, gender or cultural studies. Interdisciplinary 
efforts, in addition, have opened up further paths of research while also providing new 
vocabulary. Political science, sociology and economics, in particular, have greatly 
enhanced the debate and stimulated new discussion. The new cultural and social histories 
are filling gaps left by decades of focusing on political histories. However, as Margaret 
Macmillan has recently pointed out, the understanding of political history is of vital 
importance if one is to understand any modern society.18 As much as political history 
seems old fashioned now, there are still many interesting and important stories to be told, 
and this new and differently focused historiography can help in telling them. The present 
focus in much of historical writing on individuals and their role in history, and the 
popularity of these histories, could help to draw attention to those in the British political 
establishment who have so far received little attention from historians.19  
 
 
The emerging discussion about the structures and organisation within the Foreign Office is 
proving important to the discussion of the overall impact of officials’ suggestions.20 This, 
after all, is an important point: how much influence did officials have and how did they use 
that influence. Adam Adamthwaite was dismissive of Foreign Office efforts to make it 
more efficient in its handling of information and its discussion, and argued that in the end 
‘the Foreign Office failed to meet the challenge.’21 Focusing mainly on structural issues, he 
did not, however, take into account the other changes instituted by the Foreign Office and 
its departments. Zara Steiner, much along the same vein, has written that the ‘Foreign 
Office presents an image of a traditional organisation that has failed to move with the 
times.’22 However, the Northern Department, for example, did change its method of 
reporting several times to keep up with changing circumstances and continuously adapted 
to better meet its brief of providing accurate, up to date and well analysed policy advice. 
Alan Bullock had noted earlier that the Foreign Office was crucial for the work of the 
Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister.23 
                                                 
18
 M. Macmillan, The Uses and Abuses of History (Profile Books Ltd, London, 2009).  
19
 Sean Greenwood made a first step by offering an in-depth study of Gladwyn Jebb, Titan at the Foreign 
Office: Gladwyn Jebb and the Shaping of the Modern World  (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009).  
20
 For example, Merrick, ‘The Russia Committee’.  
21
 A. Adamthwaite, ‘Britain and the World, 1945-49: The view from the Foreign Office’ IA 61 (2) (1985), p. 
232. 
22
 Z. Steiner, ‘The Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Resistance and Adaptation to Changing Times’ CBH 
18 (3) (2004), p. 28. 
23
 A. Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (Heinemann, London, 1983), pp. 65ff. 
 16 
A few years ago Gaynor Johnson has noted that there still was no extensive study of the 
Foreign Office after 1945.24 The disparity in the discussion of British foreign relations in 
the historiography between large numbers of books focusing on Cabinet level debates and 
far fewer books analysing the discussions in the relevant government departments before 
recommendations were made to the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet means that there is a 
substantial part in the policy debate that has so far been neglected. What is needed are 
more departmental studies and more work on the personal profiles of those who were 
intimately linked to the information analysis and policy formation process at a lower level 
in the hope that these studies will contribute to a much better overall understanding of the 
role of the Foreign Office during these years.  
 
 
The Northern Department 
The Northern Department of the British Foreign Office was one of about forty 
departments. The number varied occasionally as new departments were established or 
some were closed. In 1945 there were thirty four. By 1948 there were fifty seven, including 
the ten departments now dealing with German affairs. The central focus of this thesis is the 
Northern Department which after 1945 consisted of several desks dealing with the Soviet 
Union, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, 
Sweden and Poland. Each desk in the department looked after one of these countries. The 
Soviet desk dealt with all incoming letters and telegrams regarding the Soviet Union as 
well as additional information that came from the Economic Information Department 
(EID), the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD) or the Intelligence Services. The 
annual Foreign Office List names on average only three staff directly responsible for the 
Soviet desk. Staff thus dealt with a significant amount of information. Continuity of 
personnel here was important and generally it seems that when staff were moved to other 
departments or to embassies abroad at least one specialist remained in the department.  
 
 
Staffed by older and experienced senior officials, and energetic and argumentative junior 
ones, the Northern Department provides an interesting case study of the Foreign Office, its 
organisation and policy advice, and the differing thinking within it about Britain’s role in 
the world, the plans for the retention of that role and the methods available to diplomats at 
the time. While the younger staff may well have been an occasional nuisance to their older 
                                                 
24
 G. Johnson, ‘Introduction: The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century’ in CBH 18 
(2004), p. 4. 
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superiors, they also provided the impetus for much discussion and were not afraid to voice 
critical and unpopular opinions. The real experts, Martin Folly has noted, were the junior 
staff, while the more senior officials were the ‘all-rounders.’25 This was an important issue: 
while the experienced officials, like Hankey, Jebb, Sargent, Dixon or Warner, were aware 
of the difficulties of formulating, presenting and implementing new policies, the younger 
staff, like Roberts, Brimelow, Galsworthy, Harrison, and Hohler were arguably much more 
willing to look at all the available information, think outside the box and present 
memoranda that raised controversial points and aimed to help the understanding of 
particular issues: the discussion of ideology, for example, really took off in the later 1940s. 
Few of these men have been the subject of critical study resulting in a lack of 
understanding of how and why specific policy recommendations were made.  
 
 
Younger staff had not spent their careers in a Foreign Office that could argue and negotiate 
from strength but had entered it at a time when Britain’s position in the world had already 
begun to slip. Their perspective was thus different and their proposed solutions arguably 
more radical and realistic. Steiner has graciously noted that ‘no department is better than 
the men who staff it.’26 Continuity and change helped to retain important knowledge of 
Soviet affairs and know-how of the policy formation process amongst officials while 
equally allowing new staff to make their mark and infuse the process with new ideas and 
energy. Permanent Under-Secretaries, like other senior officials, were, as Johnson has 
rightly pointed out, incredibly important for a sense of continuity within the Office; people 
who knew how the system worked and how it ought to be organised. Arguing along the 
same lines, Steiner noted that Foreign Office ministers, acted like a ‘departmental memory 
bank.’27  
 
 
1945, in more ways than one, proved a watershed for the Foreign Office and the Northern 
Department. Long planned reforms were implemented, entry into the Foreign Office was 
opened up to applicants from a broader social base, and its structure at home and abroad 
was streamlined. The new Labour government supported the setting up of new committees, 
such as the Russia Committee, and created more departments within the Foreign Office to 
deal with the complex post-war situation in Europe (setting up, for example, the Eastern 
                                                 
25
 M. Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 1940-1945 (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000), p. 5. 
26
 Z. Steiner, et al (eds.), The Times Survey of the Foreign Ministries of the World (Times Books, London, 
1982), p. 28. 
27
  Steiner, The Times Survey, p. 13. 
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European Information Department) and with the demands of the administration of the 
occupied Germany. But even after extensive reforms the organisation of the Foreign Office 
left, according to some historians, something to be desired. Bishop pointed out that the lack 
of clear channels of authority and an inadequate machinery dealing with information and 
intelligence particularly hampered effectiveness.28 Lord Strang, on the other hand, 
appeared quite pleased with the results when he wrote that ‘certainly it needed both the 
world wars to bring British Foreign Service functions to their present pitch of 
complexity.’29 Gaynor Johnson has, I think rightly, pointed out that although the Foreign 
Office hierarchy was fairly rigid, it was also flexible enough to allow an effective 
discussion and flow of information.30  
 
 
Although the speed, force and extent of the emerging Cold War did come as a surprise to 
the Foreign Office, it was not wholly unprepared. Some of its wartime structures had been 
left in place, like the JIC, to analyse and coordinate information, while others, like the 
Political Warfare Executive, were soon resurrected under a new name (the Information 
Research Department, hereafter IRD).31 The Chiefs of Staff (COS) remained closely 
interested in foreign affairs and the Foreign Office continued its lectures at Camberley. 
Many staff had spent the war years in the Foreign Office and were thus familiar with the 
difficult situation. Although the transfer from the wartime to the peacetime pursuit of 
foreign relations took time (the Prime Minister became less involved as the Foreign 
Secretary took over in a more active and decisive role), officials soon returned to taking the 
initiative with important memoranda to discuss pressing issues. While Attlee took a back 
seat and let Bevin get on with his job, staff at the Foreign Office thrived in a new, though 
admittedly externally caused, busy environment.  
 
 
In addition to these challenges the Foreign Office also had to contend with outside 
influences which it could not control. The emerging Cold War, the nationalist liberation 
movements fighting the European colonial powers in the Far East, a catastrophic financial 
situation in Britain and the general repercussions of six years of war greatly enhanced the 
influence of the Chiefs of Staff and the Treasury. The Foreign Office nevertheless tried  to 
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wrestle as much power back as it could; arguing that it alone had the expertise to properly 
assess Britain’s international situation and options. Although the Foreign Office continued 
to work closely with and was influenced by these and other government departments, lack 
of space here prohibits a fuller discussion of these links. Only occasionally, when a 
Treasury or Chiefs of Staff paper was mentioned prominently or when particular problems 
arose with regard to these departments, will these specific connections be discussed. 
 
 
The Foreign Office essentially had to demonstrate that it alone was equipped and able to 
assess the available information correctly and to come up with realistic and implementable 
foreign policies that would safeguard British interests without alienating either the State 
Department or the Kremlin (too much) in the process. Bishop had noted that ‘with the 
advent of dictators, the diplomat had almost ceased to count’, and one could argue that this 
affected officials at the Foreign Office as well.32 As much as the change of government in 
July 1945 and then again in October 1951 was important, it did not change the 
international scene and both governments found that their scope of policies was rather 
limited. So possibly more than before, the government was dependent on accurate and 
realistic advice from the Foreign Office.   
 
 
A new assessment of Northern Department perceptions of the Soviet Union 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate, through the concentration on one department, how the 
information analysis and policy formation process vis-à-vis the Soviet Union within the 
Foreign Office worked. By focusing on the Northern Department, which has not been 
given a lot of attention from historians so far, between 1945 and 1953, it is possible to 
show where this information was coming from and what the advice was based on in detail. 
Thorough analysis of the available sources reveals the everyday worries of a department 
that was at the centre of the policy debates about the Soviet Union. Many issues were 
discussed which are not surprising, like Soviet domestic affairs or potential Soviet 
international interests. Other findings, however, were more unexpected, such as the 
ongoing debate about the likelihood of war.  
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A more balanced post-revisionist argument with regards to the Foreign Office has, it 
seems, yet to emerge and this thesis hopes to contribute a small part to that discussion. It 
will illustrate, using this department, how the Foreign Office worked and why these lower 
ranking officials were so important for the formation of British foreign policy. Although 
many records are not released yet, but can be requested under the Freedom of Information 
Act, it is possible to show through departmental records how diligently and conscientiously 
staff worked to identify and promote the best possible option for British foreign policy. 
While this study is set in the early years of the Cold War and necessarily has to be seen 
within this context, it is mainly concerned with this very early stage of policy formation 
and thus cannot address some of the bigger questions of Cold War history which have been 
discussed sufficiently elsewhere. 
 
 
This thesis demonstrates, in comparison to Saville’s argument, that there was no official 
mind with regards to the best way of dealing with the Soviet Union during the difficult 
post-war years. There were many disagreements between officials and agreement was 
often only reached after detailed and prolonged debate. An official mind, moreover, in an 
age of waning imperial power and economic prowess, and ever changing international 
circumstances would have been a liability. Frank discussion and ‘thinking outside the box’, 
particularly by the ‘Young Turks’ in the Northern Department, proved important in 
enabling broad discussion and thus in preventing unrealistic policy advice. There was a 
real desire to understand the basis of Soviet foreign policy and its concern with security, 
ideology and prestige. The ‘Kremlin Memorandum’, for example, was an attempt to see 
the world through Soviet eyes. The discussion of the various choices available to the 
British was an asset that proved highly beneficial to Britain’s understanding of the world 
and Britain’s role in it.  
 
 
The simple issue of information stands at the centre of this thesis. The main aim is to show 
what the British Foreign Office knew about the Soviet Union and Soviet plans, and how 
officials discussed and used this information. The available information was good despite 
obvious and large gaps. Reports and memoranda routinely included detailed information 
about Soviet politics, economy, ideology and foreign policy. Too often British foreign 
policy is discussed entirely from the perspective of those at the top, the Cabinet, the Prime 
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Minister or parliament.33 Hankey himself, Rothwell noted, was worried that those at the 
top may not fully understand the threat and react accordingly; i.e. that those not privy to all 
the available information were picking and choosing what they believed or did not grasp 
the significance of particular developments.34 It is, therefore, hugely important and 
rewarding to understand what the original information and policy advice from the 
specialists at the Foreign Office was and why a specific tactic or strategy had been 
suggested or criticised.   
 
 
With the release of more Foreign Office files to the National Archives these issues can 
now be more comprehensively researched and addressed, and it becomes clear that 
officials’ advice was far from pre-determined or single-minded. As this thesis will show, 
their advice was based on thorough examination of all the available information and 
extended discussions about memoranda and briefs which laid out specific problems or 
policies, and that their suggestions therefore were realistic and pragmatic. Although 
Britain, just like the USA and the Soviet Union, was not averse to taking advantage of a 
situation, Britain tried to retain policies which allowed the possibility of continued 
dialogue with the Kremlin. Isolation, whether chosen or imposed, was more dangerous 
than difficult dialogue. It could be argued that it was precisely the information available to 
officials that supported both cases: that for closer relations with the USA and that for a 
continued effort to achieve a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union, which despite all the 
problems and set-backs provided the best alternative to an accelerated arms race and war.  
 
 
Far from being simple early Cold War thinking, documents suggest that the knowledge and 
discussion of Soviet policies and motives in the Northern Department was extensive and 
careful. Many avenues were researched and argued before a final consensus emerged after 
often weeks or months of discussion and debate. Information was not used to distort 
arguments to support a specific case but rather tended to illustrate both sides of an 
argument before advising a particular policy. Possibly more realistic than the Foreign 
Secretary and the Prime Minister, officials tried to avoid policies seen as too severe 
towards the Soviet Union but advocated those which could be supported and which would 
preferably not lead to an intensifying Cold War. Officials were not Cold Warriors but 
realised that British policy towards the Soviet Union had to be balanced in order to avoid 
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endangering peace and an escalation in the cost of rearmament. Bound by an increasing 
dependence on the United States and an obvious geopolitical interest in Europe, the 
Foreign Office had no choice but to support the side that appeared more likely to preserve 
peace and that was most able to defend peace if necessary, the United States and the UNO. 
 
 
Research for this thesis was based exclusively on the files of the Northern Department of 
the Foreign Office in the FO371 General Correspondence series. The timeframe between 
1945 and 1953 was chosen to analyse the early years of the Cold War until the death of 
Stalin when regime change in the Soviet Union led to an overhaul of the country’s foreign 
policy. Although this may appear to be too narrow a focus, the sheer wealth of available 
information made an in-depth analysis within a larger timeframe impossible. Although 
many files have been recently declassified, many more are still not readily available and 
have to be requested separately under the Freedom of Information Act. Important 
documents which have not been previously discussed elsewhere have been used in this 
study to show that British foreign policy advice at the time was based on experience, 
thorough analysis of all the available information and a measured dose of pragmatic 
realism. This allowed the British government to pursue a foreign policy that was based as 
much in concrete evidence as on a well developed understanding of the shifting political 
and economic power realities after World War II. 
 
 
This thesis is divided into three similarly organised parts, each of which covers a period of 
roughly three years: the first part discusses the period between July 1945 and December 
1947, the second part investigates January 1948 until March 1951, and the third part deals 
with the period between March 1951 and the summer of 1953. Each part begins with a 
chapter discussing the Northern Department, and the challenges and changes it faced 
during each three year period concentrating particularly in organisational and structural 
issues. To set the scene with regards to the Soviet Union, both in her domestic sphere and 
her international ambitions, the following chapter details the most important developments 
within the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. The middle chapters of the first and second 
parts discuss particular issues which were regarded as vitally important by the Northern 
Department in the debate about future British foreign policy. They illustrate very specific 
concerns and allow a detailed study of the discussions surrounding these issues. It was the 
perceived Communist threat which attracted the most attention in the second part. In the 
third part Political Warfare, and Western European Defence and the proposed rearmament 
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of Germany constitute the heart of the discussion. The final and main chapter of each part 
deals with the Northern Department’s response to these issues and perceived threats, and 
features the discussions and policy proposals emanating from these issues. 
 
 
The first part centres around the early post-war aspirations of cooperation and those 
elements of Soviet opportunism which proved increasingly difficult to negotiate. Between 
1945 and the end of 1947 the Northern Department faced a most challenging time: it was 
confronted with a very different international situation as compared to 1939 while there 
was no efficient way to effectively deal with the flood of telegrams and letters from the 
Moscow embassy which followed the end of the war. Organisational and structural 
changes during these three years, detailed in Chapter One, optimised the process of 
information analysis and discussion. A variety of new weekly, fortnightly or monthly 
reports were introduced to summarise the large amount of information and to make it 
accessible to those outside the department who were not Soviet specialists.  
 
 
With regards to British foreign policy this three year period constituted what Orme Sargent 
aptly described as ‘stocktaking’. Long periods of negotiation with the Soviet Union as well 
as with the USA clarified areas of British strength and weakness, and staff started to 
discuss those options viewed as best serving British interests. The Conferences of Foreign 
Ministers, ongoing until the December 1947, which cannot be detailed here as the Northern 
Department was not concerned with them directly, slowly clarified areas of policy division. 
The peace treaties, the continuing debate about the future of Eastern Europe and the central 
problem of Germany were discussed in detail in the Northern Department as they were 
central to Soviet foreign policy immediately after the war. Some of the important issues, 
discussed in the following two parts, only emerged later on.  For this reason there is no 
middle chapter in this part. There was no one concern or debate that towered over other 
issues. Rather than look too much into the future, which was, of course, also done, the 
department concentrated on assessing Britain’s position and the strategies and tactics 
available to her. 
 
 
The second part follows the change from the negotiation for a post-war settlement and an 
expressed wish to cooperate to a much more confrontational approach and attempts of 
consolidation on both sides. The Communist threat, including Communist ideology, the 
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Cominform and the Peace Campaign, was perceived as a viable danger to British interests 
in Europe and the Far East. Discussion about all aspects of it was extensive and often 
heated, new committees were formed to discuss papers in a more formal and 
interdepartmental level, and Northern Department persistence finally paid off when 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin sanctioned the start of an, initially localised, counter-
propaganda campaign. Consolidation of Communist control, particularly in Eastern 
Europe, symbolised by the coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, worried the Northern 
Department extensively. The dearth of information and the increasing harassment of 
British representatives in these countries added to a sense that a final break with the 
Kremlin was imminent. The information that was obtained from these countries told a 
broadly similar story: that of increased Sovietisation of parties, governments, 
bureaucracies, and industry and agriculture. While frequent Western protests calling for the 
implementation of the Declaration of Europe went unheeded, efforts to speed up closer 
cooperation with the United States and the Western European countries were stepped up.  
 
 
The Berlin Blockade, the first openly military confrontation of the early Cold War, 
manifested the threat from the Soviet Union and did much to accelerate developments in 
the West. Stalin, just like Britain, was getting tired by the continuing deadlock over 
Germany’s future and, possibly understandably, tried to test the waters a little further. 
While Tito’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 did much to damage the idea of a 
monolithic Communist bloc wholly controlled by the Kremlin, it added relatively little to 
the Western propaganda ‘war chest’. The threat of war had, in the estimation of the 
Northern Department, increased and Bevin as well as Marshall and then Acheson put all 
their efforts into bringing NATO into existence in April 1949. Cold War fronts, by then, 
had been hardened to an extent that even the brief détente after Stalin’s death could not 
really penetrate.  
 
 
The third and last part details the activities of the Northern Department a period that 
witnessed other momentous events of the early Cold War: the conflict in Korea and 
Stalin’s death. During these years it concentrated on promoting policies which countered 
Soviet Cold Warfare that helped to consolidate the gains made so far; for example, 
Western European defence through the proposed European Defence Community and the 
rearmament of West Germany. The relationship with the USA, by no means equal or 
straightforward, was also still being built and even the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall 
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Plan had not fully ended speculation about the reliability of the US as Britain’s main 
foreign political partner. Stalin’s death added surprisingly little to these developments. 
Consolidation on both sides continued although channels of communication were opened. 
Local and limited settlements were achieved but the language of the Cold War that had 
emerged over the previous few years did not change. What the Northern Department had 
achieved by 1953 was impressive: a tighter and more efficient structure and organisation, 
closer cooperation within the Foreign Office and with outside agencies, and most 
importantly it had helped manoeuvre Britain into a position where it still led, though not as 
decisively as before 1939, the fight for progress and peace. 
 
 
Britain in 1945 and British foreign policy  
The large and continuously growing body of work on British foreign relations reflects the 
importance of foreign policy in British history. However, the discussion of British foreign 
policy, and thus of the Foreign Office, since 1945 has invariably been set within the 
parameters of imperial decline, Cold War and European integration. Although the debate is 
ongoing about the influence of these issues on historians personally, it seems that orthodox 
as well as revisionist and post-revisionist historians have felt specific desires to absolve of 
or attribute blame. The revisionist and post-revisionist debate, often much more precise 
than previous discussions, has broadened new and balanced old arguments. Better access to 
archives has enabled historians to look much closer at the motives and methods of decision 
making. International relations theorists have added to these debates by questioning the 
perceptions and uses of economic, political and military power in forcing or facilitating 
domestic and foreign policies after 1945.35 While American motives have subsequently 
been most severely questioned, British and Soviet policies have also come under criticism. 
As a result, the Foreign Office has not surprisingly been seen in a more critical light. 
 
 
The historiography regarding British foreign policy is now so extensive that it cannot be 
discussed here in detail; rather the focus will be on those issues important for this thesis.  
While Britain’s role during the early Cold War has been slowly reclaimed by British 
historians during the past decade through revisionist and post-revisionist debate, the 
external parameters of that role have inevitably remained the same: a great imperial power 
in decline, massive economic and financial exhaustion after the war which limited foreign 
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political choices, tenacious attempts of the British government to situate itself in a position 
where it could influence, much more than its weakened state would otherwise have 
allowed, those policies of the US State Department which were seen as important in the 
maintenance and rebuilding of an independent British influence worldwide. This is 
important as any new discussion which now focused more closely on the impact of British 
policies during those years cannot ignore those parameters which, in a largely American 
led debate, have limited Britain’s role in the conflict. 
 
 
Britain’s foreign policy has traditionally been seen as concerned with issues of maintaining 
a favourable European balance of power, the establishment of an optimal international 
trade environment with a particular preference for trade within its empire, and the 
maintenance of naval lines of communication to maintain and protect its empire and 
external trade routes. Alliances were sought when necessary but entanglement was avoided 
when risks and benefits appeared disproportionate. Two world wars changed Britain’s 
ability to maintain these interests and to directly influence these issues through its own 
strength. After 1945, for example, as a response to new technologies defence priorities 
changed.36 By May 1945 Churchill, in government for another two and a half months, saw 
his foreign political choices extremely limited. At the edge of a war ravaged continent, 
with a crumbling empire and debilitating debts the choice was simple: closer relations with 
the USA, despite some difficult demands, or a continued relationship with the Soviet 
Union which would always have been fraught with difficulties. The Permanent Under-
Secretary’s Committee (PUSC) argued that the ‘third force’ idea was unrealistic and that in 
the end, there was not really a choice.37 Britain edged closer to Washington while keeping 
a foot in the door of Europe as the relationship with Moscow, established despite a lot of 
suspicion during the war, disappeared into thin air. 
 
 
Historians generally agree that 1945 for Britain was a watershed. Although not yet bipolar, 
international power was shifting away from Western Europe towards the Soviet Union in 
the East and the USA in the West.38 Developments that had started during the previous 
decades came to the fore while new developments which had been a result of the war or 
                                                 
36
 R. Ovendale (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945-1951 (Leicester University 
Press, Leicester, 1984), p. 7. 
37
 R. Ovendale, ‘William Strang and the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee’ in Zametica, British 
Officials, p. 225. 
38
 D.C. Watt, ‘ Britain, the United States and the Opening of the Cold War’ in Ovendale, The Foreign Policy 
of the British Labour Governments, p. 45. 
 27 
had been aggravated by it merged into that process. Victory in 1945 had not achieved the 
sense of security that all sides had craved and an increasing lack of confidence and mutual 
suspicion about future intentions became the Leitmotiv for much of the Cold War and its 
diplomacy; ‘a legacy of mistrust’ as Geoffrey Warner noted, which created, as Norman 
Davies put it, ‘a sense of futility’.39 War, or the fear of it, became a common denominator 
in international diplomacy.40 At the same time the arena of conflicts now moved eastwards. 
With the stalemate in Europe and the rise of China Europe slipped behind America and 
Eurasia in importance.41  
 
 
Most of the future conflicts were located elsewhere and neither superpower, the USA and 
the Soviet Union, nor the dominant Great Power, Great Britain, had real plans for the post-
war period that went beyond the usual concerns for territorial integrity, national security 
and post-war reconstruction.42 The UNO was still in its infancy and the continuing conflict 
of rival political systems proved very difficult to understand and counter. Hegemony, Peter 
Taylor has argued, is rare in the modern world, and, it could be argued, could not be 
sustained for long. In 1945 there were five possibilities and three choices for alliances, he 
noted: either all would cooperate or all would fall out, alternatively the US and Britain 
could have formed an anti-Communist front, Britain and the Soviet Union an anti-
hegemonic front or the US and the Soviet Union an anti-imperialist front.43 Rapidly 
changing international relations, however, made the choice a much more prolonged and 
less well defined issue. 
 
 
The old balance of power in Europe, as David Reynolds has written, completely 
collapsed.44 Although the reality of the situation appeared fairly clear, the overall impact of 
the change brought on by World War II, it is argued, only slowly filtered into the thinking 
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of those in the British Foreign Office, Defence Establishment and government.45 In the 
first few years after 1945, as Elizabeth Barker has noted, ‘the British in their relations with 
the two superpowers acted both as bull-dog and bull-frog.’46 Peter Taylor, in the same 
vein, wrote that there was a considerable difference between the image Britain wanted to 
project and the actual reality.47 The ‘cultivation of prestige’, as Holland has argued, now 
probably derived from a sense of weakness continued to be at the centre of British foreign 
policy.48 While the war further encouraged the move to towards European integration, 
Britain remained sceptical of closer cooperation out-with strict parameters; some have 
even argued that Europe was only a distraction from the Empire.49 Leadership ambitions, 
initially supported by Bevin in his quest for a Third Force and in the implementation of the 
Marshall Plan, were in the end abandoned.50 The ongoing uncertainty of which way to 
look, West to the USA or East towards Western Europe, continues to this day. 
 
 
In this situation, one of reality, aspiration and deception, a profound change occurred with 
regard to the perception and projection of power. Britain, in particular, now was 
uncomfortably reminded that an independent foreign policy in the absence of sufficient 
economic means was essentially impossible. Military capability, a willingness to make use 
of ever evolving military technology and the formation of alliances which supported and 
demanded this thinking moved to the centre stage of international affairs. NATO became 
‘the bedrock of British policy’ while the Soviet Union and its satellites in reply became a 
‘muscle-bound empire.’51 But the resulting over-extension of military and thus economic 
responsibilities created new problems.52 As economic prowess now became vital in order 
to maintain an impressive military deterrent and to secure a place at the top of the table of 
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international diplomacy, Britain’s severe financial difficulties and declining industrial 
performance had a significant impact on her status as a great military power.53 While the 
Foreign Secretary often demanded briefs that discussed proposed policies and the 
implications in a way he agreed with, officials undoubtedly used their influence to 
persuade him of their ideas as well as use the good relations they had with him to restore 
the Foreign Office as the main body of foreign policy formation.54 The conviction all 
shared was that Britain was despite her problems still a Great Power.55  
 
 
With a better, though still limited, access to archives and within an international 
atmosphere that demanded a re-assessment of the roles of the World War II victors and 
their responsibilities for the ongoing Cold War the 1980s saw a rush of books setting out to 
re-evaluate British policies since 1945. Titles proclaiming a ‘Retreat from Power’, the 
‘Rise and Fall of the Great Powers’ or a Britain ‘between the Superpowers’ suggested a 
negative assessment of British efforts to retain its role and possibly even a failure of that 
effort.56  Increasing subordination to the USA, in particular, was seen as evidence of a 
much weakened Britain.57 The ongoing Cold War with its frequent crises at the same time 
demanded in the wake of several foreign interventions by Washington a re-assessment; 
Rothwell here was one of the first to set British foreign policy specifically in this context. 
Balancing this debate, Britain’s relations with the Kremlin were subjected to more 
scrutiny. 
 
 
Elizabeth Barker has illustrated the varying conflicts which British policy makers had to 
take into account after the war. She argued that it was essentially an understanding of 
profound weakness which influenced policy making.58 Focusing on realistic choices 
available at the time, Bevin was willing to settle for a Soviet sphere of influence in the 
East, while pursuing a close relationship with Washington. Europe, despite his initial 
attempts to secure a ‘third force’ in the ‘middle of the planet’ never became a priority and 
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lagged far behind other efforts to secure beneficial relations particularly with the USA but 
initially also with the Soviet Union. There was still, Barker argued, a certain ‘sense of 
superiority and arrogance towards Western Europe.’59 British efforts to secure closer 
relations with Western Europe, she noted, were symbolic only; it was rather late in the day 
that the British saw the economic benefits of Western Europe.60 John Charmley contended 
that ‘even though Europe was important enough for Britain to die for, it was not important 
enough for Britain to reconstruct.’61 Bevin, John Gormly has written, was more interested 
in obtaining his sphere of influence between the American and the Soviet spheres than 
concentrating on Europe.62 But he was worried about Britain’s prospects noting that ‘if we 
are not careful, our victory in war may lead to us being plucked by our allies.’63 
 
 
While it had previously been a British prerogative to base policies on a well defined 
globalist thinking due to concerns with her empire, after 1945 both the USA and the USSR 
quickly saw the opportunities and benefits of policy planning based on broader concepts 
and with broader aims. The post-war Pax Americana which emerged as a result necessarily 
led to concurrent re-adjustments of British aims and methods, and the emerging ‘politics of 
decline’ were, according to Paul Kennedy, difficult for the British who were used to a fully 
independent foreign policy.64 Britain’s status and power rapidly declined after 1945 and 
has not recovered since. The rules of international diplomacy had changed by 1945 leading 
Saunders to note that ‘if one party plays power politics in an anarchical system then those 
with threatened interests’ have to do so too.65 An alliance to one of the two sides of the 
conflict thus appeared imperative for national security. British determination to remain a 
great power as close as possible to the dominant superpower, the USA, cost her dearly. 
Military expenditure rose well beyond indefinitely sustainable levels and the efforts to 
possess her own atomic bomb arguably did not result in better cards at the negotiating table 
with neither the USA nor the USSR.66 Despite these issues, there is the argument that the 
Cold War was a blessing in disguise for the British.67 
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Issues of national security in an age that saw the rise of the ‘national security state’ cannot 
be under-estimated in this discussion.68 To see the Cold War against global changes in 
power, as revisionists and post-revisionists do, clarifies the importance of the conflict 
between issues of security and national conflicts. Even though the Cold War is over and 
the atomic holocaust never materialised, the fears at the time were real and have to be 
taken into account when assessing the motives and methods of British as well as American 
and Soviet policy makers. Although Saunders made a strong argument for the role of 
realism in British policy vis-à-vis the USSR after 1945, there was also a strong ideological 
undercurrent promoting liberal values across the world.69 By 1947 against a scenario of 
accelerated Soviet consolidation of their orbit, still undecided American support for Britain 
and Europe, nationalist uprisings across the British Empire and impending economic crisis 
the mood was one ‘of panic akin to that of March 1939.’70 Although Reynolds may well be 
exaggerating here, indications from the sources do suggest that the feeling of nearing a 
new abyss were quite pronounced. Britain was always very sensitive of its interest and 
while it was willing to acquiesce to a Soviet sphere in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, it 
was not prepared to allow any interference in its own sphere.71  
 
 
What was needed, and what some historians have focused on, was finding and proving a 
political masterplan; Kennedy argued that the US administration certainly believed that the 
Kremlin had one.72 No side really knew what the other was up to and within this absence 
of hard information suspicions and guess work necessarily emerged. It can be argued that it 
took Britain rather long to agree and start to implement well defined and interlinking 
policy initiatives. Debate was, despite Saville’s assertions to the contrary, extensive and 
thus prolonged.73 In a full-blown revisionist account, he was exceptionally critical of the 
Foreign Office, its workings and expertise. According to him its knowledge was ‘pitiful’ 
when compared to that of the State Department.74 Officials’ opinion was stated to be a 
result of pre-conceived notions rather than the result of discussion. Since there was no in-
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depth analysis of the available information in the Northern Department or the State 
Department and its Policy Planning Staff, it seems that this criticism was largely 
unfounded. 
 
 
The last ten years or so have seen new attempts to explain British foreign policy during the 
second half of the Twentieth Century and the access to more sources than ever before only 
benefited that effort. Britain’s newly claimed role in the Cold War has come under scrutiny 
as the bipolar nature of the conflict was reconfirmed.75 ‘Superpowers’, Reynolds has 
argued succinctly, were countries that had ‘great powers plus great mobility of power.’76 
After 1945, according to this definition, there were only two: the USA and the USSR.  This 
left Britain with little choice but to ally herself to one of the two. Britain, however, tried to 
go a middle way. The focus of British foreign policy, Greenwood noted, was not the East-
West conflict but international cooperation in various bodies.77 Germany, not the Soviet 
Union, was the focus of the years after 1945 and provided much common ground with the 
Kremlin.78 Once cooperation here had given way to confrontation the main focus of the 
conflict shifted back to Washington. 
 
 
While foreign policy was limited in its scope by restrictions imposed by British relations 
with both the USA and the Soviet Union, propaganda provided a backdoor to a more active 
pursuit of foreign relations.79 Perceptions were vitally important during the Cold War and 
could, with much effort and guile, be manipulated. But even here the FO was under the 
continued pressure from the COS to be more pro-active, with a realisation that traditional 
diplomacy may have reached its limits and with the threat posed by the Berlin Blockade in 
1948/49, that the Foreign Office’s Russia Committee agreed to a support the COS’s 
stance.80 To argue that the Russia Committee consisted largely of ‘born-again hardliners’ 
who ‘wanted an all-out offensive’ was, I think, too severe and did not take enough account 
of the information available which gradually supported a harder stance against the Soviet 
Union in the absence of an equally effective policy.81 Also, the argument that the Foreign 
Office was essentially ‘russophobe’ and anti-Soviet even before the Soviet Union had 
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ended cooperation may not take the available information and the massive change in 
international diplomacy after 1945 enough into account.82  
 
 
That it was the Labour Party that presided over a policy of gradual withdrawal from the 
wartime alliance with the Soviet Union and then proceeded to initiate an actual propaganda 
and diplomatic offensive against it was difficult for those in the Labour Party who still 
craved a, rather unspecified, ‘socialist foreign policy.’83 While there was a definite 
continuation of the previous governments foreign policy, there were understandably also 
some departures, in particular over imperial policy; although there is the assertion that the 
‘old imperial consciousness held sway’ over the British political establishment after 
1945.84 The fact remains that the Empire fell apart under a Labour government. Some have 
argued that Labour never had a distinctive foreign policy and struggled with the demands 
of reality, although pressure from all sides may have left it little room for an imaginative or 
even radical foreign policy.85 Others recognised that Labour went in new directions. 
Stephen Howe noted that ‘Bevin broke with Lord Palmerston’s dictum that Britain has no 
permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests.’ Thorpe stated, along the same 
lines, that the Labour government had a leading role in the formation of the new system of 
alliances which characterised the Cold War but had lost its reforming momentum by 
1949.86 Labour ministers were even seen as ‘enthusiastic Cold Warriors.’87  Others, like 
Robert Pearce, have argued that Labour made the best of a difficult situation.88 
 
 
Britain, the USA and the Soviet Union  
Any discussion of Britain’s relations with the United States, and the Soviet Union, 
necessarily has to start during the war.89 The alliance between governments with opposing 
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views of domestic and international politics has long interested historians: ‘a most 
improbable event’, Bradley Smith noted, an ‘unnatural alliance’ Frederick Samuel 
Northedge concluded, an accident that was ‘enforced and uneasy’ Geoffrey Warner has 
argued.90 When the alliance fell apart a culprit was sought; a quest re-ignited by the 
revisionism of the 1970s and 1980s. That there was no such thing as a frank exchange of 
information even during the war has been convincingly shown by Smith.91 Even during the 
war, as allies, equality was sought but certainly not provided; for example, a unified joint 
command including all the allies was never established. Sometimes it even appeared as if 
both sides were fighting a different war.92 
 
 
The serious disagreements between the wartime allies over the treatment of Germany and, 
particularly the future of Poland and Eastern Europe, have been examined many times.93 
That the USA realised early on that its influence in post-war Eastern Europe might be 
rather slight and Churchill’s quick negotiation with Stalin over spheres of influence 
indicated that despite rhetoric and grand declarations realism was the basis of Western 
thinking with regards to Stalin’s likely sphere of influence after 1945.94 Churchill saw 
himself as the most experienced of the wartime leaders, noting once: ‘with the great 
Russian bear on one side of me, with paws outstretched, and on the other side…the great 
American buffalo, and between the two sat the poor little English donkey who was the only 
one…who knew the right way home.’95 He was convinced that the Empire and a special 
relationship with the USA would guarantee Britain’s continued Great Power role.96 
Wishful thinking did creep into the thinking of all wartime leaders as neither had a detailed 
plan, nor often the physical or psychological strength to fight a war of attrition after 1945. 
Cooperation was a much more likable and potentially profitable option. Stalin’s intentions, 
it seems, were to work within the alliance already present.97 One argument is that the 
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interest in spheres of influence was exactly what Stalin thought would be workable: if each 
power had its own sphere there would be less conflict.98 
 
 
Relations with the USA during the early post-war years were difficult. The wartime 
military and intelligence alliance did not translate easily into a political and economic 
peacetime alliance and the British desire to institutionalise the alliance with the USA 
proved difficult.99 The ‘special relationship’, much debated since then, was essentially a 
tool, as Reynolds has argued.100 Attlee, not surprisingly, complained that ‘there is a 
tendency in America to regard us as an outpost of America.’101 Britain had to prove its 
worth and the price Britain paid for American support was to help with the ‘defence of the 
free world.’102 Even though Britain and America had been and still were economic rivals, 
there was no alternative to this alliance; Churchill, for example, never doubted the 
correctness of this choice.103 ‘Too great an independence of the USA would be a dangerous 
luxury’, Adamthwaite quoted in his article along the same lines.104 Britain needed the 
cooperation of the American government in the Middle East, Germany and over the 
Atomic Bomb, in its fight against the expansion of Communism, for the retention of its 
world role, and, most importantly, it needed American loans.105 Others, however, continue 
to argue that Britain’s independence from the United States was what would guarantee a 
Great Power role for Britain.106 The USA was certainly equally aware that it could not 
pursue a foreign policy completely independently of Britain. Not to be seen by others to 
treat Britain in a preferential way, the Anglo-American relationship was portrayed as part 
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of a broader Western alliance not a close bilateral relationship.107 Real independence from 
the USA and the pursuit of a fully independent foreign policy nevertheless proved 
unrealistic. Britain certainly understood the mechanism of dependence and the implications 
of economic diplomacy for foreign affairs. 
 
 
Britain’s problematic relationship with the United States is important in explaining British 
post-war foreign policy choices. The perhaps inevitable rise of American power had direct 
influences within the British foreign policy establishment. As Erik Goldstein has pointed 
out, American policy discussions, plans and methods could not be ignored.108 Although 
sharing a common set of ideas, liberal capitalism, democracy etc, the continued hesitation 
to take on more responsibility until 1947 when isolationist ideas still loomed large and 
British adherence to the concept of imperial power proved difficult to reconcile. British 
and American aims were similar but not identical.109 American commitments after 1945 it 
is argued were reactive rather than a conscious attempt to take the lead in world affairs 
although it was obvious that the status of the USA had increased immeasurably.110 
American preponderant power was, according to Greenwood, initially used ‘by proxy’ 
through its relations with other countries.111  
 
 
Once, however, Truman took note of the fact that the international situation really had 
moved in his favour, he, believing in the greatness of the American system, went to build 
up American influence.112 The United States thus found itself in a position where it had to 
take responsibility, even if initially only economically, if some form of international 
stability was to be re-established.113 The USA like the Soviet Union strove to consolidate 
its half of the planet.114 The Marshall Plan therefore, cornerstone of many interpretations of 
the early Cold War, remains of interest to historians today.115 Some see it as an inspired 
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partnership between the USA and Europe while others have argued that it was designed to 
‘foster American influence and power.’116 Economic motivations, though important, were 
secondary to political ones: the threat of an expansion of Communist influence in a war 
ravaged Europe was a gamble that the USA was not prepared to take. Britain necessarily 
had to pay more attention to what the State Department was saying and doing but by the 
same token did not want to be dragged into the conflict arising between the USA and the 
Soviet Union.117 Through taking advantage of the rising American fear of Communism, 
once the State Department had finalised its policy aims and methods, for example, 
containment, Bevin was as Greenwood has eloquently argued ‘shackled to Washington’s 
golden chariot’.118 
 
 
While Britain undoubtedly courted and benefited from a closer transatlantic connection, it 
came at a price, as discussed above; although Britain’s bases, military and economic 
potential made it an obvious ally anyway.119 The British attempt within this emerging 
alliance to steer the State Department towards policies more in line with British thinking 
was a mixed success. Ovendale quoted from official documents in his book which stated 
that ‘Britain [had to] exert sufficient control over the policy of the well-intentioned but 
inexperienced colossus on whose cooperation our safety depends.’120 While Roosevelt had 
been happy to follow more internationalist policies with the creation of a collective 
security organisation after the war, Britain emphasised its traditional policy of balance of 
power.121 The American wish for Britain to take a more active and leading role in Europe 
towards a European Union was vetoed by the Foreign Office as a threat to the British 
Empire and her national sovereignty.122 
 
 
Britain’s relationship with the Soviet Union was even more difficult and ambiguous. 
Chances for closer cooperation between the wars had been missed, cementing the distrust 
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of the Kremlin towards the West.123 Pro-Soviet opinion among British policy makers and 
the public in general, a necessity during the war, made a quick reversal of policies in the 
face of increased Soviet recalcitrance difficult. There was no concert of powers but only  
two superpowers, one of which adhered to a strict if occasionally flexible ideology which 
advocated conflict with the Capitalist world. Both countries, Britain and the Soviet Union, 
Martin Folly has noted, were, however, adherent to pragmatism and realism, and both 
understood the importance of strength in international diplomacy.124 
 
 
British relations with the Soviet Union under Stalin were fraught with problems. The need 
to maintain cordial relations with the Kremlin, a Post Hostilities Planning Staff (PHPS) 
paper argued during the war, was essential in the containment of Germany after the allied 
victory.125 Despite the experience of working closely with their Soviet counterparts, a real 
and potentially lasting basis of trust which would enable continued cooperation after the 
war was never established during the war. Churchill, like Stalin, recognised the importance 
of strength in international relations. He was a realist, occasionally given to flights of 
fancy, whose efforts for a better understanding with Stalin, according to David Carlton, 
were pretence; a claim vigorously disputed by Reynolds and Max Hastings.126 The British 
government during and after the war simply may not have had a choice: Erik Hoffmann 
has argued that one of the enduring targets of Soviet foreign policy was the principal 
power in Europe which by 1945 after the defeat of Germany was Britain.127 After the war, 
F.S. Northedge has noted in a revisionist argument, the new Labour government 
immediately moved away from cooperation with the Soviet Union.128 This notion, after 
careful study of the available evidence, cannot really be sustained today. 
 
 
Stalin, Zubok has contended, was a realist who was well prepared to ‘squeeze as much out 
of his temporary capitalist partners as possible.’129 An active desire to play off his former 
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allies against each other was another way to create more opportunities for his foreign 
policy, and here he only followed Roosevelt’s precedent who had sought closer relations 
with Stalin by occasionally trampling on Churchill.130 Frank Roberts argued in 1945 that if 
Britain was firm with the Kremlin, there was no essential conflict between the two 
countries. Later, of course, he became much more pessimistic as to the outcome of the 
deteriorating international relations.131 The general debate argues that either Stalin was 
most interested in territorial integrity, national security and the consolidation of gains 
already made, or that he was actively seeking further expansion while exporting his 
revolutionary ideology abroad.132 In the end his faith in the accuracy of Communist 
ideology did not achieve what he desired.133  
 
 
That he created and further enhanced already existing tension cannot, I think, be denied, 
however, he just like Roosevelt/Truman and Churchill/Attlee had to take those decisions 
he thought best in the interest of his country. Stalin, Roberts noted, was interested in 
peaceful coexistence but could not realise his aims through the available methods of the 
Cold War, although, as Taubman has argued, cooperation had proven beneficial for him.134 
Stalin was doggedly determined not to loosen his grip on Eastern Europe. He thus mirrored 
the concept of containment spreading through Western foreign policy at a time when he 
was still on the defensive.135 It was difficult, Antonio Varsori has argued, for all to 
understand the complexities of the new world emerging in Eastern Europe.136 By the early 
1950s with several conflicts still raging, Soviet foreign policy started to pursue a more 
stabilising policy within the Cold War.137 
 
 
Neither side wanted war nor actively pursued it. But tensions undoubtedly continued to 
rise. Stalin was at a loss of how to change Soviet policies to suit himself and to suit his 
former allies at the same time. The fewer countries at the end of a war were in a position to 
impose their views, the greater the impact and the longer the time until a final settlement, 
                                                 
130
 W. Taubman, Stalin’s Foreign Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (W.W. Norton, London, 
1982), p. 83. 
131
 Ross, ‘Foreign Office Attitudes’, p. 534. 
132
 Leffler has argued that Stalin acted defensively, Preponderance, p. 186; Kennedy-Pipe noted that Stalin 
pursued both expansionist and cooperative policies, Russia and the World, p. 81. 
133
 Gaddis, The Cold War, p. 34. 
134
 G. Roberts ‘Stalin and Foreign Policy’ in M. Leffler & D.S. Painter (eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An 
International History (Routledge, London, 2005), pp. 42-58; Taubman, Stalin’s Foreign Policy, p. 128. 
135
 Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World, p. 102; Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, p. 40. 
136
 A. Varsori & E. Calandri (eds.), The Failure of Peace in Europe (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002), p. 8. 
137
 Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics, p. 35. 
 40 
in this case two blocs in the Cold War, was reached. That the Soviet Union immediately 
after the war was the only Communist state in existence made this situation more difficult. 
With the emergence of other Communist states and subsequent splits between them, the 
international influence of the Kremlin evened out somewhat. As discussed above, the 
adherence to the concept of military strength as a key determinant of the impact of a 
country’s foreign policy drove the Kremlin, just like the State Department and the Foreign 
Office, to emphasise the defence parameters in their foreign policies rather than those ideas 
with facilitated cooperation, like trade.138  
 
 
Soviet foreign policy achieved a lot despite all the odds but, of course, this is precisely 
what partially aggravated and continued the Cold War.139 ‘Stalin’s political strategy’, 
Donaldson and Nogee noted, ‘combined opportunistic probing with caution about 
provoking a military reaction.’140 The ensuing ‘policy of tightfistedness and hard 
bargaining with the Russians’ made negotiations even more difficult.141 That, after years of 
trying to find some accommodation with the Soviet Union, the Foreign Office by 1947/48 
had shifted its emphasis towards a more confrontational outlook, was not surprising.142 
Over two and a half years as the Foreign Ministers of the erstwhile allies negotiated, the 
situation had been deteriorating. Robert Manne has written that Britain sacrificed its 
relations with the Soviet Union over its unwillingness to settle the German question more 
in the Kremlin’s favour; Deighton agrees, adding that the settling of the German question 
meant the abandonment of East Germany in favour of concentration on the West.143  
 
 
That Stalin used the worsening Cold War partly as a reason to force through more policies 
on social control in the Soviet Union has convincingly been demonstrated by Elena 
Zubkova.144 Only by 1948 when consolidation in the East had proceeded faster than 
possibly anticipated did Western governments attempt to initiate a policy of ‘roll-back’ in 
                                                 
138
 V. Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Little, Brown, Boston, 1971), p. 11. 
139
 Aspaturian, Process and Power, pp. 87ff. 
140
 J. Nogee & R. Donaldson,  The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests (M.E. 
Sharpe, London, 1998), p. 75; C. Keeble, Britain and the Soviet Union 1917-1989 (Macmillan, London, 
1990), p. 209. 
141
  Smith, Sharing Secrets with Stalin, p.  251. 
142
 Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, pp. 284ff. 
143
 Manne, ‘The Foreign Office’, p. 748; Deighton, ‘Towards a Western Strategy’, p. 69. 
144
 E. Zubkova, Russia after the war: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957 (ME Sharpe, 
London, 1998). 
 41 
order to liberate the Eastern satellites.145 As much as a settlement was desired by both 
sides, the emerging structures in both East and West restricted their governments’ ability to 
offer incentives substantial enough to maintain cordial relations between the Allies and to 
negotiate arguments. By 1951 as Lord Strang has noted, there was no alternative to closer 
Anglo-American relations.146 While the role of ideology in the East had been recognised, 
the new demand for, and emergence of, a set of coherent ideas in the West in Containment 
created a similar vocabulary of superiority, strength and conflict. The primacy of foreign 
policy had created new circumstances and thus demanded new solutions. 
 
 
The failure, during the war, to agree a peace settlement, particularly for Germany and the 
Balkan states, proved a turning point.147 Geoffrey Roberts noted that ‘neutralising the 
German threat’, which had been one of Soviet foreign policies most important issues, ‘was 
a goal whose achievement was worth a high price’, although, as Greenwood made clear, 
Germany still provided the common denominator between Britain and the Soviet Union.148 
Thereafter military realities, for example the presence of occupation forces, provided the 
lever to hold out during negotiations for better settlements. Not surprisingly, in 1945 with 
the Red Army occupying most of Central and Eastern Europe, the Foreign Office wanted 
to keep some cooperation with the Kremlin going; the old idea of spheres of influence, 
discussed between Churchill and Stalin in October 1944, was a concept that would survive 
the end of the war.149 Whatever may have been said in private, Realpolitik stipulated that 
Britain kept up its diplomacy with the Soviet Union. Churchill, a fan of summit diplomacy, 
trusted Stalin to at least get things done. As the commitment of America to Europe was 
still uncertain, the Foreign Office was interested in maintaining good relations with the 
Kremlin just like the Soviet Union was interested in maintaining good relations with her 
former allies.150 What Stalin did not realise, Gaddis argued, was that the change situation at 
the end of the war in return changed the possibilities and opportunities for Soviet foreign 
policy.151 
 
 
                                                 
145
 B. Heuser, ‘Covert Action within British and American Concepts of Containment, 1948-1951’ in Aldrich, 
British Intelligence, pp. 65-84.     
146
 Lord Strang quoted in Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, p. 92. 
147
 Varsori & Calandri, The Failure of Peace, p. 84. 
148
 Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics, p.38; Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, p. 20. 
149
 Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, pp. 237ff. 
150
 Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, p. 277; Gaddis, The Cold War, p. 12. 
151
 Gaddis, The Cold War, p. 14. 
 42 
The concept of Soviet Communism was difficult to grasp completely. Even now the 
arguments still rage over the question why such a system managed to survive for so long 
and why it exercised so much influence over international relations. It may have been 
single-minded determination and ruthless will: ‘In Russia’, John Gooding noted, ‘the 
Socialist regime would itself create the conditions necessary for socialism rather then be 
created by them.’152 Ideology, as well as other factors was vital in understanding Soviet 
foreign and domestic policy.153 Stalin’s claim to leadership, initially not uncontested, 
lacked the sharp intellectualism of Lenin, and while Lenin favoured discussion, Stalin used 
trials and purges to consolidate his hold on the top of the party. ‘Soviet leaders paraded as 
democrats while strengthening tyranny’, Robert Service noted in Comrades: Communism – 
A World History.154 Robert Conquest has argued with regards to Stalinism that ‘the 
Westerner has a certain blockage against the real mental degradation of evil.’155 While the 
evidence of this was noticed by foreign observers, they found it difficult to make sense of 
it. ‘Kremlinology’ became a widespread but not wholly persuasive science. Even 
weathered specialists could not argue their cases convincingly without much better 
information than that available.156 Possibly that reason, the lack of enough and accurate 
information, led to a much closer focus on Soviet foreign policy in order to understand the 
political system behind it through its external relations than might otherwise have been the 
case. The portrayal of strength outward while denying information about the actual 
situation inside, led to a severe over-estimation of Soviet strength and was thus a factor in 
public anxiety and the severe American responses to Soviet foreign political muscle-
flexing.157  
 
 
Hoffmann has helpfully listed the foreign policy aims of Britain, the USA and the Soviet 
Union to see if and where they overlap.158 According to him they did not. Britain and the 
USA were interested in Western Europe, the UNO and the Far East (the order of priorities 
differed) and Britain, of course, still paid much attention to its empire. The Soviet Union, 
by comparison, was most interested in national security, control, reconstruction and 
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territory. International cooperation and security did not rank at all. Any threat to his 
perceived needs required a quick retaliation from Stalin, a man who understood power 
politics possibly better than anyone else. His new empire, Vojtech Mastny noted, proved 
both ‘his triumph and his nemesis.’ On the road to the Cold War, he concluded, ‘Stalin was 
both a victim and an accomplice.’ 159 
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Part Two.  Cooperation and Opportunism, 1945 to 1947 
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Rather than focus on specific issues, like the Peace Campaign or Western European 
Defence which later emerged as important topics, the Foreign Office and the Northern 
Department after 1945 made a serious effort to ‘take stock’. Britain’s position vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent the USA, and the foreign policy options now open to 
the British government were discussed at length to pinpoint the best options available and 
develop suitable foreign policy strategies.  
 
 
After the upheavals of the war years the Foreign Office needed some time to settle back 
into the peacetime routine of information analysis and policy proposals. While initially 
reports sent in from abroad and discussion of them and other relevant material were the 
main means of debate, staff soon started to wrote papers detailing the available information 
and state of discussion on very specific issues. By the later 1940s their briefs were the 
main means of conveying complex information quickly and succinctly. Once the Moscow 
embassy had re-organised itself to work within peacetime parameters, closer attention paid 
again to the Soviet press which, for example, yielded large amounts of information for use 
in London. A Joint Press Reading Service between the British and the American embassies 
in Moscow spread this very time-intensive work over several staff and thus made 
important information available much quicker than it had previously been. The Northern 
Department during these years focused on the material that was readily available to build a 
picture of the Soviet Union and its interests abroad to gage possible short and longer term 
objectives, and then pointed out opportunities for negotiation and realistic foreign policies. 
 
 
The first part consists of three chapters. Chapter One will introduce the department and the 
most important officials while Chapter Two explains some of the most important aspects 
of Soviet domestic and foreign trends during these years to provide some background to 
the major Soviet foreign policies. Chapter Three looks at the discussion and formation of 
British foreign policy.  
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Chapter One: Institutions and personnel: The FO, the ND, and the Moscow 
Embassy, 1945-1947 
 
 
This country could not again be used as an outpost to save other countries. 
                             Notes of a conversation between Bevin and Zarubin, 27.1.1947160 
 
 
The Foreign Office and the Northern Department 
To protect Britain from bullying by the Kremlin, or the State Department, and to maintain 
and enhance her ability to negotiate effectively, the Northern Department had to provide 
the best possible policy advice that had to be based on accurate and up to date information. 
Britain, as Bevin made clear to the Soviet ambassador, could not again find itself in a 
situation where it fought a powerful enemy almost alone. Having come through the war by 
the skin of her teeth and now having to face up to a vastly changed, and not yet fully 
comprehended, balance of political and economic power in the world, Britain could not but 
explore every avenue that could lead to an accommodation with Moscow. Initially this 
seemed the cheapest option of bridging the time until Britain had evaluated her choices 
more fully and had a chance to allow for a frank and realistic discussion of possible foreign 
policies in the immediate future. The most important person in this quest was undoubtedly 
the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office understood his importance to 
herself and her future role in the formation of British foreign policy. 
 
 
For the Foreign Office to once again occupy the centre of foreign policy decision making 
after 1945 required a Foreign Secretary who was confident vis-à-vis the Prime Minister 
and who understood and valued his staff. Ernest Bevin had the full confidence of Clement 
Attlee, the Prime Minister until 1951.161 His relationship with the Prime Minister was close 
and trusting, and allowed for frank discussion as well as a significant level of autonomy in 
the day-to-day running of the Foreign Office. During the war the situation had been 
markedly different as Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill’s relationship was fraught 
with difficulties. So much so that by the end of the war officials in the Foreign Office were 
                                                 
160
 FO371/66362-8109. 
161
 Although they too had their differences, Steiner, ‘The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’, p. 15; 
Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, p. 228; Smith, ‘A Climate of Opinion’, p. 634; Adamthwaite, ‘Britain 
and the World’, p. 225. 
 47 
used to backing their Foreign Secretary against the Prime Minister.162 Aware of all the 
information available at the time and worried about the repercussions of potentially wrong 
decisions on the part of the Prime Minister, they consistently supported their Foreign 
Secretary.163 Once Winston Churchill was re-elected Prime Minister in October 1951 after 
the Conservative election victory and Anthony Eden again became Foreign Secretary the 
relationship between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary became difficult again once 
more. In 1945 the Foreign Office knew that Bevin was its direct route to the Cabinet and 
Prime Minister, and thus to the implementation of the policies they regarded as in Britain’s 
best interest. They knew that he had to be persuaded first. Policy advice given therefore 
had to be persuasive, realistic and implementable.  
 
 
Bevin, although appearing only on the fringes of this thesis, occupied a central place in 
Foreign Office structure and thinking. Major decisions were taken by him and only him, 
and therefore his views had to be taken into account when presenting information. His 
relationship with senior staff and his ability to direct their work was crucial to the fast and 
efficient work of the Office. Bevin, who inherited the post of Foreign Secretary from 
Anthony Eden after the Conservative defeat in the general election in July 1945, was 
central to British foreign policy between 1945 and his rather forced resignation due to 
severe illness in March 1951. As much as traditional historians may have glorified him and 
revisionist historians possibly argued too critical a case, he was central to ideas of Britain’s 
place in the new post-war world and inspired fierce loyalty among those who worked with 
him.164  
 
 
Uneducated in a conventional sense, Bevin had nevertheless acquired considerable skills 
before and during the war that were to aid him after it. A man of much common sense and 
a lot of pragmatism, particularly in his dealings with the Soviet Union, he may well have 
been the rock that the Office needed after the upheavals of the pre-war and wartime period. 
Many, though not blind to his weaknesses, were impressed by his undoubted abilities. 
William Strang, who became Permanent Under-Secretary in 1949, recalled much later that 
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‘his knowledge of that world [Bevin, according to Strang, saw the world as a complete 
whole], in its essential aspects, was profound.’165 John Connell, in The Office pointed out 
the difficult international situation Bevin was confronted with, noting that ‘the scope and 
the gravity of the decisions which he had to take, and of the negotiations in which he had 
to take part were without parallel in British history.’166 David Reynolds has described him 
along similar lines as ‘almost Churchillian in his attitudes.’167 
 
 
Frank Roberts, who served him most closely as a Principal Private Secretary after Pierson 
Dixon had been appointed ambassador to Prague, noted that ‘he was a man of vision’ with 
the ‘memory of an elephant.’ To him, writing in 1991, Bevin simply was ‘a great 
Englishman, warts and all, worthy to stand comparison in his own day with Churchill or in 
the past with such figures as Oliver Cromwell or Palmerston.’168 Even though rose-tinted 
glasses may be obvious in Roberts’ comment, he does make the important point that Bevin 
was as important for Britain after 1945 as Churchill had been before it. Others disagree, of 
course. Zara Steiner wrote that Bevin by 1947 displayed ‘increasingly rigid and 
ideologically based anti-Soviet attitudes.’169 Victor Rothwell also noted Bevin’s hostility 
towards the Soviet Union.170 No doubt that Bevin’s anti-Soviet stance needs more research 
while the literature on British foreign policy and Anglo-Soviet relations, although 
extensive already, would nevertheless benefit from a closer examination of the role that 
ideology played for senior British foreign policy makers after 1945.  
 
 
Although Bevin at times required a lot of persuading, when he finally had been convinced 
of the benefits of a particular policy he stood firmly behind it.171 Great policy shifts, such 
as the start of a more aggressive propaganda policy countering Communist propaganda in 
1948 (which will be more closely discussed in Chapter Eight), had to be based on firm 
evidence and workable strategies and tactics as such policies were difficult to reverse. He 
thus took his time and then occasionally, as Raymond Smith has argued, ‘became trapped 
by the momentum of this official policy.’172 To institute said propaganda initiative the 
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setting up of a more specialised committee or department had been discussed but, as 
Christopher Mayhew, Parliamentary Under-Secretary between 1947 and 1950, recalled, 
‘Bevin was not persuaded’ minuting that ‘I am not enthusiastic for more machinery.’173 
Bevin here had, of course, a point. Machinery does not necessarily mean a more organised 
discussion or execution of a strategy. However, in the absence of a department that 
oversaw short and long-term policy proposals it was necessary to find an effective way of 
keeping all strands of policy proposals together; the establishment of the Permanent Under-
Secretaries Department in 1949 was an attempt to resolve this problem. Some historians, 
nevertheless argue that the Office was too slow to adapt to new times and a diminished 
British world role.174   
 
 
The Permanent Under-Secretary was the Foreign Secretary’s chief adviser, occasionally 
even receiving foreign ambassadors on his behalf. Usually appointed by the Foreign 
Secretary he was the head and most senior official in the Foreign Office, and thus 
responsible for the whole organisation. He was most likely someone who had had a 
distinguished career in the Foreign Service and this was sometimes the last assignment 
before retirement. Permanent Under-Secretaries, like other senior officials, were, as 
Gaynor Johnson has rightly pointed out, incredibly important for a sense of continuity 
within the Office; people who knew how the system worked and how it ought to be 
organised. Arguing along the same lines, Zara Steiner noted that Foreign Office ministers, 
acted like a ‘departmental memory bank.’175  
 
 
Sir Alexander George Montagu Cadogan had been ambassador in Peking before taking up 
his post as Permanent Under-Secretary in January 1938 and thus served through the 
difficult pre-war and war years.  He was, as Otte and Neilson contend, ‘an invaluable 
advisor’ to the Foreign Secretary.176 Sir Orme Garton Sargent, who was appointed to the 
post in February 1946 had been Deputy Under-Secretary for nearly seven years prior to his 
appointment and led the Foreign Office during the challenging post-war years until 
February 1949. He, among others, as McKercher has pointed out, was at the ‘heart of 
professionalism in British Foreign Policy’; well deserved and rather rare praise for a senior 
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civil servant.177 Saville, extremely critical, has described him as ‘prejudiced, narrow-
minded and politically illiterate.’178 His successor, William Strang served until 1953. 
Strang was the only senior official who, between 1930 and 1933, had served in Moscow.179 
All were career civil servants who had previously worked in a variety of posts in the 
Foreign Office in London and abroad. They had a good relationship with the Foreign 
Secretary and proved indispensable to him, keeping him informed about developments as 
well as implementing reforms and new policies. 
 
 
The   Permanent Under-Secretary was supported on a senior level by three Deputy Under-
Secretaries who supervised eight Assistant Under-Secretaries (these numbers occasionally 
varied). Each of them, Deputy and Assistant Under-Secretaries, supervised several 
departments, as superintending Under-Secretaries, and, on the basis of instructions from 
the Foreign Secretary, worked out policy guidelines and recommended courses of action. 
One example was Oliver Harvey, who, having been private secretary to Eden, became 
Assistant Under-Secretary in 1943 before being promoted to Deputy Under-Secretary in 
1946. He worked in this post until 1948 when he was sent as ambassador to France. As in 
any big institution, there was always the chance to move vertically as well as horizontally, 
depending on expertise and experience. Supervising several departments was as 
challenging as it was interesting. In 1945, for example, Oliver Harvey headed the Western 
Department, dealing among others with Belgium, France, Italy and Europe General, and 
the German Department. In the same year Alexander Cadogan, then Permanent Under-
Secretary, was in charge of the News and the Services Liaison Departments which in the 
early post-war years were usually under the supervision of the Permanent Under-Secretary.  
 
 
The superintending Under-Secretaries, as the most senior officials working in the Foreign 
Office, supervised the departments. Their workload was often extremely heavy. For 
example, in 1946 and 1947 Christopher Frederick Ashton Warner supervised the Northern 
and the Southern Department in his capacity as Assistant Under-Secretary. In 1948 he 
became superintending Under-Secretary of the American Information Department, the 
Cultural Relations Department, the Western European Information Department, the 
Eastern European Information Department, the Latin American Information Department, 
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the Far Eastern Information Department, the Information Policy Department and the 
Middle Eastern Information Department. Although unlikely to be aware of all the details of 
information passing through these departments, he would have read most if not all major 
papers leaving the department and would have taken part of the major policy debates 
within his departments. Such broad expertise also helped to put Soviet foreign policy into 
perspective and to identify likely sources of disagreements early on.  
 
 
Sargent was the superintending Under-Secretary of the Northern Department until 1946 
when he was  succeeded by Christopher Warner who, as head of the department since 
1942, knew its staff and work very well. When Sargent became Permanent Under-
Secretary in 1946 Warner, not surprisingly, was promoted to Assistant Under-Secretary 
and succeeded him in this capacity as superintending Under-Secretary of the Northern 
Department where he remained for the next two years. Warner was followed in his post in 
1948 by Charles Harold Bateman who took over until 1950 and who, in turn, was followed 
by the Oxford educated and experienced Andrew Napier Noble. Last but not least, Paul 
Mason, born in 1904 and educated at Cambridge, succeeded Noble in 1952 after becoming 
Assistant Under-Secretary in the same year.   
 
 
These men were the most senior officials, apart from the Permanent Under-Secretary 
himself, whom staff in the Northern Department dealt with on a regular and often daily 
basis. Far from being Office ‘creatures’ they had served abroad and acquired an extensive 
knowledge of international affairs, (although none had worked in the British Embassy in 
Moscow) and of the workings of the Office and Whitehall. Their occasional demanding 
treatment towards their staff reflected this experience and the reality of the foreign policy 
formation process. They were advisers as well as gatekeepers of information, and their 
guidance and expertise was crucial to the work of the department. All important papers and 
memoranda would go through their hands before being passed on to the Foreign Secretary, 
the Cabinet or Parliament. They often commented on issues they thought were not clear or 
which had to be re-thought. It was their responsibility to ensure that the papers eventually 
arriving at Bevin’s desk were well-written, accurate, realistic and had taken all important 
issues connected to a particular topic into account. For this reason, many papers were re-
written several times to ensure that only those of the highest quality reached the Foreign 
Secretary. 
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Under the superintending Under-Secretary worked the Head of the department who had 
everyday supervisory duties for the department’s staff. He was the first port of call for 
questions and would read anything that was to go higher up the seniority chain in the 
office. Warner, already mentioned above, had provided continuity during the war since 
1942 and was succeeded by Robin Maurice Alers Hankey in February 1946 who remained 
Head of the Northern Department until 1949. In November 1949 he was appointed chargé 
d’affaires in Madrid and left London. Geoffrey Harrison, a few years younger then 
Hankey, took up the post of Head of department having served in Tokyo, Berlin and 
Brussels. Experience abroad was of vital importance when assessing information, and the 
Foreign Office was well aware that such expertise was needed in order to avoid any form 
of tunnel vision which could easily develop when one was stationed exclusively in 
London. Henry Arthur Frederick Hohler, the Head between 1952 and 1953, came from a 
slightly different background. Born in 1911 he attended Eton before studying at the Royal 
Military College in Camberley.   
 
 
Service in Moscow was very important for a better understanding of the Soviet Union and 
its domestic and foreign policies. Some of the staff in the Department, in particular junior 
officials like Thomas Brimelow, Joseph Dobbs and Hugh Morgan would or had at one 
time spent time in Moscow and had therefore gained first hand experience not only of the 
country and its leaders but also of the problems of working there. Living in the country 
revealed more about it than any book in the admittedly extensive Foreign Office library 
ever could do. This  library held, and still holds, an extensive collection of books dealing 
with any aspect of foreign countries deemed important for the formulation of British 
foreign policy. Thousands of volumes were at hand to enhance the knowledge of those 
appointed to a particular post or department. Several times in the documents staff referred 
to the library as their first port of call in order to read up on all aspects of Soviet history, 
foreign policy and ideology, in particular.  
 
 
The Northern Department Soviet desk was a very demanding post and many who worked 
here later went on to have great Foreign Office careers. The Northern Department’s junior 
staff, constituting the centre of this thesis, also deserve an introduction. Among the first to 
feature prominently in the documents examined for this thesis is Thomas Brimelow. Born 
in 1915, and thus one of the younger officials in the department, he joined the Foreign 
Service in 1938 as the best in the Civil Service examination that year. Intelligent and 
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resourceful he served, among other places, in Riga in 1939 and in Moscow between 1942 
and 1945. The historian John Zametica argued that ‘he was perhaps the only person in the 
entire Foreign Office who could plausibly be described as a Russian expert.180 Although 
his tough line vis-à-vis the Kremlin has been criticised by some historians, his outlook was 
actually much more nuanced.181 He certainly never argued a case without backing it up 
with detailed evidence.  
 
 
Other junior officials equally made their mark on the work of the department. Although not 
all could be found in the Foreign Office List or the Dictionary of National Biography the 
details of several of them are available. John Galsworthy worked at the Soviet desk of the 
Northern Department in 1945 and 1946. Thomas Brimelow, already mentioned above, 
joined the Department after his return from Moscow in June 1945 and stayed until 1948 
when he was sent to Havana; it was a general procedure of the Foreign Office to rotate 
staff to broaden their knowledge and expertise. Brimelow returned in 1951 to take over the 
newly formed Russian Secretariat at the British Embassy in Moscow until 1954. He was an 
outstanding Soviet specialist who contributed hugely to the Department’s expertise. John 
Pumphrey, after three years in the Foreign Office, was posted to the Department in 1946 
where he stayed for a year and thus worked with both Galsworthy and Brimelow during 
the difficult early post-war years. A. E. Lambert, after fourteen years of Foreign Office 
experience, started in the Department in 1947 and remaining there until 1949. His 
experience in the Near East prior to this post, was undoubtedly an advantage to the 
Department during the early post-war crises in Turkey and Iran. Starting just after 
Lambert’s arrival C. R. A. Rae, Eton and Cambridge educated, had entered the Foreign 
Office in 1947 and, although the Foreign Office List unfortunately does not provide exact 
dates, likely joined the Northern Department as his first post.  
 
 
The personnel changes in 1951 as apparent in the Foreign Office List show that there was a 
significant change with no continuing service for any member of staff who had worked 
there prior to 1951. The reason is not clear but may well have been a result of regular 
rotation of staff. One important improvement was notable though: the Soviet desk now had 
four instead of the previous three staff, in 1953 there were even six staff. While most of 
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them are elusive two can be introduced in more detail. Hugh Travers Morgan, had served 
in Moscow between May 1948 and May 1950. He joined the department in 1951, where he 
remained until 1953, and provided much needed first hand experience of the Soviet Union 
during a time of increasing political Cold-warfare worldwide. Equally, Joseph Alfred 
Dobbs joined the Department in 1953 with extensive experience of the Soviet Union. He 
had served in Moscow from 1949 until 1951 and had been appointed Head of the Russian 
Secretariat at the British Embassy in Moscow in October 1950. 
 
 
The skill of these officials to assess the most important and pressing points first, to distil 
large amounts of data into memoranda often only a few pages long and to write clearly for 
an audience that often was not necessarily intimately familiar with the intricacies of Soviet 
ideology, Soviet history or the Soviet bureaucracy and governmental system greatly 
enhanced understating of the Soviet Union. Their care in accumulating the knowledge to 
give precise and accurate summaries and policy proposals were hugely important in 
allowing the Permanent Under-Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and Cabinet to decide the 
best options for British foreign policy initiatives. Their importance in providing a mostly 
realistic, pragmatic and implementable foreign policy, should not, as this thesis will show, 
be underestimated.  
 
 
The flow of information within the Department and the Foreign Office in general during 
this period appears, as far as can be seen from the sources, flexible and well organised. 
Staff commented on the most important or pressing points and passed the file to their head 
of department who would, in turn, send it on to his superiors. All would minute their ideas 
and arguments on sheets attached to the original telegram or memorandum and it is thus 
possible to follow the argument from bottom to top. Increasingly, after 1945 information 
which demanded a specific expertise was sent for further comment to the Foreign Office 
Research Department (FORD), the Economic Intelligence Department (EID) or to the Joint 
Intelligence Bureau (JIB) which collated intelligence gathered through military channels 
and reported to the Chiefs of Staff (COS) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). Once 
all relevant staff or departments had commented on a particular telegram or memorandum, 
a summary was written or a separate memorandum was requested to link this information 
with other facts or policy ideas. These memoranda, usually written for the Russia 
Committee, the Foreign Secretary or British delegations to Conferences etc, often included 
detailed policy proposals or suggested methods of dealing with a particular issue. One 
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piece of information, therefore, may well travel up and down the Foreign Office hierarchy 
gaining volume in the process.  
 
 
To deal more efficiently with the increase in information and the changed international 
scene after 1945, several committees were set up in the Foreign Office. Important and best 
known in the historiography was the Russia Committee.182 Set up after advice from both 
Warner and Frank Roberts, it first met on April 2nd, 1946. Although the Northern 
Department was not in charge of the Russia Committee, it played a central role in it thanks 
to its expertise of Soviet affairs. The Russia Committee assessed information relevant to 
the Soviet Union and its worldwide policies, requested specific reports and debated policy 
options and methods. The initial members consisted of all the Assistant and Deputy Under-
Secretaries. Over the years this membership grew in accord with changes in policy and the 
demands of policy implementation, and included representatives from the BBC, the 
Services, the Treasury and later the Permanent Under-Secretaries Department and the 
Information Research Department (IRD). The IRD itself was established in late 1947 to 
organise and co-ordinate the recently agreed policy of a ‘defensive-offensive’ propaganda 
campaign against the ever increasing worldwide Communist propaganda campaign which 
is discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
 
 
While this represented a large pool of expertise, the task for officials participating in the 
meetings of the Russia Committee was far from easy. Multiple Soviet policy initiatives 
across multiple fronts following various strategies and using varying tactics required a 
different sort of expertise. Here, the Northern Department in conjunction with Foreign 
Office Research Department (FORD) undoubtedly made a difference. Staff at the Soviet 
desk provided detailed memoranda on a large number of topics to aid discussion and to lay 
out the choices available. Ideology, for example, and the state of Soviet industry and armed 
forces became focal points for the assessment of the country as a potential military 
adversary, in particular after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Information 
about the continuing weakness of the Soviet economy provided the background for the 
discussion of using economic pressure as a ‘hard’ policy option in negotiations with the 
Soviet Union. Ideology, on the other hand, opened up the ‘softer’ option of cultural 
warfare within the ongoing propaganda battle. The Cultural Relations Department, which 
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kept an eye on international organisations and intervened covertly if required, was by then 
already up and running.183  
 
 
The Moscow Embassy 
In 1954 William Hayter raised the question whether, considering the virtual isolation of the 
embassy, expense issues and the never-ending harassment of staff, Britain should maintain 
its embassy in Moscow.184 Many years later Rodrick Braithwaite, ambassador to the Soviet 
Union in the 1990s, raised the same point arguing that the embassy really did not do 
much.185 These were not the first times the issue was raised. During the severe harassment 
of foreign embassies in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s this point was discussed several 
times. The Chiefs of Staff, however, always maintained that eyes and ears on the ground 
would be invaluable in case of a future military conflict. Information, all recognised, was 
key to any strategy, tactic and approach to foreign policy initiatives. As Donald Bishop 
wrote in The Administration of British Foreign Relations ‘the Foreign Office cannot rise 
above the level of information provided to is, and the diplomat cannot rise above the level 
of the policy instructions sent to him from London.’186 Lord Strang agreed.187  
 
 
The Foreign Office in London was politically impotent without accurate information given 
to it by its missions abroad. These were the institutions that would at times provide the 
impetus for a new policy or strategy towards a particular country. Primary information 
about Soviet domestic and foreign affairs came nearly exclusively from the embassy in 
Moscow. Although work and life in the Soviet Union was very difficult for those who were 
posted there, their work was incredibly important for their colleagues in London. First 
hand information, bits of conversations overheard or things seen in shops, changes in the 
presence of military or security forces around the capital or the personal appearance of 
Soviet leaders were important information that could not be gained from out-with the 
country.188 Staff soon acquired substantial experience of extracting useful information 
from scarce sources but their task was nevertheless very difficult. One embassy, including 
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a military mission, reported on a country many times the size of Britain. Working 
conditions were difficult and required patience and perseverance: David Kelly, the 
ambassador, had noted in early 1951 that ‘it was very hard from the ivory tower of this 
embassy’ to assess Soviet internal affairs.189  
 
 
British representation in the Soviet Union had been complicated.190 Those diplomats who 
were posted to the Soviet Union after the revolution and Civil War had experienced the 
abject poverty but also the excitement of the promise of Communist ideology and social 
progress. By the 1930s much of that excitement had gone when the realisation had grown 
that another large country was being turned into a totalitarian dictatorship. They worked in 
what many saw as a very undesirable post. Thomas Preston, stationed in Moscow in the 
late 1920s, thought of the embassy as a ‘luxurious prison’.191 Most were glad when after 
about 3 years, according to Foreign Office routine, they were posted somewhere else. The 
Moscow embassy in 1945 was a rather small affair. Headed by Sir Archibald Kerr it 
comprised of only fourteen staff. In addition, there was at least one service attaché, 
seconded to the embassy from the British Ministry of Defence. By 1947 the number of 
staff had swollen to 33 but by 1953 there were only 15 staff. This decrease in numbers was 
a result of the increasing paranoia of the Soviet leadership about possible espionage. In 
comparison, the British Embassy in Washington in 1953 had 58 staff while the Soviet 
Embassy in London in the same year had 39 staff. 
 
 
Between 1945 and 1947 there were two British ambassadors in Moscow. Sir Archibald 
Clark Kerr served in Moscow between 1942 and 1946.192 In October 1945 he had told 
Bevin that having spent fours years with Molotov was quite enough for any man.193 He 
was then posted to Washington in 1946 succeeding Lord Halifax. Clark Kerr’s successor, 
Sir Maurice Drummond Peterson was appointed to Moscow in March 1946 where he 
remained until June 1949. Moscow was to be his last appointment.194 Both men had 
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extensive expertise in diplomatic matters; a necessary basis for the difficult post that was 
Moscow where skill and experience were vital for the conduct of diplomacy. Both were 
briefed extensively before taking up their posts and were routinely called back to London 
to be updated on important developments in person. Diplomatic reality in Moscow 
certainly was very difficult and regular ambassadorial work though not impossible was 
very challenging. Lord Strang, who had been to Moscow, noted in his book The Foreign 
Office that a diplomatist really was occasionally a ‘soft buffer between hard surfaces.’195  
 
 
To acquire the information needed and demanded in London, for example economic data 
or information about particular events or people, was difficult and this situation left staff in 
Moscow with a number of serious problems. Ever decreasing cooperation with their Soviet 
counterparts meant less face to face contact and less opportunity to directly gage the 
reaction of Soviet leaders to particular problems. It also meant that information had to 
come nearly exclusively from second hand sources, like newspapers, radio and propaganda 
material. In addition, staff increasingly found that their travels were restricted to Moscow 
and a few major cities. A possible source of first hand information, actual contact with 
Soviet people, very quickly disappeared. New Soviet campaigns on vigilance in the face of 
the perceived encirclement of the country by the capitalist class enemy encouraged a new 
wave of denunciations. As a result most were afraid to be seen talking to foreigners. Soviet 
staff at the embassy, often known to be reporting to the Ministry of Internal Security, 
periodically disappeared only to be replaced by new informers. Because of this difficulty 
of obtaining reliable information it is not surprising, that the flow of reports to London was 
not constant and that there were considerable gaps.  
 
 
In other respects, however, reporting from a totalitarian country had its advantages. All 
information in the public sphere, in newspapers, radio broadcasts etc, was at least partially 
sanctioned by the government and thus reflected its opinions. There was virtually no 
information that was independent or opposed to the existing regime. Bearing the 
insufficient supply of radios and the size of the country in mind, newspapers and 
magazines were essentially the only source of information for the vast majority of the 
population. Radios channels were routinely monitored by embassy staff and news items 
analysed just like regular newspaper articles. If something was important enough for the 
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government to be concerned about or necessary for all to know, the press was the only 
conduit that guaranteed full coverage. The embassy, of course knew that a lot of the 
information in the official press was likely to have been manipulated. The difficulty was to 
assess what was likely to be true and possible reasons behind the manipulations. To live, as 
the members of the British embassy did, in an enclave that was highly controlled and 
riddled with rumours and suspicions made this task even harder. The assessment of 
available information was really akin to something the Foreign Office liked to call ‘crystal 
gazing’. It was above all the skill of the staff that turned official Soviet information into 
something useful to the Foreign Office. 
 
 
While diplomats and staff generally felt well treated by London, differences of opinion 
between the centre and the periphery were not rare. Moscow staff were much closer to  
Soviet affairs while staff in London had more information available to them. Moscow 
argued for continuing negotiations with the Kremlin long after the Foreign Office had 
decided that a tougher line had to be taken to protect Britain’s interests vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union. The Embassy, feeling it was closer to the heart of the matter and more intimately 
familiar with the nuances of Soviet diplomatic manoeuvres, repeatedly argued for caution 
in dealing with the Kremlin.196 It is probably true that, despite being far away from the 
Foreign Office and its information and debates, and despite having very limited contact 
with Soviet leaders, the Moscow Embassy had a better feeling for the peculiarities and 
sensibilities of the Soviet leaders. On the other hand, it is also true that some who had 
served in the Soviet Union were now working in the Northern Department and therefore 
should have been aware of these issues as well. Nevertheless, it is generally the people on 
the ground who can give important advice about the leaders and policies of the countries to 
which they are posted. 
 
 
Although the occasional nudging from Moscow may have ruffled feathers in London, it 
was certainly good that a variety of opinions were offered for discussion. Many times 
issues were raised from Moscow in a way that had not been considered in London. It was 
precisely this, the ability and confidence to argue with and against commonly held views, 
which enhanced the overall discussion and ensured that policy decisions were not taken 
lightly. Many saw Bevin and the difficult international scene after 1945 as a chance to 
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regain Foreign Office purview over foreign relations.197 If the Northern Department, and 
the Foreign Office in general, were to benefit from Bevin’s stature as Foreign Secretary it 
had to earn his trust. The only way to achieve this was to provide good policy advice based 
on accurate and well analysed information about the Soviet Union and Soviet affairs.  
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Chapter Two: The Northern Department view of the Soviet Union and Soviet 
foreign policy, 1945-1947                        
 
 
A judicious blend of bamboozle, bluster and bluff. 
                                                     Ronald report on the Soviet Union, 1.11. 1946198 
 
 
The years between 1945 and 1947 saw a Soviet Union that in its core had remained the 
same but that in its domestic and foreign political ambition had also changed significantly. 
Victory in 1945 had come at a high cost. Vast swathes of the West and South of the 
country had been devastated, industry had been moved, millions of lives had been lost and 
many had been left disabled.199 Communist Party control of the localities had been 
significantly weakened especially in those areas that had been occupied by the German 
army. Party membership, which had been increased in part to admit soldiers and ensure at 
least a measure of ideological control of the army, had diluted the solid knowledge base of 
the Party in the process and partially ended the elitism of the Party. Millions of returning 
slave labourers and prisoners of war added their views to the flood of knowledge of the 
outside world which now had to be reined back in to allow a return to a uniform view and 
acceptance of Communist ideology as the basis of Soviet government and society. The war 
also proved an emotional and political watershed. It became the main reference point for 
many people in their history, often displacing the events of the 1930s or re-interpreting 
them.200 While the emergence to the status of superpower offered potentially great rewards 
with regards to foreign affairs, this was not a bonus available in the domestic arena.201  
 
 
As a result of the wartime devastation and post-war confusion the Soviet government 
immediately concentrated on domestic issues. Repatriation of those still abroad was one 
priority, the preservation of internal control and the strengthening of the Communist Party 
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was another. Repatriation was pursued by the Kremlin with iron determination.202 It came 
in the wake of demobilisation of the Red Army, particularly after the end of the war in the 
Far East, and naturally was a major concern of the Foreign Office.203 The virtual 
occupation of Central and Eastern Europe by Allied and Soviet forces had opened up 
foreign political opportunities as both sides had quickly realised.  Domestic control was 
another pressing issue with frequent reports of lawlessness making the headlines in the 
Soviet Union.204 The vast slave labour force in the Gulag, which had contributed to 
victory, was a further problem that needed addressing; a partial post-war amnesty released 
millions of prisoners during the summer of 1945.205  
 
 
The enforcement of internal cohesion as the basis of Communist control, and the further 
acceleration of industrialisation and collectivisation (the newly acquired areas in the Baltic 
States, for example, had to be incorporated into the system), both ultimately designed to 
increase Soviet military capabilities, were deemed vitally important in order to maintain 
and expand the newly gained role of Great Power in a world still recognised as hostile. The 
Communist Party, aware of these and the many other pressing issues, strengthened Party 
control over central and local affairs while simultaneously restructuring the party and its 
admission system to secure a more ideologically educated, homogenous and trustworthy 
membership. An iron grip on the whole country and all its inhabitants was deemed vital for 
the perceived post-war struggle with the capitalist West. Life for the population was bleak; 
the Russia Committee argued in late 1946 that ‘there is little or no trace of applied 
Communism in Russia.’206 The country was undoubtedly totalitarian. 
 
 
The elections to the Supreme Soviet held in February 1946 were the first countrywide 
opportunity for major policy announcements and a streamlining of Communist 
propaganda.207  Important speeches by all leading party members demanded a return to 
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ideological conformity, hard work and more sacrifice. Ideology regained its primary 
importance for all aspects of life and Communism was held out as a carrot for the Soviet 
donkey.208 The election also massively promoted the new Five Year Plan (the Fourth since 
1928) which became law on March 21st, 1946.209 Industrial managers and local party 
administrators were put under severe pressure to restructure and deliver. Peasants, at the 
bottom of the social hierarchy and used to substantial suffering, found that their lot 
deteriorated significantly.210 The widespread famine of 1946 again demonstrated the 
vulnerability of the countryside and the knock-on effects it had on the towns and cities, and 
thus on industrial recovery and progress.211 It became a top priority for the Kremlin after 
1945 to manage and eventually escape this continuing dependence on passively resisting 
peasants. 
 
 
While the Party, industry and agriculture were brought back into line, the Kremlin dealt 
with another issue that more than those just mentioned aroused the suspicion of the West 
about Soviet domestic matters: the Leningrad Writers affair which erupted in the summer 
of 1946.212 Zhdanov’s 1934 vision of Soviet writers as ‘engineers of human souls’ had 
apparently not produced the desired results. The relaxed rules during the war, when writers 
such as Konstantin Simonov and Vasily Grossman proved exceptionally popular and did 
much to enhance the Soviet war effort, were reversed. Now ideological conformity was 
tightened again; ‘an ideological house-cleaning’ was in progress, as was noted at the 
time.213 
 
 
Stalin, sixty five at the end of the war and undoubtedly in charge of his government, had 
during the war relied increasingly on his colleagues. With influence naturally came power 
and this resulted in an ongoing debate, in foreign circles, about divisions within the 
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Kremlin.214 We now know that the conflict between Georgi Malenkov and Andrei 
Zhdanov was probably the most virulent.215 But it is still not clear, how much control over 
particularly foreign policy Stalin’s lieutenants really exercised. A relatively small purge 
beginning in 1946, affecting Molotov and Malenkov among others, removed those from 
their positions of power who were perceived by Stalin as too independent and served as a 
reminder of Stalin’s continuing power. The Politburo, as the core of the decision making 
process, became ever more important during Stalin’s last years and Stalin paid close 
attention to it.216 
 
 
Soviet foreign policy during the early post-war years was difficult to assess, and foreign 
intelligence here played a still relatively little researched role.217 Frequent changes in 
tactics made the overall evaluation of its ultimate strategy and aims challenging.218 
Lacking specific information and at times confused by contradicting policy 
announcements, experts had no choice but to use precedent, educated guess work and 
intuition. Even when there were statements by senior leaders, for example Stalin’s speech 
on the eve of the election to the Supreme Soviet in February 1946 or Zhdanov’s speech at 
the Cominform foundation conference in September 1947, it proved tricky to unravel the 
problematic relationship between politics and propaganda. The importance of ideology, of 
possible alternative opinions within the Kremlin, and of continuities and change between 
the old Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union that now found itself in a position of 
international power were difficult to quantify.219  
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While the Alliance was sustained during the war, no side really put a lot of effort into 
sustaining it afterwards.220 Even though both sides professed to work for continued 
cooperation, political realities and opposing views of a post-war settlement meant that it 
died a slow death after 1945.221 The wartime conferences, although establishing the main 
parameters for the envisaged post-war Europe, had already highlighted the differences 
between the Allies.222 Stalin’s inability to understand the viewpoints and concerns of his 
former Allies, or his unwillingness to take them into account, was a significant problem.223 
This is an important point: with regards to the Soviet leadership one could not hope that 
they saw the world as Western leaders did. Expansion of direct influence, Soviet and 
American, both with arguably similar aims but different strategies, was not a post-war 
development but had started during the war.224 The Conferences of Foreign Ministers 
(CFM) meeting between September 1945 and December 1947 exposed incompatible 
differences, and resulted in a severe disappointment about the lack of progress. Post-war 
political, military and economic strengthening of both sides out-with the UNO and the 
CFM soon solidified the emerging division between the Allies.  
 
 
Eastern Europe, understood by Stalin as largely within his sphere of influence after the 
October 1944 agreement with Churchill, a fact accepted (though not openly) by the US 
State Department, was important to Britain for several reasons: Poland had provided the 
raison d’etre for entering the war in the first place while the security of the most southern 
part of Eastern Europe was considered vital for British imperial defence and 
communication.225 European trade was another important concern. The most difficult issue 
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to resolve, however, was Germany.226 Concerns and demands about territory, reparations, 
political control and economic unity proved impossible to negotiate. Although of central 
importance to both sides, none had had a viable plan for it when the war ended and the 
failure to solve this central post-war problem was a vital ingredient in the development of 
the Cold War.227 
 
 
Stalin’s foreign policy was as much the product of history, precedent and experience as of  
personality.228 It was also, however, the result of a narrow ideological construct that left 
limited room for manoeuvre and of a vast bureaucratic machine that was unable to function 
like its Western counterparts.229 Within this ideological construct a conflict with the 
capitalist West was for Stalin unavoidable.230 Whether or not Stalin, using the defence of 
national security in the face of ‘Capitalist encirclement’, actively sought expansion is still 
debated. The issue was often not necessarily his justification for a particular policy but the 
methods used to realise it.231 This was much evident in his policy of consolidating and 
partially Sovietising Eastern Europe after 1945, using forced nationalisation and 
collectivisation, rigged elections, the elimination of rivals in show trials and the increased 
enforcement of ideological conformity in the aftermath of Tito’s defiance in 1948.232 
Realism was part of the equation, but similarly opportunism and pragmatism were 
important characteristics of Stalin’s view of the world; although it was difficult to make 
assumptions about Stalin’s motivations.233 The occupation of the Red Army of vast 
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stretches of Eastern and South Eastern Europe established and cemented Soviet political 
influence while showing off its main instrument, apart from national or imported 
Communist leaders, of maintaining and solidifying that influence.  
 
 
The Soviet post-war concept of peaceful co-existence was as much a real hope as a shrewd 
tactic to soothe the Western leader’s anxieties and retard Western consolidation in Europe 
and in NATO. Propaganda became a favourite method for promoting it and other Soviet 
policies. When the Kremlin during the summer of 1947 decided that neither the Soviet 
Union nor any other Soviet bloc country would participate in the Marshall Plan and East-
West relations took a turn for the worse as a result, not even propaganda could 
persuasively explain the motives behind this decision. This rejection, for various reasons, 
of economic aid that would undoubtedly have benefited the bloc and also would have 
bought time to sort out Europe’s political post-war problems, was the first decisive step 
towards a separate future.234 Peaceful co-existence after that (discussed in chapter seven) 
was seen in the Foreign Office as a diversion not a real offer of cooperation. 
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Chapter Three: ND input into FO policy, 1945-1947   
 
 
The last thing one would wish to suggest is that we should fail to endorse 
Lippman’s thesis of the need to equate diplomacy with power; nevertheless 
diplomacy has its place. 
                                         
                                        Carcoe in a letter to the Northern Department, 10.9.1945235 
 
 
 
3.1. Taking stock 
After the cessation of hostilities and the end of Allied conferences it fell to the Foreign 
Office to deal with the outstanding issues.236 The large presence of various armies across 
Europe, the huge numbers of refugees still crossing borders and no clear ideas when the 
peace treaties would be signed left no choice but to try to assess options and start 
negotiations as soon as possible. Since the list of these issues was extensive, possible 
points for future friction were numerous. Although Europe was not completely pacified by 
the time of the German surrender in May 1945, options to use military force were very 
limited.  In addition, already during the war it had become clear that Soviet diplomacy was 
unlike any other. Facing forceful, uncompromising and volatile opponents who 
increasingly operated from a strong perception of British weakness and Soviet strength, 
British diplomats took time to take stock and adjust.  
 
 
Trying to sum up the problems so far to see what the more immediate implications for 
British foreign relations might be and to refocus Foreign Office staff for the upcoming 
Potsdam conference, Orme Sargent, then superintending Under-Secretary of the Northern 
Department, produced the first comprehensive Foreign Office assessment of British 
interests after Word War II: ‘Stocktaking after VE Day.’237 Soviet military occupation of 
Eastern Europe, now a reality, was not surprisingly a major problem; rival influences there, 
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as Ross has argued, were not going to be tolerated.238 To make matters worse ‘this time 
control is to a large degree in the hands of the Soviet Union and the USA, and neither of 
them is likely to consider British interests overmuch if they interfere with their own and 
unless we assert ourselves.’ Effective foreign political influence would be difficult to 
achieve and continued Great Power cooperation, very much favoured by Sargent, was not a 
certainty. Realising that strength was vital in international relations where Britain needed 
to be a Great Power to secure her aims, he frankly demanded that ‘it is this misconception 
[that Britain is now a secondary power] which it must be our policy to combat.’ The trump 
cards to achieve this, although valid in themselves, were somewhat vague: ‘our political 
maturity, our diplomatic experience, the confidence which the solidarity if our democratic 
institutions inspires in Western Europe, and our incomparable war record’; no word here of 
hard political, military or economic facts. To face up to these and incorporate them into 
actual political planning in the Foreign Office took a little longer. 
 
 
As it turned out Sargent was right: British experience in world affairs coupled with her 
enhanced role in Western Europe and her persistent defence of Social Democracy against 
Communism would help retain her role as a Great Power. The problem was that a Great 
Power was not a Super Power. Sargent did recognise without a doubt that Britain would sit 
at the top of the table only through her collaboration with other Western/European powers 
and the Dominions. Nevertheless, however difficult it was to make sense of Britain’s 
changed role, Sargent was quite clear on the role of the Soviet Union. Military 
preponderance in Eastern Europe meant that she would strive to secure her territorial gains 
and her border. He advanced the idea of an ‘ideological Lebensraum’ which Stalin might 
create to satisfy this need for security but did not go into a detailed discussion about what 
this may look like. The overlap in British and Soviet strategic interests was obvious: 
Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia, Germany, Italy, Greece and Turkey 
according to him had to be defended as British interests; this overlap becomes a more 
pronounced problem by 1950 and it discussed in more detail in Chapter Fourteen. The 
Soviet government had, not surprisingly, made their interest in most of these very clear. As 
a result, the choice of potential areas of conflict was extensive and any opportunity to settle 
conflicts had to be made the most of. 
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The British followed a dual strategy: safety and influence through negotiation and political 
consolidation. It thus became ever more important for the British to find reliable foreign 
policy partners, secure continued US presence in Europe and focus on the formation of a 
strong British foreign policy doctrine. A new doctrine, although difficult to agree on in the 
absence of clear foreign policy statements from either the US or the Soviet Union and 
while lacking good information and intelligence from Washington and Moscow, would 
give British foreign policy stability and a new confidence.239 This would enable the British 
to ignore the frequent Soviet provocations and react confidently to the numerous changes 
in Soviet tactics: the ongoing Conferences of Foreign Ministers, for example, were not 
only opportunities for settling disputes but also quite good opportunities to rattle an 
opponent. Facing these problems the mood in the Northern Department did occasionally 
dip very low.  
 
 
The Russia Committee bluntly noted in December 1946 that ‘our present difficulties with 
the Soviet Union are indeed not due to our not facing up to fundamental problems…but 
rather to our having to face up to so many fundamental problems at once.’240 The absence 
of further high-level talks after Potsdam made it very difficult for the British to accurately 
gage Britain’s place in the new world order where issues of cooperation, dependence and 
independence still had to be clarified and where the Soviet Union and her intentions were 
still being evaluated. This assessment followed a predictable course and reflected first 
wartime and then peacetime experiences and realities. During the war the closest contact 
between the two countries had been through their leaders, their military and occasionally 
intelligence representatives. After the German surrender this changed back to a more 
traditional diplomacy thus making the diplomats once again the main point of contact. 
Predominantly military issues (strategic, technological and financial), but also general 
issues of post-war collective security and responsibility, were replaced by detailed 
discussions about political, economic and social matters; so that by the end of the war not 
only the points of contact but also the objectives had changed. As a result of this, reports 
on reflections of wartime experiences were followed by assumptions and predictions of 
peacetime diplomacy. Reactions to peacetime diplomacy were followed by increasingly 
detailed strategy proposals.   
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Diplomacy continued to drag its heels. Military victory had immediately reduced the need 
for political concessions. The Conference of Foreign Ministers in London in September 
1945, charged with working out the peace treaties, was a case in point. Both Byrnes and 
Molotov, overly confident, overplayed their hand and Britain was unable to influence the 
other two. However, this was also a new experience for the Kremlin. The war was over and 
the Kremlin now had to get used to being in the minority on issues of dispute. The 
resulting frequent changes in Soviet tactics became a fertile ground for analysis and an 
obsession for the Northern Department’s staff. By early 1947 papers started to appear on 
Soviet tactics worldwide which were intended to assist Foreign Office diplomats in 
London and around the world in dealing with their Soviet counterparts.241 It was important 
but difficult for the British to determine whether the behaviour of Soviet diplomats was 
based on short-term tactical issues or on a more long-term strategy.242 One idea was that 
Molotov expected the Labour government to be more ‘accommodating …than its 
predecessors.’243 This issue would not be resolved until the following year when the 
Foreign Office had looked very closely at Soviet ideology and her behaviour so far to state 
confidently that although tactics would change, in fact most of Soviet post-war behaviour, 
possibly excluding Germany, was now based upon a firm long-term strategy. Whatever the 
answer to the question of tactics and strategies, the existence of definite spheres of 
influence was now a reality.244  
 
 
Soviet tactics at the Conferences of Foreign Ministers displayed an acute awareness that 
these were opportunities to be exploited. Soviet unscrupulousness could not be 
misunderstood: as Pierson Dixon wrote in a top secret memorandum at the end of 
September: ‘the opportunity will not recur without war.’245 Pointing out that the stakes 
were high and that all were aware of it, he went on to say that ‘the Russians have applied 
them [characteristic Soviet bargaining tactics] much more obstinately here, because the 
issues at stake in the present conference are much more vital than those in the war-time 
conferences.’ This was an indirect admission that war-time diplomacy had missed vital 
opportunities to settle disputes. But in the end he too put his faith in the hope that Russia 
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was economically weakened and therefore dependent, just like Britain, on US financial aid. 
This point, though discussed many times over the next months, was only resolved when in 
July 1947 the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states withdrew from the 
negotiations for the ERP.  
 
 
Apart from military and territorial issues, it was the idea of a Western Bloc which played 
its part in derailing the discussion about the peace treaties.246 Although only in a very early 
discussion stage on the British side, the overall concept was clearly seen as plausible and 
implementable enough by the Soviet side to be treated from the start as a viable future 
threat to Soviet interests in Europe. As any bloc that excluded the Soviet Union was seen 
as an aggressive gesture, Britain, perceived to be pursuing just that, had in Soviet eyes 
become hostile to the Soviet Union. The outlook for future diplomatic negotiations was 
therefore bleak. Furthermore, the atomic bomb had made international relations even more 
complicated. The toughness of Soviet diplomacy particularly at the CFM in London in 
September was a direct result of this. In the absence of possession of the bomb itself but 
with enough confidence that it would not be used against her, concession from the Soviet 
side were not granted. The white flag offered by Byrnes at the next CFM in Moscow in 
December that year was thus duly exploited.247  However, it was clear that the Soviet 
Union had to be shown the limits of British concessions, otherwise the position of Britain 
would be possibly permanently damaged as concessions were regarded by the Soviet 
Union as weakness and as something to be exploited. At that time the US and Britain were 
not yet following the same principles of in dealing with the Soviet Union and the unhappy 
grumblings in the Northern Department about this were getting louder. 
 
 
The failure of this conference was the first serious post-war international setback and had 
huge repercussions.248 Without the peace treaties, Europe could not leave the war behind.  
Without the peace treaties diplomatic relations and negotiations, particularly with the 
former aggressor states, would be difficult. Moreover, as John Galsworthy pointed out 
soon afterwards: ‘since Russian suspicions can only be banished by the acceptance of 
Russia’s views and demands, the harbouring of suspicions – both artificial and genuine – 
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becomes a profitable policy for the Soviet Government.’249 Diplomatic recognition of the 
Soviet imposed Romanian and Hungarian regimes had proven completely unacceptable to 
the US, even if not to Britain. However, if Britain and the US were left dissatisfied with the 
outcome of the conference, so was the Soviet Union. This conference had shown quite 
clearly that without concessions on all sides there was no progress.  
 
 
Roberts pointed out the implications.250 The Soviets ‘have been consciously reducing the 
tension. It looks as though they want to resume discussions which they had not expected to 
break down so completely.’ However, he went on to say that  
 
 
the US chargé d’affaires agrees with me that the Soviet government regard this 
as an important test case of Anglo-Saxon firmness and that they are confidently 
expecting us to weaken first in which event it will not be necessary for them to 
make any attempt to meet us half way.  
 
 
 
In other words, Britain found itself between a rock and a hard place. To secure US 
acquiescence with regards to British territorial interests at that time proved extremely 
difficult. To obtain concessions from the Soviet Union was near impossible.  
 
 
The Middle East, for example, particularly with regards to Persia where the Anglo-Soviet-
Persian Treaty was about to run out, was an area of major Allied antagonism at that 
time.251 Any talk about interests there which would have to be negotiated with the Soviet 
Union on a bilateral basis, would alarm the Americans who were violently opposed to a 
return to the old balance of power thinking.252 Britain, the Foreign Office knew, had little 
to give to the Kremlin at that time. Roberts’ had commented on this issue in an earlier 
telegram where he noted that ‘Stalin’s attitude [with the US congressmen] was that Britain 
and the Soviet Union had little to give each other at present, whereas Soviet-American 
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relations were all-important.’253 The ongoing Foreign Office debate about the idea to just 
state British interests and ask the Soviets to state theirs could in these circumstances go 
nowhere. The main loser in this instance, of course, would be Britain as ‘there was a 
growing danger that if the present international deadlock remained unbroken, we, rather 
than the Americans, would be the main sufferers from any Soviet tendency to pursue a 
more aggressive foreign policy.’254 One could not ask for a more open statement of the 
dependence of Britain on the whims of the two new superpowers. Face to face talks which 
may have been useful to settle disagreements were by now extremely rare and even then 
Stalin did not respond well to prodding from others. By October 1945 Allied relations, as 
Warner quite openly stated, had entered a ‘stalemate.’255 This situation tested all sides and 
in the absence of any means to force an agreement it benefited those who could afford to 
wait. Waiting, of course, carried its own risks, particularly for the West.  
 
 
Russia’s economic interests in Eastern Europe had become an ever greater worry to the 
Foreign Office as ‘the political means they employed to establish a stranglehold on Eastern 
Europe …keep us and the Americans out.’ 256 Warner suggested that rather than addressing 
individual issues the whole of Soviet policy there should be tackled, preferably in 
cooperation with the US, thus forcing the Soviet Union to lay their cards in the table. To 
this effect he attached a memorandum entitled ‘The effect of Russian influence in Eastern 
Europe on the European economy.’257 The implications in it were clear. To seal off Eastern 
Europe politically was one issue, to refuse or minimise economic interaction was plainly 
dangerous; particularly if the country ‘in charge’ was a socialist planned economy with a 
poor economic track record and no interest in affluence for its people. Markets were vitally 
important to European recovery, as Britain well knew, and (Eastern) Europe as the nearest 
could not be given up without a fight. The US surely understood, Warner thought, and 
would support that argument even if they required some nudging. Overall, Britain had to 
become much more proactive. Changing policy, adopted since the CFM in London, the 
Foreign Office decided to implement ‘a reversal of our present policy of leaving the 
Russians alone and leaving it to the Americans to take the initiative.’258  
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3.2. Discussing options and policies 
The Northern Department knew that without a strong partner in Europe, and being 
dependent on US financial aid, Britain did not have a choice but to look West. It had 
become clear that military and economic strength would effectively dictate diplomacy but 
without accurate information about economic problems or potentialities on all sides, 
strategy recommendations were difficult to make. Up to a certain point Britain had to wait 
and see how the US and the Soviet Union would behave and where their declared interests 
and allegiances would lie.259 In the meantime, as much as Bevin tried to put forward a case 
for continued British independence in cooperation with the US, it had become clear that 
present British diplomatic weight had decreased rather dramatically.   
 
 
In 1946 Kennan and Roberts wrote their famous despatches kick-starting a serious debate 
about a new foreign policy doctrine and new organisational structures for dealing with the 
Soviet Union on both sides of the Atlantic; Churchill gave his Fulton speech, Warner wrote 
his famous memorandum, the Russia Committee was established, new British and 
American ambassadors arrived in Moscow, the CFM met four times and an invitation to 
the Supreme Soviet for the visit of a Soviet delegation to the UK had been accepted. More 
movement within the Foreign Office and international politics offered a better chance to 
analyse the international situation more precisely in order to establish a baseline for a more 
effective foreign policy. There was just one problem. Although there were numerous 
departments, there was still nothing like a political intelligence department. The Russia 
Committee, established in March 1946, was an attempt to partly rectify this situation. 
However, it was a committee, not a department and met only weekly, later even only 
fortnightly. And since all Deputy and Assistant Under-Secretaries attended, along with 
representatives from the Ministry of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff, the Treasury and the 
BBC’s Foreign Service, membership varied. As an advisory body its task was to assess 
information, recommend strategies and help implement those sanctioned by the Foreign 
Secretary and the Cabinet. To counter the ‘Soviet attack and the offensive of militant 
Communism’ was expected to use a large percentage of the Foreign Office’s resources.  
But it had no permanent staff, no independent financial means and was not closely linked 
to non-Foreign Office departments and organisations. Being an extra-parliamentary 
committee, it could also not pressure the Foreign Secretary to adopt certain 
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recommendations. As a result, its overall impact arguably remained well below its actual 
potential even though its achievements are undeniable.260  
 
 
January and February 1946 was an important time for the Northern Department. The 
election campaign to the Supreme Soviet was in full swing and while there was a lot of 
emphasis on domestic issues, foreign policy issues were never far away. The election 
speeches were generally very ambivalent. All leaders including Stalin made comments 
containing thinly veiled warnings about Soviet capabilities if not intentions. The main 
arguments used were not new. However, this time these points were made by the Soviet 
leaders themselves, thereby lending much more authority to these statements. Essentially 
the attack upon the West was three-pronged: against Britain as an exploitative imperialist 
power and an inadequate social democracy, against capitalist countries in general for 
having caused the war and for being likely to do so again, and by presenting the Soviet 
Union as a country fully capable of defending herself in the future against any aggressor. 
Roberts stated not for the first time that ‘Soviet propagandists seem unable to boost their 
own achievements without the help of a foreign bogey.’ 261  
 
 
Although there were intermittent comments about the desirability of continued allied 
cooperation, an atmosphere of tension was clearly discernable and clearly desired by the 
Kremlin. It is no coincidence that international politics at the time were particularly 
difficult. The Soviet Union was obviously testing the ground and so confirmed what 
Brimelow had stated in February: ‘there is no balance of power in Europe.’262 The 
continued role of the US in Europe was still in doubt while Soviet intentions in Europe 
were now becoming clearer. The peace treaties with the former aggressor states had not yet 
been signed and the new world organisation, being based in the US, left Europe without its 
own framework for dealing with European matters. In the absence of war the overt threat 
of military intervention could not safely be used and that left only diplomacy to deal with a 
very complex situation. However, political uncertainty could influence diplomatic reality. 
Uncertainty in the West potentially also meant uncertainty in the Soviet Union:  
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the Russians fear the Americans much more than they fear us, which perhaps 
makes them all the more eager to avoid provoking them too far…on the other 
hand the Russians, in contrast to the Americans, still seem to regard us as a 
great world empire and are in no danger of under-rating us as a small island on 
the edge of Europe,  
 
 
 
Roberts’ here echoed Sargent’s sentiments from July.263 Whether or not this was actually 
true did not really matter. Diplomatic strategies on all sides, in the absence of hard facts, 
were based on assumptions and occasionally wishful thinking. 
 
 
Much of the discussion in the Northern Department during that year continued to be based 
on Soviet foreign policy and how to deal with it. As regards detailed information about the 
country itself, the gaps in knowledge remained extensive: ‘we are here at present so 
completely cut off from contact with what happens outside Moscow that it is perhaps a 
mistake not to seize any opportunities that offer themselves for extending the scope of our 
knowledge’, Clark Kerr wrote in September 1945.264 The Northern Department did not 
have much choice but to base their assessment of the Soviet Union and her intentions on 
readily available information: mainly the Soviet press and Soviet behaviour in international 
politics, particularly at the UN and the various CFMs, Soviet foreign policy itself and on 
any other information the Moscow embassy could provide.  In May 1946 this issue was 
addressed at a JIC meeting: ‘the unanimous opinion of the committee was…that our 
sources of information inside Russia were so few that it was in our interests, so far as 
intelligence is concerned, to do our outmost in every way.’ 265  
 
 
One event possibly more than any other illustrated in 1946 how much of a threat the Soviet 
Union/ Communism was becoming. In February of 1946 a diplomatic bomb of sorts 
exploded. The Canadian authorities had made it public that they were investigating a case 
of Soviet espionage.266 The Soviet Embassy in Ottawa had undoubtedly been the centre of 
a spy ring and the Soviet authorities had admitted responsibility. In June 1946 the report 
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was published.267 It revealed a sophisticated Fifth Column network which had recruited 
and trained highly educated Canadians, and some British nationals. This case proved 
especially damaging with regards to atomic and military matters. Reports on atomic 
research as well as advanced information about radar, anti-submarine devices, explosives 
etc. had been handed to the Russians; information that detailed research developments 
‘which would play an important part in the post-war defences of Canada, the UK and the 
US.’ For Britain this was particularly serious. Not only had a possible military advantage 
been lost, but the much desired idea of a continued information exchange about atomic 
research suffered another serious setback.   
 
 
Churchill’s Fulton speech on March 5th, 1946 did nothing to relieve the international 
tension.268 His concentration on the ‘two giant marauders, war and tyranny’ and his linking 
of them to the ideas of democracy, collective security and communism essentially 
addressed all the points that had caused concern. To state that ‘a shadow has fallen upon 
the scenes so lately lightened by the allied victory’ was more than an understatement. The 
furore this speech caused everywhere came as no surprise and Stalin’s response was 
predictable. Asked by a Pravda correspondent how he assessed Churchill’s speech he 
stated ‘I appraise it as a dangerous act calculated to sow the seeds of discord between the 
allied states and hamper their collaboration.’269 As usual he deliberately underplayed the 
friction between the allies and refused to take any responsibility for it.  The article went on 
to say that ‘it should be noted in this respect that Mr. Churchill and his friends strikingly 
resemble Hitler and his friends.’ That Churchill had not been authorised by the British  
government to make this speech and was therefore not speaking for them did not matter. 
However, having used the threat of war extensively in Soviet domestic propaganda 
throughout the year, Stalin was eventually forced to grant interviews to several western 
journalists to calm the waves of a serious war hysteria that had engulfed the Soviet 
Union.270  
 
 
The heated public debate which followed Churchill’s speech possibly allowed the Northern 
Department to voice its concerns and ideas more outspokenly. For the US, Kennan had 
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already started this reorientation about the Soviet Union in his Long Telegram of February 
22nd, of which the Foreign Office was well aware of. This memorandum, which had made 
such a big impact on the State Department, caused less of a sensation in London; possibly 
British policy makers thought that they understood the Soviet Union and its political 
system better then the Americans and thus required less teaching on it.271 Kennan’s 
equivalent in the British embassy in Moscow was Frank Roberts, also charge de affaires 
while Clark Kerr had left and Peterson had not yet arrived. He and Kennan frequently 
socialised and exchanged ideas.272 His famous three letters to Bevin were sent on March 
14th, 17th and 18th 1946; often seen in the historiography as ‘Britain’s Long Telegram’.273 
Essentially he was taking stock from his side of the Foreign Service.274  
 
 
Dissecting the international situation after the end of World War II, Soviet history and its 
implications for her present and future foreign policy, and the situation of Britain, he made 
a series of suggestions. Not surprisingly certain points, already discussed within the 
Northern Department on previous occasions, arose again: the Soviet preoccupation with 
her national security, the role of ideology in her domestic and foreign policies, her 
problematic negotiating behaviour, the problems of distinguishing between Soviet short-
term tactics and long-term strategies, and the changed roles of different countries within 
international society. As he wrote: ‘instead of the old balance of power there now exists a 
UNO and the Big Three’, just what this really meant was not yet clear. In February already 
a concerned Warner had written: ‘I am afraid the Russians no longer remain faithful to the 
big three idea.’275 Robert’s discussion on who really wielded power in the Soviet Union 
was somewhat inconclusive. What was presented in public may not have been a true 
reflection of power behind the scenes. Roberts’s overall summary of the USSR though, 
was short and sharp:  
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the USSR is ideologically and economically a closed community, controlled by 
a small handful of men, themselves cut off from the outside world, whose 
system of government is based upon  an all-pervasive police system and the 
most widespread propaganda machine. 
 
 
 
Months later he would add one more problem: ‘we should always remember that the Soviet 
Union has an almost religious conviction of infallibility.’276 Moving on to strategy Roberts 
discerned six Soviet long-term objectives: to develop the Soviet Union into the most 
powerful country, to weaken capitalist or social democratic countries, to keep America and 
Britain apart, to support communism everywhere, to attack social democracy and to use 
propaganda to maximum effect. In response, Roberts suggested, Britain could do several 
things: ‘the first essential is to treat the problem of Anglo-Soviet relations in the same way 
as major military problems were treated during the war.’277 That a man like Roberts should 
resort to such suggestions revealed a serious disaffection with Soviet diplomacy, a 
disappointment about the absence of sufficient progress and a lack of hope for future 
cooperation. Next, the public had to be educated and Britain to be portrayed as the leader 
of a free world based on the principles of social democracy, freedom and prosperity for all. 
On a more tactical basis he recommended that  
 
 
we should base ourselves firmly on the principle of reciprocity …this means 
that we must be strong and look strong…should always take account of Soviet 
susceptibilities and prestige. Above all we should never rattle the sabre and 
make it difficult for the Russians to climb down without loss of face.278  
 
 
 
This, of course, severely restricted the choice of diplomatic manoeuvres the British could 
attempt, since the Russians were hypersensitive to all forms of overt criticism or pressure. 
Without the choice to do as they thought best, the British were never going to be in charge. 
This became quite clear at the CFM in Paris which took place in three long haggling 
sessions between April 25th and October 15th 1946.279   
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After numerous telegrams, letters and memoranda which had made the rounds in the 
Northern Department and the Foreign Office, it fell to Warner as superintending Under-
Secretary to summarise and continue the discussion of Soviet intentions just before the 
Paris CFM was to take place. His memorandum on ‘The Soviet campaign against this 
country and our response to it’ was designed to push the Secretary of State more than 
possibly the Foreign Office itself into a more confident and decisive foreign policy.280 At 
one point, the Northern Department knew, Britain would have to make a definite choice 
between the need to move closer to the US and the still strong wish to find some 
accommodation with the Soviet Union. In the end it was arguably a choice that was made 
for Britain, rather than by her. It had become painfully clear that financial dependence 
entailed a certain foreign political dependence as well, particularly since Britain wanted 
closer relations with the US. Thus American opposition to some British ideas in Europe 
and the Middle East could not just be brushed away. The Soviet Union, of course, did not 
care about British desires at all as long as the threat of any serious retaliation was nearly 
non-existent. Warner in his attempt to dissect Soviet future domestic intentions settled on 
three: ‘a return to the pure doctrine of Marx-Lenin-Stalinism, the intense concentration 
upon building up the industrial and military strength of the Soviet Union, and the revival of 
the bogey of external danger to the Soviet Union.’281 The implication here was that only an 
internally strong Soviet Union could project strength outwards. So the Soviet government 
zealously returned to those methods that had guaranteed its survival so far. For the Foreign 
Office ideology long after Lockhart’s initial suggestion now made it to the top of the 
agenda.  
 
 
As Warner frankly continued ‘we should be very unwise not to take the Russians at their 
word just as we should have been wise to take Mein Kampf at its face value.’282 This 
statement was extraordinary. It not only admitted a serious failure in the assessment of 
Germany prior to World War II on the part of the government, if not the Foreign Office, 
but it also admitted that the Russians were indeed regarded as a serious threat whose nature 
had not yet been fully understood. In order to counter this threat effectively he demanded 
that ‘the Foreign Office must claim a voice in these matters which before the war was often 
denied to it’; foreign policy would only be successful if the Foreign Office was allowed to 
return/remain at the heart of the foreign policy machine. Here he laid the ground work for 
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an increased Foreign Office influence across the board. The Russia Committee was to be 
based in the Foreign Office and senior Foreign Office staff continued to attend a range of 
extra-Foreign Office committees.283 The Foreign Office essentially asserted its position 
above that of the Ministry of Defence, which still held considerable influence in the 
government. Soviet actions could not be countered with overt military initiatives on a 
wider scale anymore leaving only diplomacy to deal with problems and thus confirming 
the renewed primacy of the Foreign Office.  
 
 
According to Warner Soviet strategy appeared to target several points: that Russia would 
try to obtain her objectives through all methods short of war, that her present foreign policy 
was likely to be based on long-term plans and that it was aggressive and threatening to 
British interest worldwide, that one aim was to weaken Britain as much as possible, that 
this behaviour was likely to continue for a long time and that Soviet policies in different 
areas would be coordinated. In order to defend Britain he advocated the adoption of a 
‘defensive-offensive policy.’ This made him the first to suggest an actual strategy that 
could be adapted to be used in different areas. This new policy was needed to counter the 
three main Soviet foreign political initiatives: to install communist or friendly governments 
wherever she could, to divide the countries opposed to her and to weaken Britain. The 
implementation of a ‘worldwide anti-communist campaign’ however, required apart from a 
sanction of this by the Cabinet, American acquiescence which would be very difficult to 
obtain.284 The US had still not declared her future intentions in Europe and viewed any 
suggestions by Britain to ‘gang up’ on the Soviet Union with suspicion, while Britain 
could not afford and did not want to alienate her wartime ally.285 In any case, propaganda 
matters were incredibly difficult to deal with: Should campaigns be anti-Soviet or anti-
communist? How should people be addressed who were already used to an aggressive 
propaganda? How to deal with local prejudices? The bottom line, though, was clear:  
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the interests of this country and the true democratic principles for which we 
stand are directly threatened. The Soviet government makes coordinated use of 
military, economic and political weapons and also of the communist ‘religion’ 
…we must at once organise and coordinate our defences against all these. 
 
 
This in actual fact was a suggestion of a declaration of a new form of war.286 Although the 
Northern Department was generally in agreement, it took Bevin much longer to accept this 
as a basis for future policies with regards to the Soviet Union.287 In September Warner 
reminded the Northern Department that  
 
 
we should not allow considerations of not irritating the Russians to influence us 
in the tactics adopted in specific matters ….and not allow such considerations to 
deter…us from taking any action necessary to withstand Soviet political 
aggression and the spread or consolidation of Soviet and Communist 
influence… in the world. We should point out the damage of the doctrine of 
non-irritation leading initially to appeasement.288  
 
 
 
Unfortunately, the Northern Department found it hard to persuade the Secretary of State of 
this and even in March 1947 Sargent still stated that ‘a policy of ‘defensive-offensive’ 
against communism had never been authorised except with regards to the Middle East.’289 
As much as Bevin was loved by his staff and proved an asset to the Foreign Office, he was 
not someone who liked to be prodded too much. He always made up his own mind but 
once that had been done he displayed a single-minded determination that proved often very 
effective. 
 
 
Against Northern Department recommendations, the Secretary of State’s desire for 
cooperation was still stronger than the will to look beyond it and consider the alternatives 
and this limited the options that could be used by Britain to achieve her aims. As long as 
this did not change, Britain could not re-assert her place as an independent great power. On 
the other hand, it was still unclear whether the Soviet Union was acting from a position of 
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strength or weakness. Weakness meant that it was unlikely that she would resort to military 
force, while strength meant unpredictability and was therefore the real worry. The JIC had 
concluded that the Soviet Union would not risk war in the next five years.290 This, 
however, was not really much comfort, particularly since there was ‘an inherent danger of a 
situation in which the Russians had to depend on their unaided judgement in deciding 
whether or not to carry through some foreign policy which might lead at once to a major 
war.’ This point was problematic not only for the British. On both sides of the Atlantic 
there was a pronounced fear that a new war might break out because of serious Soviet 
misjudgements. Since the end of the war the Soviet Union had been testing her power and 
influence along her perimeter, and in the new international organisations which, 
considering the length of her border, provided never-ending irritation for all.291 
 
 
In organisational terms it took time for the Northern Department attempted to get on top of 
dealing with Russia. There had been a debate about the usefulness of a committee dealing 
specifically with Russia as Roberts had suggested and the Russia Committee was 
established in March 1946 just before Robert’s despatch reached the Foreign Office. It met 
for the first time on April 2nd.292 Brimelow’s point had been more than clear: 
 
 
two people at the Russian desk  [in the Northern Department] …three people in 
the Russian section of FORD…rarely any hard thinking on what the Russians 
are up to and what we ought to do about it except when a JIC paper is on the 
stocks…there is no proper machinery for ensuring that decisions on topics 
which at first sight to no concern the Soviet Union are considered in advance 
from the standpoint of the opportunities they afford to communist inspired anti-
British propaganda. 
 
 
 
This was essentially an admission that the Foreign Office had to become more proactive 
and better organised. To anticipate Russian actions would be invaluable for effective 
diplomacy; shortly after discussions started about the need for ‘ideological reporting’ in 
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order to expand the Foreign Office’s knowledge base about Communism and its present 
forms and threats.293 Months later Hankey returned to this point when he wrote that  
 
 
the Russians see almost everything in terms of their propaganda value for 
bludgeoning their enemies … a counter attack might have a useful effect in 
making the Russians realise that their present methods may well be turned 
against them294;  
 
 
 
just like Warner had suggested in April. Propaganda, of course, worked both ways. The 
near complete ignorance of the British public of the hostile Soviet propaganda campaign 
against Britain as well as Soviet behaviour worldwide was a major concern for the 
Northern Department.295 Just like the American so the British government had to wean 
their populations off the idea of the great wartime ally and persuade them that the Soviet 
Union had in fact become a serious threat. To deal with this and also to streamline 
information from Moscow, new guidelines were issued that refocused diplomatic 
reporting. The increase in the foreign political weight of the Soviet Union coupled with the 
relative stagnation in the number of staff both in the Northern Department and the Moscow 
embassy required some rethinking about how to make the best of available resources. The 
increased need to properly digest available information, in order to turn it into useful 
policy advice, intensified the pressure on the Northern Department.  In the end, Bevin took 
his time to come round to the Northern Department’s views and in the meantime this new 
system could be perfected.  
 
 
Halfway through the third session of the Peace Conference in Paris, which took place 
between July 29th and October 15th 1946, and presumably exasperated by the very potent 
mix of stubbornness, aggressiveness and single-minded determination displayed by the 
Soviet delegation, Roberts moved closer to the admission that there were now two hostile 
camps; something the Foreign Office should finally acknowledge.296 Even though there 
had been increasing talk of opposing even hostile blocs, in reality two irreconcilable camps 
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had existed for twenty years before the outbreak of World War II. Now, the underlying and 
particularly long-term motives of Soviet foreign policy were discussed as something like 
the Holy Grail of international diplomacy. For Roberts  
 
 
the essential long-term explanation of Soviet conduct is that the Soviet Union is 
not simply another totalitarian dictatorship playing at power politics, but a 
unique and abnormal member of international society, whose policy is governed 
by dynamic ideological motives. 
 
 
 
Here again he confirmed the primary importance of ideology. Worryingly for the Foreign 
Office he continued that ‘Soviet policy is…a constant offensive-defensive…and growing 
strength will only remove the chief check upon her actions i.e. the fear of consequences.’ 
Although he thought that some form of arrangement was possible, friction along the 
frontier between Capitalism and Communism would only increase. The expansion of the 
number of Communist states would only lengthen this frontier and the corresponding 
friction would thus intensify.  Thomas Brimelow, much in favour of tougher action against 
the Soviet Union, spelt out the implications. The Soviet leaders ‘preach a doctrine of 
permanent hostility …[and] the result of this hostility is a permanent risk of war.’297 The 
consequences for the Soviet Union were clear: the extension of the military-industrial 
complex in the Soviet Union, the tightening of internal control and the aggressive 
continuation of the search for an effective cordon sanitaire. In all but name this was an 
admission that the Cold War was a reality.  
 
 
The diplomatic choices for Britain appeared slim: not to exacerbate the already existing 
problems and not to create new ones. The preferred strategy to Brimelow was clear: ‘we 
must have a basic, logical, coherent and sober doctrine that will be acceptable to men of 
common sense everywhere…the time has come when we must make up our minds on a 
political strategy.’ However, in the event neither Hankey nor Warner were completely 
convinced. They did not think that more could be done at the time or that some form of 
balance of power was unattainable.  
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By 1947 the Northern Department had battled its way through numerous discussions and 
memoranda and had arrived, though not unanimously, at a fairly firm conclusion. A new 
foreign policy doctrine was needed and it had to be firm yet flexible, without being overly 
alienating to opponents. The focus was on the US as the preferred and needed partner in 
international relations. The Soviet Union would undoubtedly have to be treated as a threat 
to British interests worldwide. More certainty also meant less discussion. Most had been 
won over by the new way of thinking and improved communications procedures within the 
Northern Department made analysis quicker and easier. The Russia Committee slowly 
sprung into action and arguably improved communication with other segments of the 
government. In the highly fragmented organisation of British governmental departments 
any close exchange of information though occasionally difficult to achieve was very 
valuable. To assess and counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union demanded nothing 
less. Information, as usual, proved to be the key. And the challenge to obtain what was 
needed kept the Moscow embassy extremely busy. Not for the first time there was a lack of 
suitable staff in London and Moscow. Although the Moscow embassy profited from a 
small increase in staff, the Northern Department essentially had to make do which those 
they had already got. The government drive to train Soviet specialists to work in various 
government posts only kicked in much later.  
 
 
The focus of allied discontent had shifted and Germany was now recognised as a main 
battle ground. Animosities between the former allies had steadily increased making 
effective cooperation there impossible.298 The ACC and the EAC had both proven to be 
ineffective. The Bizone, created on January 1st, 1947, had been a result. For Germany the 
downward spiral continued until in October 1949 two Germanies were in existence. 
Elsewhere Greece, Turkey and Iran were also still unresolved issues.299 The Secretary of 
State here eventually made a decision that changed both Britain’s and the US’s role in the 
world. The Northern Department had long desired firm statements of intent, not only from 
others but also for Britain. On February 24th 1947 Bevin instructed Kerr, the ambassador to 
Washington, to inform the US State Department that Britain would withdraw from Greece  
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on May 30th.300 Financial difficulties had made a continued British military presence there 
impossible. Greece proved crucial. The wartime goodwill towards the Soviet Union 
amongst the American public and politicians was disappearing fast and thus revealed new 
options in foreign relations. In the end, it was the final trigger that persuaded the US 
government to admit that the Soviet Union had become recognised as a big enough threat 
to US interests to warrant continued involvement in Europe. It, however, also proved again 
that US diplomacy was still more reactive than proactive when it came to a bigger scale. 
Only an admission of weakness by Britain persuaded the US to make her future intentions 
clear. 
 
 
Meanwhile the violent propaganda campaign against Britain continued unabated while 
country after country in Eastern Europe fell under Soviet control. Having learned their 
lesson the hard way the previous year, however, the Russians were more careful in their 
behaviour so not to prejudice the CFM in Moscow in March/April 1947. They also 
possibly did not want to jeopardise the visit of the delegation of the Supreme Soviet which 
came to Britain in March 1947. Bevin played along. A draft speech for the Secretary of 
State by the Northern Department continued along the traditional line:  
 
 
the formal foundations of our relations with the Soviet government is entirely 
satisfactory, namely our common membership of the UN and of the CFM, our 
belief in Great Power collaboration and unanimity and out Treaty of Alliance…I 
believe that we shall…continue to work for Four Power collaboration in the 
framework of the UNO.301  
 
 
As this draft did not reflect Northern Department beliefs and demands, it is safe to assume 
that it was written with instructions from the Secretary of State in mind. Although Bevin 
had admitted defeat over Greece, he had not yet accepted the futility of a policy towards 
the Soviet Union that was not based on a firm doctrine of reciprocity. He still held out 
some hope that things could still get done. And this illustrated one of the major problems 
of the Northern Department. Without a Secretary of State who agreed with the Northern 
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Department and made their suggestions official British policy, there would be not much 
movement in foreign relations and certainly no emergence of a more determined and 
independent British foreign policy. It also did not help the Northern Department that the 
Secretary of State was equally determined to ignore the flood of anti-British propaganda in 
Moscow.302  
 
 
Overall, this was not a promising background to the negotiations for a revised Anglo-
Soviet Treaty which got underway in January of 1947 and led to heated arguments during 
the CFM in Moscow which started on March 10th.303 When Bevin had offered to extend the 
Treaty Stalin immediately took up the offer to start a discussion about a proper revision of 
it. Not surprisingly this was something the US felt ambivalent about, especially since 
Byrnes had already proposed a Four Power Treaty that would deal with Germany.304 
George Marshall stated quite frankly that ‘this policy [the Four Power Treaty] has the 
overwhelming support of our people who pin their faith to this rather than to the attempt to 
reach international security through bilateral agreements.’305 The US was obviously not 
amused and the Foreign Office promptly telegraphed back to confirm that closest Anglo-
American cooperation was very much desired.306  
 
 
The problem was that a proliferation of bilateral agreements would make the US idea of a 
Four Power Treaty unnecessary, while it could seriously harm the work of the UNO.307 
The British, of course, suspected that Stalin had proposed to extend the new treaty 
precisely in order to bypass quadripartite agreements. In a confidential memorandum to 
Sargent Oliver Harvey voiced his suspicions: ‘this bilateral obligation is precisely what the 
Soviets …want, because they do not trust the quadripartite machinery to work 
promptly.’308  And not only that, as Sargent admitted in a letter to Duff Cooper  
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while the Western Bloc as such has not yet materialised, it is, as you know, our 
policy that our affairs should be ‘mixed up’ more and more closely with those 
of France, Belgium and the Netherlands and we always have in view the 
possibility of closer association with all the other countries of Western 
Europe.309  
 
 
As much as Britain needed US financial aid and her continued military presence in Europe, 
Britain did not trust US motives enough to rely on this support alone.  
 
 
Apart from obvious geopolitical implications of having only the US as a major ally, it 
made sense to secure the protection of peace and of British interests from different points. 
The parts of the treaty dealing with German aggression had been in actual fact superseded 
by the establishment of the UNO. However, both parties had to acknowledge this, therefore 
both had to trust the UNO to be up to the job. Unfortunately the Soviets were not interested 
in putting their faith in the UNO, not surprisingly after the experiences with collective 
security in the 1930s, and demanded specific amendments and additions to the treaty.310 As 
the British openly acknowledged, war was a fast event and whether the UNO was able to 
respond in an appropriate time frame was questionable. Also, the Grand Alliance in any 
meaningful military sense had ceased to exist in August 1945. For now Britain was still 
obliged on a bilateral basis to come to the assistance of the Soviet Union in the case of 
future German aggression for another twenty years. As a memorandum pointed out, this 
situation was far from desirable: ‘we cannot wage war effectively without the Dominions 
and also America’ and so an extension of bilateral obligations was not desired.311 Even 
out-with the treaty negotiations this was a surprisingly honest admission of British 
weakness at a time when international diplomacy was all about strength.  
 
 
There was one more reason that made the British weary of extending this treaty without a 
change in the military provisos. The Foreign Office thought that the likelihood of a war 
between the US and the Soviet Union in the Far East, in which Germany might join the 
US, within the next fifty years was just as great as that of a war between the Soviet Union 
and Germany.312 In both cases Britain would under the existing treaty have to come to the 
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existence of the Soviet Union, overall a highly undesirable situation. In the end, the British 
wanted to delay the signing of a possible new Anglo-Soviet Treaty until it was clear where 
the Four Power Treaty would go. They saw it as highly undesirable to leave the CFM in 
Moscow with a new bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union while a multilateral agreement 
with the US had not also been signed.313 The wrangling over these issues lasted several 
months and certainly did not enhance mutual good-will. The Soviets were increasingly 
exasperated with the British for their refusal to extend the military provisions of the Treaty, 
while the British could not persuade the Soviets to put their faith in the UNO. Negotiations 
never broke down, merely remained ‘in progress.’ That was something that could not be 
said for the last CFM in Moscow in London during November and December of 1947. 
Despite Bevin openly stating to Molotov that ‘we had so many sessions that this was 
probably about the last chance of reaching agreement’, the conference ended as usual in 
disagreement.314  
 
 
Looking back at the previous CFMs this was not particularly remarkable. More 
problematic was the fact that this was the last CFM for the time being. Losing this forum 
of discussion reduced the diplomatic contact between the one-time Allies even further. 
Germany, of course, remained the main issue on the table and disagreements far 
outweighed agreements. There were strong suspicions on the British side that the Soviet 
Union had been delaying effective agreements to consolidate their gains in Germany so 
far.315 As Roberts put it ‘the Russians never take ‘half a loaf’ until their have exhausted 
every means of getting the whole loaf.’316 To get that ‘half a loaf’ however, proved 
increasingly difficult as cooperation between Britain and the US had improved 
considerably. Like the British, the Americans had gone through ‘a lengthy series of 
disillusioning experiences to exhaust the great reserved fund of goodwill created during the 
war by the achievements of the Red Army.’317  And just like the British they arrived at a 
similar conclusion. The new policy of ‘patient firmness’, the US version of the Foreign 
Office idea of ‘firm reciprocity’, was finally being implemented.  President Truman and 
General Marshall had confirmed it in their speeches and American political and public 
opinion was lining up behind them. US continued interest in Europe and US financial aid 
were now much more likely to continue with the full approval of Congress, even though 
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many Americans still struggled with the differences between Social Democracy and 
Communism, and may have longed for the old idea of retreating into isolation.    
 
 
That the Soviet Union and her Eastern European satellites had withdrawn from the 
negotiations for the ERP in July came as no surprise and just compounded Western 
suspicions about future prospects. The British were also finding American demands 
connected to the ERP rather humiliating.318 The term ‘Cold War’ slowly crept into 
diplomatic correspondence, although some presumed it a stage rather then a permanent 
problem.319 For the Foreign Office and the Northern Department these developments came 
only partially as a surprise as periodic drives to ensure the ideological supremacy of 
Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism had been a constant feature of Soviet domestic political life 
since 1917. Now however, with Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and an expressed 
interest in other areas of Europe, the Middle and Far East, the export of this ideology and 
its methods became a major concern. Information and intelligence were increasingly 
perceived as vitally important: to back up political strategies, not only to aid negotiations 
but also to ensure the longevity of the eventual agreements; to find ways to counter this 
perceived threat to the Western political and social system; and to deal with issues of 
national security and future military planning in the Western countries. The integrity of the 
Soviet political system, the strength/potential of industry/agriculture and domestic 
content/discontent were important markers in establishing just how strong the muscle 
behind the Soviet face really was. But although the task was clear, the ways to get this 
information were extremely limited. In a totalitarian police state any sensitive information 
is tightly controlled and when released has to be regarded as having been manipulated.320 
At the same time, those individuals with access to information are usually unwilling to 
volunteer it.  
 
 
Roberts in his first full report since the German surrender wrote in late May 1945 that more 
confidence on the part of the Soviet Union led to bigger plans and a desire to play a bigger 
international role.321 He clearly saw that as a result Britain was faced with limited options 
but thought that, even though the Soviet Union was unlikely to treat Britain with any 
special kindness with regard to her ‘peculiar difficulties and embarrassments’, she would 
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not aim for a reduced British military or general world role.  This of course was only part 
of the truth as increased intervention of both the US and the Soviet Union would 
necessarily alter the British role in the world. However, it took a while to see through 
declarations of intent and actual actions. Brimelow was undoubtedly right when he later 
commented that ‘it is more important to watch what they do than what they say.’322  
 
 
Despite attempts to maintain a workable relationship with the Soviet Union and despite 
huge efforts to understand this country, its history and ideology in detail it proved 
impossible to find a level on which to discuss pressing issues and reach agreements 
agreeable to both sides. Soviet post-war opportunism in Eastern Europe and her paranoia 
about her security as well as her undoubtedly strengthened international position led to a 
stagnating international diplomacy. Britain, economically and financially severely 
weakened, could not disguise her slipping international position; and, like Lippmann had 
argued, diplomacy without power could not really be effective. For Britain therefore 
realism and pragmatism, rather then confidence and opportunism, were the main 
cornerstones of her diplomacy. Until the USA was more firmly on Britain’s side and until 
some Western integration was achieved in the Western Bloc and NATO her room to 
manoeuvre was limited.  
 
 
The Northern Department led the discussion of possible policy initiatives. Staff realised 
very quickly that although Britain had lost its dominating position in world politics 
possibly for good, this newly found weakness could not be shown. Firmness towards the 
Kremlin, and within limits also towards the State Department, was necessary in order to 
maintain the remnants of its former power. As the international scene was shifting towards 
a real division between East and West, and as former colonial empires were suffering 
severe civil unrest and slowly broke up, Britain focused on Western Europe and the USA 
as future allies and sources of strength. Staff diligently analysed large amounts of 
information, and discussed and presented those future policies which in their opinion best 
supported Britain in this changed world. Dedicated and realistic they established the basis 
of the discussion during the early Cold War about how to deal with the Kremlin and how 
to ensure that this emerging conflict would not escalate into a new war. 
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Part Three.  Consolidation and Confrontation, 1948 to 1950 
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By the end of 1947, with all peace treaties but two signed and spheres of influence 
essentially entrenched, the need and will to cooperate virtually disappeared. Crises in Iran, 
Greece and Turkey had been dealt with; Germany and Austria were still occupied.  War 
had been avoided although talk of it had increased over time. The next three years, 
however, were to see the first clash in Europe over Berlin, the first war in the Far East in 
Korea and the emergence of three new countries within or close to the Allied spheres of 
influence with the FRG, GDR, PRC (not including the successor states in the Far East). In 
this charged atmosphere both Britain and the Soviet Union acquired the atomic bomb thus 
breaking the American monopoly. The Northern Department, not surprisingly, found that 
the need for an accurate and speedy assessment of any available information regarding the 
Soviet Union had increased dramatically. 
 
After a lot of stocktaking and the increasing experience of failure in international 
diplomacy to settle outstanding disputes, all sides moved towards a more thought through 
and determined approach. Political and military consolidation, and the pursuit of an 
effective domestic and international propaganda were now cornerstones of both Western 
and the Soviet policy. 1948 hailed a new post-war phase as British plans for increased 
Western European consolidation, which included Western German rearmament, elicited a 
severe Soviet response with the blockade of Berlin in June that year. Stalin´s Peace 
Offensive and fairly low key negotiations allowed the Soviets to withdraw less than a year 
later but the Soviet tactic of using peace propaganda to maximum effect remained. The 
Peace Campaign had already penetrated the international press when the Korean War 
broke out in June 1950. The first post-war war, albeit not in Europe, hastened 
consolidation on both sides and further hardened the diplomatic front. A tactical mistake 
by the Kremlin allowed Western forces to fight in Korea thus bringing hostile armies very 
near the Soviet border. Like Greece, Korea had resulted in a more determined American 
response in an area it might not have otherwise have been interested in. Against this 
background it is not surprising that the Northern Department continued to push for a more 
determined and confident British foreign policy.  
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Chapter Four: Institutions and personnel: The FO, the ND, and the Moscow 
Embassy, 1948-1950  
 
We…must go over to the offensive so that we do not have to lead from    
 weakness. 
                                                                                          Wallinger note, 10.5.1948323 
 
The Northern Department in 1948 was well organised and included new as well as 
experienced officials. Charles Harold Bateman took over as superintending Under-
Secretary of the department replacing Christopher Warner. Robin Hankey remained as 
Head of Department until 1950 when, after four years, Geoffrey Harrison succeeded him. 
All were supported at a higher level by Sargent, the Permanent Under-Secretary until 
February 1949 when William Strang took over. Strang himself had served in the Soviet 
Union between 1930 and 1933 and had thus valuable first hand experience of the country. 
Thomas Brimelow and A.E. Lambert, who had joined the Soviet desk of the Northern 
Department in 1946 and 1947 respectively, remained and ensured a much needed 
continuity of knowledge about Soviet affairs. C.R.A. Rae, who had entered the Foreign 
Office only in 1947 complemented their team at the Soviet Desk. In 1949, after Brimelow 
left for his new post in Havana, the thirty five year old J.Y. Mackenzie joined them.  
 
In British Embassy in Moscow had been headed by Maurice Peterson since June 1946. On 
his retirement in June 1949 David Kelly took over until he in turn retired two years later. 
Both guided their embassy through difficult times. The number of staff had decreased 
between 1947 and 1948 from thirty four to twenty nine. In 1950 Kelly would preside over 
only twenty two staff. The deepening Cold War and the problematic situation in the British 
embassies in the Soviet orbit made it even more important to secure accurate information 
and a careful analysis for the Northern Department in London to work with.324 A 
significant change of staff in the embassy may have made this quite a challenge. Two well 
regarded specialists left: the first secretary Charles Bolsover and the embassy 
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counsellor/minister Frank Roberts. Bolsover went on to teach at a London University while 
Roberts took over from Pierson Dixon as Bevin’s Principal Private Secretary. Only Roger 
Allen remained as first secretary. Nevertheless, very able new faces joined the embassy in 
these three years. Geoffrey Harrison arrived to serve in Moscow until 1950 when he 
returned to London to take over as head of the Northern Department, and William Barker, 
a Slavonic linguist who had worked at Bletchley Park during the war, became the head of 
the new Russian Secretariat. 
 
To remain effective and on top of new developments and the resulting demands on the 
Foreign Office, new committees were formed and procedures changed.325 The Cold War 
sub-committee of the already well established Russia Committee was to facilitate a wide-
ranging and accurate discussion of the new phase of post-war Anglo-Soviet relations.326 As 
part of the ongoing assessment of Foreign Office efficiency the Russia Committee itself 
was, not surprisingly, re-evaluated to ensure its proper function.327 At a higher level the 
Permanent Under-Secretary formed his own Committee with a view to discussing longer 
term policies while the Russia Committee was to remain the focal point for short term 
policy proposals.328 The Information Research Department (IRD) was set up in January 
1948 to oversee the propaganda aspect of British foreign policy. Its importance for the 
Cold War fight against Communism, cannot, as Aldrich noted, be overstated.329 Being at 
the forefront of this fight back, the IRD, not surprisingly, soon found itself pressured by the 
COS to include covert operations in its portfolio.330 As British foreign and defence policies 
slowly narrowed, the COS not surprisingly gained a stronger foothold in Foreign Office 
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committees. While the existence of British embassies in the Eastern bloc was difficult, all 
agreed that they had to remain despite severe harassment levelled at the staff. 331 
 
A Committee on Communism, which included Foreign Office as well as military 
personnel, was sanctioned by Attlee.332 To use and distribute the ever growing material on 
the Soviet Union and the Soviet orbit frequent bulletins were started. FORD, often 
instrumental in producing them, for example, regularly published a Bulletin on Communist 
Party Affairs.333 Amongst other internal reports were the frequent Monthly Review of 
Soviet Tactics and the Summary of Indications regarding Soviet Foreign Policy. Within 
this debate it was occasionally argued that the higher echelons within the Foreign Office, 
the Deputy and Assistant Under-Secretaries, should have access to the Cabinet papers on 
foreign policy and the Cabinet conclusions on them.334 The link between policy suggestion 
and its discussion at a higher level was seemingly too weak for those who wanted to ensure 
that these two parts of British foreign policy planning would complement each other while 
suggesting the best possible policy options.  
 
The primary problem of securing relevant and up-to-date information from the Soviet 
Union continued and elicited frank discussion within the Northern Department; within this 
debate the discussion about the usefulness of reading the Soviet press for clues to future 
Soviet policies was important. The Joint Press Reading Service in Moscow was expensive 
and had a difficult time keeping up with translating all relevant material. While Rae and 
Hankey argued against paying too much attention to the Soviet press, Roberts and Violet 
Connelly of FORD remained convinced that the study of available Soviet newspapers 
could yield important clues.335 This was a crucial point as the still relatively new IRD used 
material from the Soviet press and Soviet contacts to produce British propaganda 
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material.336 Reading and reacting to the Soviet press also had other implications; it was, for 
example, considered to answer more fully to Soviet ‘charges’ in its propaganda in order to 
possibly prompt clearer statements about future Soviet plans.337  
 
By 1948 the Northern Department was more than ever before aware that Soviet 
propaganda was part of a consistent and sustained attack on British democracy and its 
foreign policy. Peace in particular, Judt has argued, became the ‘centre piece of Soviet 
cultural strategy.’338 Retaliation had proven more difficult than initially anticipated; to 
persuade the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet that Britain had to step up its own 
propaganda campaign while taking off its still rather velvety gloves took longer than 
officials had imagined in the face of the growing Communist threat.  But by then the 
Northern Department by 1948 was well linked to outside agencies and well prepared in its 
expertise to deal with Soviet policies worldwide. The specialists spent a lot of their time re-
visiting Soviet ideology and its propaganda and organisational tactics to devise the best 
possible retaliation approach. Communism, the Cominform as the international centre for 
the organisation and dissemination of the Kremlin’s plans for world revolution, and the 
Peace Campaign were major issues discussed. The obvious Sovietisation of Eastern Europe 
and thus the extension of Communism’s geographical extent was another important area of 
interest.  
 
The continuous diplomatic fighting over Germany and its future role as well as the 
surprising defection of Tito from the grip of Stalin complicated British policy towards 
these countries. Much was still uncertain and the end result not yet clear. The British 
nevertheless had by now put their faith firmly in Western consolidation and a close 
relationship with the USA as well as in conflict resolution in the UNO. NATO and the 
Western Union institutionalised these plans, a development reciprocated at least partially in 
the Soviet bloc. Another major concern, especially after Berlin, was the likelihood of war. 
Although ostensibly a military issue, it was nevertheless extensively discussed in papers 
and memoranda reflecting a very real concern about the prospect of a new European war.  
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Chapter Five: The Soviet Union and Soviet foreign policy, 1948-1950   
 
Anything to do with the Politburo and the activities of its members is shrouded  
 in mystery. 
                                                                              Harrison to Hankey, 19.9.1948339 
 
While the Northern Department remained very interested in Soviet affairs, the progress of 
post-war reconstruction and the Five Year Plan, what happened at the top of the Soviet 
hierarchy became an ever more important issue. While the previous few years had seen the 
main focus on economic, military and social developments, these, although still playing an 
important role in the assessment of the country, by 1948 were overshadowed by important 
personnel changes in the Soviet Union.340 But here, as elsewhere, the lack of first hand 
information, as Harrison indicated above, was severe and at a time when the importance of 
psychology in policy and propaganda was increasingly recognised this proved a real 
disadvantage. Playing into the hands of the Soviet Desk, however, were changes in the top 
party leadership which were discussed at length in the Soviet press. As this information 
came in and as the complexities of the process of foreign policy formation in the Soviet 
Union were better understood, theories in the Foreign Office became more sophisticated.341 
 
The death of Andrei Zhdanov, considered Stalin’s right-hand man, on August 31st, 1948 
started a re-shuffling of posts between older and more inexperienced party personnel.342 
The longstanding differences of opinion between Zhdanov and Malenkov, now regarded as 
likely successor to Stalin, seem to have gone mostly unnoticed at the time. Concerning the 
role of top party leaders in the organisation and running of the economy, the dispute was 
settled only with Zhdanov’s death.343 The following year saw the beginnings of the first 
real post-war purge with the elimination of Zhdanov’s supporters and protégés within the 
Leningrad party organisation. Eventually resulting in the deaths of senior party leaders, 
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like A.A. Kuznetsov, Popkov, Kaputsin and Rodionov, and of highly qualified economic 
specialists, like N.A. Voznessenskii, the head of Gosplan, it heralded according to some 
historians a much bigger purge.344 When later reports appeared suggesting similar changes 
to the Moscow party organisation conclusions were difficult to draw because of a lack of 
reliable first hand information. The Northern Department, however, with only access to 
official information released in the Soviet press had a difficult time analysing these 
important events.345 Khrushchev, officials reckoned, was in the aftermath of this Leningrad 
Affair brought in as a counterweight to Malenkov’s increased national profile.346 Equally, 
changes within the Ministry of State Security, in the past a good indicator of purges to 
come, were noted but staff had difficulties to assess the importance of these 
developments.347  
 
The literature addressing issues regarding the top leadership of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union has grown rapidly in the past few years. Unlike the Northern Department at 
the time, access to archives, interviews and the publication of memoirs has helped piece 
together the last years of Stalin’s reign. In particular, the mechanics of the party leadership, 
their patronage networks and the differences between those at the top have been addressed. 
These discussions have helped to shed more light on some of the events mentioned above: 
the ministerial changes in 1948, the Leningrad Affair in 1949, and, in addition, the 
Doctor’s plot (which will be discussed in the third part). Patronage networks have attracted 
a lot of attention from historians. This is important as a better understanding of them, their 
impact and their place in the ‘affairs’ and purges of the later 1940’s could facilitate the 
understanding of the Soviet system at work. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk have argued that these 
‘neo-patrimonial’ networks resulted in an unstable system.348 The Mingrelian Affair, for 
example, is thought to have been executed to reduce Beria’s increased power and influence 
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which was largely based on such networks.349 Rigby, however, noted that these networks 
in actual fact stabilised Soviet political life.350  
 
Thought to have been the result of rivalries between Politburo members, the Leningrad 
Affair/ Gosplan Affair was the first instance in post-war years of a purge that resulted in 
the executing of some of the accused.351 Starting after Zhdanov’s death with the explicit 
motive of removing his supporters and protégés, and thus to break up his patronage 
network, it led to the conviction of over two hundred party members.352 It appears that a 
‘cadre revolution’ was being carried out.353 It is argued that it was Stalin himself who, 
always fearing that his lieutenants did not need his guidance anymore, oversaw these 
events.354 Others see it as Beria’s success or a combined Beria/ Malenkov effort.355 
Volkogonov, more colourfully, noted that ‘the Moscow Camarilla’ wanted action.356 
Nearly all agree that one underlying reason for this purge was the perceived independence 
of the Leningrad party organisation which, to Stalin at least, suggested possible 
disloyalty.357 The Soviet political elite itself, Stalin knew, was the real threat to himself.  
 
The replacement of Viacheslav Molotov, who had long tested the nerves of British 
diplomats, with Andrei Vyshinski, who had come to prominence as state prosecutor in the 
infamous show trials of the 1930s, after the disaster of the Berlin Blockade was much 
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discussed in the Foreign Office.358 While the Northern Department thought that he had 
indeed fallen out of favour, Peterson in Moscow disagreed; although a few months later 
rumours appeared suggesting the arrest of Molotov’s wife.359 Although Vyshinski was seen 
by the Northern Department as tactically superior to Molotov there was only little hope 
that this change of personnel would lead to better East West understanding. The 
appointment of Andrei Gromyko as one of Vyshinski’s deputies meant the return to the 
Soviet Union of a man who had gained a lot of first hand experience of the West in the 
Soviet embassy in Washington and the UN headquarters in New York. But this 
appointment equally did not result in an easing of Anglo-Soviet tension. This change 
among those in close contact with the West was puzzling.  
 
Although the composition of the Politburo was known, it was of little use when the 
functions of the members and their relationships were unknown.360 The issue of 
divergences of opinions within the Politburo, though much discussed, has not yet been 
settled. Without further archival access it is doubtful if it ever will. Khlevniuk states 
categorically that there were no factions.361 Harris argues equally convincing for a 
significant split between Malenkov and Zhdanov, until Zhdanov’s death.362 At the time the 
Northern Department tended not to speculate because there was no evidence to support 
either case.363 It seems clear, however,  that there was a struggle between groups to gain an 
advantage with Stalin.364 Interestingly, Zubkova has written that it seemed that Stalin, in all 
this, was not actually able to control his ‘entourage’ very well.365 
 
The Soviet Union between 1948 and 1950 went through a number of important 
developments which ultimately were designed to strengthen the leadership and its hold on 
the country as well as the industrial/military potential of the Soviet Union. Speeches and 
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articles pointed out the threat from abroad which demanded a further acceleration of 
industrialisation and the extension of the military-industrial complex.366 The race to build 
and test a Soviet atomic bomb, achieved in 1949, continued as a race to develop a 
hydrogen bomb. Aspaturian points out quite rightly that possession of the bomb, amongst 
other technological innovations, were of prime importance for a country considering itself 
a global power; Britain, of course, saw it exactly the same way.367 As more and more of the 
total Soviet budget was used for these efforts, the standard of living for the population not 
surprisingly stagnated and at times even decreased. The perseverance with which Stalin 
tried to secure reparations from Germany, against all opposition, may be more 
understandable against this background.368  
 
While Stalin used his iron will to form the country he thought he needed in order to 
succeed in his eventual goal of a Soviet controlled proletarian world revolution, his foreign 
policy was not so successful. According to Vladislav Zubok he never succeeded in 
understanding the motivations of American foreign policy and its interventions, while 
Mastny argued that Stalin followed a policy of testing the West’s ‘soft spots’.369 The 
resulting disasters in Berlin and Yugoslavia (discussed in detail in the next chapters) only 
added to his anxiety about the dangers of encirclement. The British ambassador Sir John 
Killick much later suggested that ‘my conviction is that Soviet foreign policy since 1917 
essentially was a position of turning Clausewitz on its head: Foreign policy was a 
continuation of war by other means.’370  
 
Roberts has classified this phase as that of ‘Cold War confrontation’, lodged between that 
of the ‘Grand Alliance’ and eventual ‘De-escalation’.371 Mackintosh, much earlier, had 
suggested that between 1944 and 1947 the Kremlin exploited its victory in World War II, 
while between 1947 and 1953 it was reduced to reacting to policies emerging from the 
USA and Britain.372 Much evidence can be provided to support this point: in particular 
Soviet policies and initiatives following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the 
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Marshall Plan, the founding of NATO and the suggestion to include West Germany in a 
European Defence Community. The stalemate in international diplomacy between East and 
West reached by 1953 was in the end a defeat for Stalin; his successes were essentially 
limited to those areas originally liberated by the Red Army.373 Efforts elsewhere had met 
with very limited success. Stalin found, as William Taubman has noted, that the ‘West 
refused to play the role assigned to it by him.’374 
 
Although, as Hosking argues, Stalin from 1948 onwards oversaw a Soviet empire in 
Eastern Europe, it did not provide the security he had craved.375 Yalta remained unfinished 
business as Stalin continued to hope for an American/British acceptance of his Soviet 
preponderance in Eastern Europe; the Kremlin took the October 1944 agreement 
seriously.376 Formerly promising developments in the Far East, with the victory of Mao 
over Kuomintag forces in 1949 and the promise of a short conflict in Korea in 1950, turned 
into a double-edged sword. While Mao proved a dedicated but independent Communist, 
the conflict in Korea brought American forces close to the border of the Soviet Union in a 
war that proved difficult to end. Nevertheless there was hope for Stalin. The detonation of 
a Soviet atomic bomb evened out the perceived imbalance of American technological 
superiority. Today there is little evidence that the American possession of the atomic bomb 
was an asset in discussions with the Soviet leadership, and possibly vice versa.377  
 
At the same time, it also became more apparent that the world order was becoming 
bipolar.378 This, Robert Service argues, actually increased the feeling of security for the 
Kremlin, until, it can be assumed, the outbreak of the Korean War.379 The turn in Soviet 
foreign policy noted in the historiography occurred in 1947 after the withdrawal from 
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negotiations for the Marshall Plan and were preceded by a telegram which supported a 
very ‘hawkish’ interpretation of American foreign policy.380 Marxism, it had been noted, 
did not provide a blueprint for Communist diplomacy in a world considered as hostile.381 
And this, it could well be argued, may well have been at the root of the problem. No 
blueprint demanded an assessment of choices and a measured response to secure the 
envisaged objectives. However, this demanded adequate negotiating skills as well as an in-
depth understanding of international relations, its function and methods. 
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Chapter Six: The ND view of the threat from Communist ideology, 1948-1950 
 
International Communism, organised and tightly controlled by the Kremlin is, 
in combination with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, such a threat to 
peace that we may be justified in making use of any force capable of disrupting 
it.           
                                                                 Russia Committee memorandum, 6.1. 1950382   
 
The simple kosher Jew goes to see the rabbi and tells him, ‘Rabbi, the world is 
in turmoil; they’re preparing for a new war. You are so wise, tell me: can we 
really not avoid war?’ ‘War? No, there will be no war, my son. But the fight for 
peace will be so bad that no stone will be left standing. 
                                                                                         Joke cited in Hammer and Tickle383 
 
Realpolitik should, towards the end of the war, have dictated to end the pretence of 
indefinite cooperation; Capitalism and Communism by ideological definition were 
incompatible, each awaiting the other’s demise for its own ends. The dithering in 
diplomacy, particularly on the Western side, between the end of the war and the failure of 
the last CFM in London in December 1947 was one result of this indecision. As important 
and understandable as the discussion and pre-settlement of political issues during wartime 
was it also tied the hands of those who had to deal with the detailed implementation of 
these after the war. Since there had been no precedent for this sort of alliance, there was 
now no precedent of how to maintain or end it. Arguably, a realistic assessment by all three 
sides would have revealed that the prolongation of this alliance out-with the UNO was 
improbable and that some form of peaceful cooperation was all that should be expected. As 
the Russia Committee concluded in the quote above, Communism in British eyes had 
turned into a credible threat. The Foreign Office knew that having proven its worth on the 
battlefields of the war, the Soviet government would demand not only international 
recognition but also a commanding voice in international politics. However, to match the 
aspirations, strategies and tactics of the liberal and democratic West and the totalitarian and 
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Communist East proved essentially impossible. 384 Communist ideology proved to be a 
new and sustained threat that could not be ignored and had to be fully understood in order 
to be effectively addressed. 
 
6.1. Communist ideology  
By the end of World War I ideology had emerged as a major force in European politics and 
by the 1930s as a major threat to European peace. Communist ideology had survived 
World War II and emerged as an established political ideology. The war had elevated the 
Soviet Union, as the first country practising Socialism, to the position of a world power 
with commensurate diplomatic influence and political gravitas. Newly confident, the 
Soviet Union now made her future intentions clear and proclaimed that the expected post-
war chaos in Europe in particular offered great opportunities for the spread of Communism 
through revolution. World revolution would enhance the security of the country itself and a 
secure Soviet Union could more effectively direct world revolution. In order to take the 
lead in this crusade, it now became vital that domestic strength mirrored external strength 
and that Communism was promoted as an attractive ideology with a lot of potential for the 
future. It was not surprising, that the Western powers perceived Communism soon as a 
global challenge which, so far, had been contained only in Europe.385 Not without reason 
has Mastny noted that ‘never did the totalitarian ideology of a fully regimented body 
politic come closer to perfection than in Russia under Stalin.’386 As a result this ideology, 
as a potent tool in the hands of the Kremlin and communists abroad, presented a real 
danger to Britain and British interests.387  
 
The Foreign Office was no novice in the appreciation of Communism and the overall 
consensus was clear:  
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Communism is the vehicle of an aggressive ideology [which takes the] hostility 
of the non-communist world to the Soviet Union [as] a basic assumption of 
Marxist –Leninist thought. Not only aggressive, it was also considered militarist 
to the point that the use of armed intervention is recognised as a legitimate means 
of extending the revolution.388  
 
In January 1950, after experiencing four and a half years of Soviet inspired Communism in 
Eastern Europe, Thomas Brimelow in a lecture to the Joint Services Staff College equally 
concluded that the Soviet Union ‘is inspired by an aggressive revolutionary ideology.’389 
Attlee himself thought the Soviets ‘ideological imperialists.’390 The semicircle of satellites 
around the Western border of the Soviet Union had brought this ideology directly to the 
front door of the Western European democracies. Opportunities for the careful territorial 
expansion of the Soviet Union had taken precedence over the retention of good relations 
with her Allies. If the study of history had taught the Soviet leaders one certainty, it was 
that opportunities should be exploited when they seemed to present themselves so readily. 
The ultimate aim, the Russia Committee reckoned, was worth the risk:  
 
the eventual planned organisation of a planned world economy and political 
system directed from Moscow by means of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, in 
other words by the means of a self-appointed priesthood of Communist leaders,  
 
and in more direct terms: ‘a Stalinist world.’391 The only consolation was that war for the 
Soviet government was neither an objective nor a means to an end.392 The merging of 
Russian expansionism with Communist ideology presented new opportunities and 
problems for the Soviet leadership while the perpetual struggle between the will and need 
to export Communism and the requirements of Soviet national security remained difficult 
to overcome.393  
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The reality of Communism, in such close proximity and the prospect of continuous Soviet 
expansion to further enhance the security of the country worried the Foreign Office.394 To 
the Northern Department this presented a threat which became serious once the Soviet 
Union sprung into action to export this ideology. Particularly by the spring of 1948, once 
the Eastern European countries had been safely brought more or less into line, the Kremlin 
stepped up its initiatives to achieve what had been announced as Communist policy at the 
Cominform foundation conference in September 1947: the defeat of the ERP in order to 
retard Western European recovery, hinder further European integration and engineer a 
revolutionary situation of which to take advantage.395 Hankey, then Head of the Northern 
Department, worried that this might be rather easily achieved.396  
 
Communism was attractive to many who did not know better and the weakened not exactly 
unified democratic governments of Western Europe had not put up a strong or effective 
defence so far. It was not really surprising that the Soviet government in these 
circumstances, seeking security and Communist expansion, tried to take advantage of the 
situation. But even then, the Northern Department argued, ‘one cardinal rule of Communist 
procedure is not to proceed to a major attack until everything is ready and there are very 
good chances of success.’397 This, of course, was exactly the problem and the solution to 
the Foreign Office: good information was necessary to assess how strong Communist 
support and organisation really was, and precise plans and Cabinet approval were needed 
to thwart any Soviet efforts to increase that strength and extend Soviet influence.398 Until 
that time when definite Soviet strength emerged, the West would be relatively safe: ‘one of 
the differences between Hitler …and the ruling clique in Moscow today is that while the 
former did not really mind if he did provoke a major war, the probability is that the latter 
do not wish to do so, anyhow at present…’, Harrison noted in March 1948.399 
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The Marxist theory of an economic slump across the Capitalist world promised a neat 
solution to the problem of exporting the revolution and, mistaking normal post-war 
economic difficulties for a proof of Marxist theory, the Soviet leadership decided to keep 
up the pressure across Europe through its mass organisations and propaganda considering 
Capitalism doomed and already in its death throes.400 As Marxism taught, during a post-
war period the economic difficulties would prove too extensive to be dealt with sufficiently 
by the respective governments thus leading to severe inter-power rivalries for resources 
and markets. At the same time the deteriorating economic and social conditions would 
radicalise the workers. This emphasis on a slump in capitalist countries was, apart from the 
Peace Campaign, the main Soviet propaganda theme. The Kremlin simply hoped that with 
an economic crisis American support for the ERP would wane and leave the continent 
open to Communist penetration. They had a point, the Northern Department reluctantly 
admitted.401 A year later Rae succinctly pointed out why: ‘the Cold War is more 
destructive to this side of the curtain than to the other, and the Politburo must surely know 
it.’402All the Soviet Union had to do was to wait and prepare the ground as effectively as 
possible to reap the rewards when the time came.  
 
Stalin’s doctrine of Peaceful Co-existence was effectively only bridging this time and did 
not change the fundamental Soviet truth that war was essentially inevitable. ‘Peaceful Co-
existence was a Soviet tactic calculated to lull suspicion [and] it cost nothing’, Barker 
concluded in a memorandum by his Russian Secretariat.403 Peaceful Co-existence also 
offered other opportunities, as the US chargé d’affaires Foy Kohler told Harrison in 
February 1949:  
the Soviet Union seems to have been basing policies and actions in the 
expectation of peace for the near future, believing itself save from attack the 
Soviet government has deliberately chosen to weaken itself to a certain extent 
during the next few years - the Tito dispute, purges, collectivisation etc – in order 
to gain strength for a later inevitable conflict in which it continues to believe.404  
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All this, not surprisingly, provoked intense debates within the Northern Department and 
the Foreign Office in general. Of particular interest was the problem of whether or not the 
Soviet leadership actually believed in their ideology. Hankey certainly suspected that they 
did, as did nearly all those in the Department and the Moscow Embassy. Others, however, 
disagreed. Dixon pragmatically wrote that ‘after all, Communism was merely a 
convenience for the Russian revolutionaries.’ 405 The major problem here was that personal 
contact was so limited that it was impossible to make a confident judgement in this matter. 
That leaders might say one thing in public and another in private was well known. Soviet 
public pronouncements on the issue were therefore problematic, a fact often admitted 
amongst officials.406 
 
The apparent nearness of Communism caused its own theoretical problems and the more 
the public discussion suggested that it was nearly within reach, the more these had to be 
addressed. The Northern Department followed these discussions very closely to assess if 
and how they might offer opportunities for the West in the coming years. How Communist 
ideology was adjusted to changing reality would be a strong indicator of how much 
potential Peaceful Co-existence really had and how long it would be a useful Soviet tactic; 
how Soviet Communism was organised domestically could provide important clues to the 
future stability of the country and the possibilities for covert intervention. Stalin’s 
management of this was a perfect example of the merging of Realpolitik and a well defined 
ideological construct and, as the Northern Department argued, ‘represents perhaps the best 
hope that the world may avoid catastrophe.’407  
 
It revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of Communist ideology. It was obviously 
able to evolve and adapt to different realities as required, and even more importantly it also 
revealed that these adjustments were made in response to pressure applied from outside. 
Here potentially lay a real chance for Western foreign policy to have a significant impact 
on the perceived threat of Soviet Communism. Even though the adjustments had been 
made as a last resort, the Soviet leadership did make these adjustments rather than to retain 
an ideological model which proved difficult to reconcile with their own perceived needs.  
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This struggle between a relatively neat ideological construct and the need to apply it to ever 
changing circumstances proved challenging for the Kremlin.408 Stalin was frequently 
flexible in tactics to get what he wanted. During a Russia Committee meeting it was noted 
that ‘Hankey thought that Stalin’s foreign policy might be compared to his war strategy, in 
that when one offensive failed or ceased to yield results he always has another ready to be 
launched.’409 The combination of ideology, preparedness, flexibility, imagination and 
boldness was considered highly effective.  
 
All this led to the question of what Communism would really change.410 Although this 
appears to be foremost a theoretical point, it did have huge implications for the future and 
the potential disaffection of millions with a future that might not be as fabulous as it had 
previously been described and it could offer unique opportunities to the West. If, as the 
Northern Department considered during the late summer of 1949 when this issue was hotly 
debated, it all came down to ‘Lenin’s famous equation of electricity plus socialism’, it 
would be difficult even for the Soviet propaganda machine to see this as the future of 
world Communism. On the other hand the Kremlin could well choose to make a drastic 
distinction between the reality of Communism in the Soviet Union and in other countries. 
In early 1950 a memorandum on the ‘Transition to Communism’ assumed that  
 
the purpose of the propaganda …is to point out the carrot to the donkey [because] 
without the propaganda the donkey might forget about the carrot and it is fair to 
assume that this particular donkey needs quite a lot of persuading that the carrot 
is there at all.411  
 
Communism, it seems, was still not really a heart and minds ideology but, as always 
argued in the Foreign Office, an imposed political doctrine.  
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A related and important issue, and a discussion very closely watched in the Foreign Office, 
was that of the security and armed forces in Communism. For the Northern Department 
this was a major issue of concern and interest with potentially very important implications 
for Soviet, and therefore British, foreign policy and military strategy. When an economic 
slump in the West became a more distant hope by 1949, Soviet propaganda turned more 
directly to the theme of Western preparation for an aggressive war against the Soviet 
Union. Here more than in any other propaganda argument did the issues of post-war 
reconstruction, internationalism and peace come together and in actual fact helped the 
Soviet government support another major adjustment in Communist ideology. Being part 
of the state, the army and punitive organs too should in theory wither away with the state. 
However, the capitalist encirclement was used to justify the continued existence of these 
services. At the same time, on the international scene, the Soviet Union very neatly 
manoeuvred herself into the position of champion of peace, unable to initiate a war due to 
restrictions by its ideology, by declaring that because of ‘its very nature the land of 
Socialism cannot wage aggressive war [and] cannot pursue imperialist aims.’412  The West, 
pursuing military consolidation in NATO and the proposed European Defence 
Community, was thus on the defensive. That this was an example of creating an 
environment fertile for specific Communist propaganda initiatives was well recognised.  
 
Even if the Kremlin would not intentionally start an aggressive war, the Foreign Office 
knew that any decision to do so would be based as much on facts as on perceptions of 
strength, weaknesses and of threats both of the Soviet Union and of the outside world. The 
fear of attack by the Capitalist powers was, the Foreign Office admitted, probably quite 
genuine.413 A more immediate problem, as the Northern Department and the COS well 
realised, was that the danger of conflict would rise exponentially once the Kremlin grasped 
that she could no achieve her aims by other methods. 414 A paper by the PUSD on ‘British 
policy towards Soviet Communism’ made this point very clear: ‘Russian policy today is 
more dangerous…Russian and her satellites represent a vast agglomeration of power [and] 
this power is animated by a militant ideology which aims at the overthrow of all systems 
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not on conformity with it.’415  Not without reason did Rae remind his audience at the Staff 
College in Camberley in March 1950 that ‘we must remember that the Soviet Union is 
organised permanently on a more or less war footing.’416 David Kelly, British ambassador 
in Moscow, added a worrying implication:  
 
they will continue to believe in the approaching inevitable disintegration of the 
West…but my feeling of the atmosphere leads me to think that we should now 
reckon on there being some limits to the extent to which this ‘apocalyptic’ 
doctrine will act as a brake in all circumstances.417  
 
Aggressive war, it seemed, was not that far out-with the purview of Communism as to 
make it impossible. This interplay of reality, ideology, perceptions and intentions was 
dangerous, as subsequent Cold War crises were to prove. 
 
The Foreign Office knew that Soviet foreign policies were based on Realpolitik as well as 
on Communist ideology.418 What was used in which circumstances depended on the 
Kremlin’s assessment of the international situation. In a way, both the Soviet Union and 
the West had limited choices in the matter of ideology: the West could not ignore 
Communist ideology since it was so prominently used in Soviet propaganda and foreign 
policy, and the Kremlin could not do without this ideology as a large part of its domestic 
and international credibility depended on it. The major difficulty was that it was essentially 
impossible to accurately gage the personal opinions of the Soviet leaders. Educated guess 
work was thus, as in many reports at the time, an important part of the Northern 
Departments assessments. The Northern Department had no choice but to take it seriously 
although the discussion of Communism, possibly with the exception of China, centred 
around the issues of Soviet intentions and future plans.  
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Communism was seen as weak and unlikely to survive worldwide if divorced from the 
Soviet leaders and their determination to implement it. Awareness of this issue as well as 
of the problem of trying to be a Great Power while simultaneously being the ‘fatherland of 
the international proletariat’, both with different and not always reconcilable opportunities, 
responsibilities and freedoms, prompted further Soviet action. The Cominform became the 
instrument to establish and then streamline control over foreign Communist parties, and to 
issue directives. Through this organisation the threat of Communism as a potentially 
subversive force became more apparent.419  
 
6.2. The Cominform 
The Northern Department was aware that the expanding Soviet empire after 1945 
presented the Kremlin with new problems. The technologically still relatively restricted 
communications opportunities at the time meant that Communist leaders on the spot were 
unable to consult the Soviet leadership about all problems which arose. While overall 
policies and strategic aims could periodically be discussed at meetings and conferences, 
the everyday administration of the satellite countries had to be left in the hands of trusted 
Communists. National sensibilities, varying experiences throughout the inter-war and war 
years, and differing ideas of how to realise Marxist theories, however, meant that, while 
Communism might in theory appear to be a coherent ideology, its implementation in 
countries with such diverse backgrounds would invariably raise questions which would 
hardly be answered identically within the orbit states. Individuality meant deviation which  
made central control from Moscow harder if not impossible.  
 
The Foreign Office was interested to see if and how the Kremlin would try to achieve and 
maintain control over its new orbit. The Cominform, formed in September 1947, was to be 
the conduit between the centre and its periphery; it also opened a new stage in the conflict 
between East and West.420 It was to act as an advisory body to maintain uniformity within 
the Communist parties in the satellite states as well as act as an enforcing agency for the 
Kremlin ensuring that policies dictated in Moscow would be implemented by these parties. 
Interestingly, the SED in the Soviet occupied zone of Germany was not allowed to join 
                                                 
419
 FO371/77569-N7491/1017/38, FORD, ‘Survey of Communism in Western Europe’, 16.8.1949.  
420
 FO371/66374-N13701/271/38, RC meeting notes, 23.10.1947 and  FO371/66373-N12755/271/38, 
4.11.1947.  
 117 
even though it had proved itself more radical and Stalinist than most other Communist 
parties. For Western Communist parties it was to act as a sort of intermediary; not all 
questions which arose could be directly dealt with by the Kremlin itself. To increase its 
profile and distribute its propaganda more effectively it organised frequent congresses and 
issued journals. The association of high profile Communists with this agency was an 
attribute of its importance. Although Northern Department staff argued about its real 
influence and long-term impact, at the time it was another tool for the Soviet Union to 
increase and maintain control in East and West, and therefore had to be watched closely. 421  
  
The Foreign Office, it appears, was interested in the Cominform because it was central to 
communications between Western Communist parties and the Soviet Union. This direct 
contact was a serious concern. Propaganda and its effective distribution, the 1930s had 
proven, could be highly effective in destabilising established political systems. The 
Northern Department had no choice but to take the Cominform seriously; at least until its 
actual impact could be properly assessed. By 1950, probably to the relief of the Northern 
Department, it had become clear that although its propaganda output was high, the 
Cominform had little impact on Western European affairs. Its prestige had suffered 
substantially through an aggressive Soviet foreign policy. As a result its main impact 
remained restricted to Eastern Europe.   
 
The Cominform, established in Poland in September 1947, was a much smaller and more 
streamlined organisation than previous far left-wing international bodies had been. It was 
founded in a politically defined and, crucially, post-war environment. Andrei Zhdanov’s 
‘two camp speech’ had pointed out the battle lines.  The wartime Grand Alliance was 
unmistakably dead.422 Whether or not there actually were two camps was essentially 
irrelevant. It was the perception of this reality of this idea that made it so potent and that 
quickly induced substantial paranoia in Eastern as well as Western governments. It was 
clear, and had been confirmed by Zhdanov, that the Kremlin demanded the leading role 
within the Communist world movement and that it would follow its aspirations as far as 
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was safely possible. A memorandum by FORD, reviewing Anglo-Soviet relations since 
1939, stated in September 1948 that undoubtedly   
 
the dominant feature of Soviet domestic and foreign policy since the end of the 
war has been the vehement reassertion of uncompromising Marxist-Leninist 
orthodoxy [and that] the creation of the Cominform was the ceremonial 
restatement of the central truth on which Soviet policy is based that  the world is 
divided into two irreconcilably hostile camps.423  
 
Taking this as a basis for its assessment of Soviet policies and diplomatic manoeuvres, the 
outlook was bleak: any Soviet gestures of goodwill or offers to negotiate outstanding 
issues of contention were tactics only.424 The basic strategy would not change if the 
primary assumption it was based on did not change as well.  
 
But the Cominform was by no means just a tougher copy of earlier attempts to dominate 
Socialist/Communist parties elsewhere. Both in the 1930s Comintern and in the 
Cominform there was only one centre of importance, one supreme leader and one overall 
plan.425 If one added the Soviet criticism of foreign Communist leaders, the purging of 
their parties and the hard-line propaganda issued by the Comintern, it was not surprising 
that it thus became an important instrument for coordinating working class responses to 
different Soviet tactics: anti-ERP strikes, the Peace Campaign, the Stockholm Appeal, the 
strikes against the Korean War. 426 As the Kremlin and obedient Communist leaders in East 
and West knew, organisation, cooperation and coordination were keys to success. By 
bypassing the national governments, a favoured Communist tactic, the Cominform called 
on the ‘peoples from below’ to implement Soviet strategies in their countries where, 
adhering to Marxist doctrine, the working class would take the main role in the struggle. 
But the Cominform was also to work against the growing, and for Stalin troubling, forces 
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of nationalism within the orbit states.427 To avoid direct attack from the West the 
Cominform was run almost like an underground organisation: it was heard but not really 
seen. This, in particular, made it a real worry to the Foreign Office as it made the 
assessment of its structure and potential very difficult. 
 
There were inherent weaknesses in its organisation, however. The Cominform did not 
prove to be the major super-weapon to wield when trying to solve disputes or enforce its 
policy against reluctant opponents; it could not levy sanctions as such. When the Kremlin 
tried to use it to bring Tito back into the Soviet controlled Communist fold it failed 
miserably; this episode more than anything else demonstrated its tactical limits. To deal 
with the national Communist parties proved extremely difficult for the Kremlin. While 
Communist leaders within and out-with the orbit may have sincerely dreamt of a Marxist 
paradise, their national aspirations had been given a boost by their wartime experiences. 
Western ally during the war or not, the defeat of one oppressor was preferably not to be 
followed by the imposition of another. What they wanted, and what Stalin could not grant, 
were different roads to Communism within a loosely organised Communist movement. 
The Soviet idea of simply imposing its will on the weaker states quickly proved difficult to 
implement. In the end the Cominform revealed its importance more over its publications of 
Agitprop and for directing the conduct of the Peace Campaign.  
 
Cominform propaganda was violently anti-Western, arguing that ‘like the Fascist aggressor 
the Anglo-American Bloc is engaged in preparing a new war in all spheres.’428 Whether or 
not the Kremlin actually believed that war was fairly imminent did not really matter in this 
instance, the aim was to put the West on the defensive. In the absence of Communist 
participation in national governments in Western Europe other avenues of influence and 
subversion had to be explored and it was here that the Cominform saw its chance for 
further activities. This definition of battle lines opened up opportunities for the West. The 
Soviet aim of preventing Western consolidation by any means short of war was actual 
political warfare and required a strong, consistent and continued response from the British 
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government. Here the IRD, the BBC, and other smaller organisations were at the forefront 
of this new peacetime war. As the Soviet Union concentrated its propaganda more and 
more on the West, the Northern Department realised that the battle for the support of their 
own population would be one of the real challenges of the Cold War.   
 
What remained to be debated was how serious the Kremlin took this organisation and its 
propaganda. Verging often on the hysterical in its appeals to the ‘suppressed workers’ of 
the world, it seems unlikely that the Soviet leadership took too much notice of it. This, at 
least, was in the end the consensus within the Northern Department.  Mayhew wrote in 
September 1950, when the Peace Campaign had become an increasingly frantic tool by 
Communists everywhere, that ‘it would be strange if the kind of nonsense which is 
purveyed by the Cominform was taken seriously by the undoubtedly able and clever men 
who form the Politburo.’429 Nevertheless, the Cominform did fulfil an important function 
within the orbit, even though some historians argue it was inadequate both in foiling the 
Marshall Plan and enhancing cooperation across the orbit states.430 Conformity was 
deemed vital to the Kremlin and the Cominform was one tool of achieving it. In usual 
Soviet style, it was not the only tool. If it was deemed necessary, as it was by early 1948, 
other tools would complement it to enforce conformity: political terror, suppression by the 
secret police and the imposition of Soviet communists on satellite governments and armed 
forces. 
 
6.3. The Peace Campaign 
Soviet propaganda had been fairly consistent with regards to its main aims, the disruption 
of Western European recovery and the frustration of any Western plans for political or 
military consolidation of its sphere of influence, particularly if this included Germany. But 
although it mercilessly attacked the West for its alleged hostility towards the Soviet Union 
and her satellites, for the West’s imperial policies out-with Europe, for ‘ganging up’ on her 
by forming Western defence coalitions and for planning the next war, it had apparently 
mainly influenced those already interested in or committed to the Soviet Union. A real 
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publicity coup was needed that would unite these strands and permeate broader sections of 
society out-with her immediate sphere of influence and that could be repeatedly 
manipulated to suit various circumstances. The Peace Campaign was to be just that. 
Although the overall impact may actually have been rather limited, the overwhelming 
presence of this campaign in the press and the resulting discussions about issues of national 
security and the probability of war gave it an importance far beyond its propaganda. 
 
The war of nerves between East and West intensified during 1948 when the coup in 
Czechoslovakia, numerous trials in orbit countries which ended with death sentences and 
imprisonment for many prominent men, and increased activity in the SBZ in Germany had 
clarified Soviet intentions. Her new ‘empire’ was here to stay and the methods of control 
were being fine-tuned while outstanding issues were being addressed. But while a secure 
ring of satellites promised improved national security for the Soviet Union, the prospects 
for influencing and penetrating the West increasingly shrank. The French and Italian 
Communist Parties had been voted out of the national governments in 1947 while in the 
West German zones the population proved surprisingly reluctant to embrace any ideas 
emanating from the East. Increased consolidation of the West of Germany and of the 
Western European states out-with the UNO, and increased international cooperation in 
halting Soviet manipulation in the UNO provided the Kremlin with a broad front to attack. 
The additional very heated debates about the control of atomic energy, allied intervention 
in Far Eastern affairs and the continuing issue of national self-determination for colonial 
peoples gave the Soviet Union a highly populist agenda on which to campaign for herself. 
Peace was the common denominator for all of these.  
 
Although the Peace Campaign is usually referred to as having started in April 1949 in 
response to plans finalising the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, its first salvo was fired 
during the previous year. Tiring of Soviet interference in transport links between Berlin 
and the West German zones President Truman in May 1948 instructed Bedell Smith, 
American ambassador in Moscow, to make it clear once and for all to the Soviet 
government that the USA would not withdraw from Berlin. Bedell Smith on May 4th 1948 
met Molotov, then the Soviet Foreign Minister, conveyed this message and was persuaded 
to leave a copy of his memorandum for the record. This proved to be a costly mistake and 
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started a propaganda war that was quite new in the story of the Cold War so far.431 The 
statement had made American intentions clear not to budge to Soviet pressure but the 
version of the note released to the Soviet press implied that the USA had made an approach 
to the Soviet government to settle their differences, over Germany in particular, on a 
bilateral basis.  
 
This was reminiscent of appeasement and the Northern Department was at a loss over what 
had apparently happened. Lord Inverchapel, former ambassador to Moscow and now 
ambassador to Washington, was instructed to seek an appointment with George Marshall, 
the US Secretary of State, immediately. The major concern was that the USA was 
implementing a change in foreign policy in which Britain did not play a key role.432 In the 
absence of any definite US military commitment to Europe the Northern Department was 
extremely worried. Extraordinarily it seems that officials took Molotov’s remarks in the 
Soviet press and the published document at face value. Actual fear seems to have clouded 
their initial judgement. After a flurry of telegrams it turned out that American foreign 
policy doctrine had not in fact changed.433 Marshall, with Kennan and Bohlen present, had 
explained the situation and made the Soviet manipulation of events as well as the rather 
limited confidence of the UK in her American partner rather obvious. Marshall was 
seriously displeased with this British lack of trust.  
 
While the Soviet propaganda machine milked this episode and the apparent Soviet peace 
offer for all it was worth, the American administration was forced to engage on a damage 
limitation exercise. The Kremlin had, quite impressively, shown its superior skills of 
merging opportunity with the effective manipulation of events. 434 That Stalin had made 
this ‘peace’ offer to negotiate without a responding move by the Western allies was seen as 
extremely damaging: the Northern Department stated very clearly that even though ‘the 
object is to …disorganise the resistance which the Kremlin Cold War tactics have been 
building up against Soviet expansion …Stalin’s letter cannot be ignored [and] must be 
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dealt with positively.’435 However, the alleged champion of peace had not succeeded in 
bullying the USA into bilateral negotiations and the major issues thus remained unsolved.  
 
The second phase of the Peace Campaign started in the later winter 1948/early spring of 
1949 in response to further Western consolidation with the imminent signing of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. A successful settlement with the West and/or the delay of this treaty would 
have scored a victory for the Kremlin which had been left humiliated by the Tito affair, the 
rejection by the Norwegian government of the offer of a bilateral non-aggression pact and 
the success of the British and American air forces over the supply of Berlin. On March 31st 
1949 the Soviet Union delivered formal notes to the governments of the Brussels powers, 
the USA and Canada which condemned the planned treaty as aggressive. The West 
remained firm and the treaty was signed in April 1949. With hindsight Kelly, the new 
ambassador to Moscow, wrote in November 1949 that the ‘peace campaign certainly made 
no headway at all commensurate with the efforts put into it.’436 But nevertheless, as the 
Northern Department realised, it had to be addressed by the West. To stand back in this 
propaganda war was not really an option which is why the IRD and the BBC among others 
were placed right at the centre of British plans to fight back.  
 
The emphasis of the Communists to link themselves and their ideology to the preservation 
of peace was hugely attractive to many so shortly after a major war, but it did not 
necessarily increase grass-roots support for them. The most disturbing aspect of this whole 
campaign was that it allowed those involved to continuously talk about war while 
ostensibly talking about peace. Another was that it harnessed all available Communist or 
affiliated outlets into it: trade unions, local interest groups, papers and journals, 
international congresses. The momentum was therefore always kept up and the 
governments on both sides, in a self-perpetuating development, spend an increasing 
amount of time trying to deal with it. While the governments arguably knew better than to 
expect war any minute, the concern among many people was real. To take advantage of 
this the Kremlin had, as the American chargé d’affaires Foy Kohler put it, planned and 
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executed a ‘war scare’ campaign in order to retard Western recovery and frighten the 
populations.437 The Peace Campaign thus fell on fertile ground.  
 
The discussion in the Northern Department about whether this campaign was outright 
propaganda or whether it revealed a real Soviet worry about war and a willingness to 
negotiate to avoid it went on for many months. Brimmel, from the IRD, argued that the 
‘next war is purely a bogey and thus that the present peace campaign is merely a racket.’ 
Rae, rather unconvinced, retorted that ‘such an interpretation seems scarcely to accord with 
our general practice of finding at least some fire behind Soviet smoke.’438 Violet Connelly 
of FORD quite rightly pointed out that ‘fear of war is certainly being manipulated by the 
Kremlin…but surely one of the basic reasons for this movement is precisely some fear of 
war.’439 A month later the Russia Committee concluded that the Peace Campaign had 
‘emerged as a sustained smoke screen for the scale of Soviet military preparedness and 
their sacrifice of butter to guns.’440 The talk of war will be addressed in a following chapter 
but it has to be said here that neither side saw a future war as one it could win. In February 
1949 the JIB had been ‘forced to conclude that Russia’s military strength is vastly superior 
to that of the Commonwealth/ USA.’441 The Soviet government was equally worried about 
its prospects in a new war so soon after just having survived another. The massive Soviet 
propaganda effort and desire to enhance Eastern consolidation by all means short of war 
was an admission that it too did not perceive war as a viable tactic to get what it wanted. 
 
The Russia Committee in May 1949 discussed the campaign in a paper entitled ‘Peace 
offensive, tactical deviation or change of long term policy.’442 Because the Kremlin was 
seen under the influence of Leninism/ Stalinism to understand politics in military terms it 
was assumed that the Soviet discussions of tactics and strategies would be fairly accurate. 
They also agreed that the long term objectives of the Kremlin had not changed. Placing the 
start of the campaign with the dismissal of Molotov as Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
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alongside the other already mentioned components, the Russia Committee concluded that 
the Soviet Union, faced with numerous problems elsewhere, was interested in calming 
relations for the time being. The Peace Campaign was thus possibly a rather poisonous 
olive branch held out to the West. In August 1949 a FORD paper assessing the campaign 
concluded that so far its success was rather limited.443 
 
For the Foreign Office it became ever more important to secure a solution to outstanding 
issues in order to deal with this barrage of propaganda emanating from the Communist 
movement. It was necessary to calm the nerves of those Western governments which were 
not involved in top level international diplomacy and therefore rightly worried about their 
future security, and about what happened behind closed doors when the Great Powers did 
negotiate. Hankey explained that   
 
so far as Denmark and Norway are concerned, what we need is the right degree 
of pressure by the Russians to frighten the sheep into the fold. It seems about 
right now. We do not want that growling of the bear to reach such a pitch that the 
sheep take panic and scatter into isolation.444  
 
Although this was a Great Power talking, his comment revealed the problem of the 
possibly lacking attractiveness of belonging to a or any bloc. The threat of subversive Fifth 
Column activity in their respective countries was a valid and potent concern and one which 
neither Britain, the USA, the UNO nor NATO could do much about. But in the absence of 
an actual military threat from the Soviet Union or one of its satellites, British hands were 
essentially tied.  
 
To counter this campaign various ideas were discussed in the Northern Department during 
these three years: publicity offensives – overtly and covertly, an extension of the work of 
the IRD, broader use of the BBC, the leaking of information to sources which would use 
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them to educate the public at home. Two ideas were vital: the agreement that hostile 
propaganda had to be addressed vigorously and immediately, and that the consolidation of 
the West had to progress, even in the face of continued Soviet opposition to it. In effect the 
West had to mirror what was happening in the East, consolidation and aggressive 
propaganda, but with an emphasis on freedom, democracy, economic progress and social 
equality. The West, suggested General Ian Jacob, then in charge of the BBC’s foreign 
service and member of the Russia Committee, had to come up with a ‘positive reply.’445  
 
To match the appeal of peace ideas and an apparently progressive ideology it would have 
to be attractive, emotionally involving and convincing. This emphasis on Positivism had 
gradually emerged in Northern Department advice in order for British propaganda to be 
more appealing, persuasive and to get away from the negativity of being seen to be anti-
Soviet /anti-Communist.  But the British during the spring of 1950 were still at a loss what 
to offer in return: ‘our side still lacks an impelling gospel’, an unnamed Foreign Office 
official noted.446 This lack of an appropriate answer made an effective retaliation to the 
Peace Campaign very difficult. Any good campaign designed to appeal to a broad mass of 
people had to have a strong central message.  In March 1950 Chip Bohlen, the American 
minister in Paris, plainly stated to a Foreign Office official that  
 
the Russians …had cornered the market in peace: the peace campaign had not 
been a great success…but the fact remained that it was the Russians who started 
it and who had now more or less jockeyed us into a position where we were 
organising military defensive groups whilst they were innocently concentrating 
on the pursuit of peace.447  
 
That was as near as anyone in the West would go to admitting defeat in this instance of the 
Cold War. It also demonstrated the overwhelming problems the Foreign Office faced in 
dealing with the fairly sophisticated propaganda machine of Soviet Communism.  
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Globally, and worryingly for the Northern Department, 1950 was dominated by two 
developments. Firstly, the Stockholm Appeal, launched in March 1950 and demanding the 
control of atomic weapons, proved to be the biggest single initiative within the Peace 
Campaign.448 Although mass saturation of this campaign was not achieved, the outbreak of 
the Korean War and the threat of the use of atomic weapons revived the campaign later 
that year. The war in Korea, which had started on June 25th 1950, provided the background 
to the second important campaign that year. Here was the first hot war of the Cold War at a 
time when both sides had dug in their heels over their respective positions in Europe.  
 
The Soviet inspired and slowly increasing criticism on the UNO against this background 
betrayed a more sinister Soviet idea: that the World Peace Congress could be built up to 
challenge the UNO as the most effective and representative international organisation.449 
Two articles, in the Cominform journal and the Soviet journal of Soviet State and Law, 
hinted that this new organisation would be a ‘true parliament of the peoples.’450 A Foreign 
Office paper concluded in December 1950 that it was ‘clear that the activities of the peace 
movement are to be characterised more and more by the thought of Signor Nenni’s dictum 
[that] we [the peace movement]  have most positively and concretely become the  sixth 
great power.’451 This suggestion was not only worrying because it could endanger the 
UNO but also because its call for outright subversion of the post-war international order 
might prove attractive to those who felt that the UNO was too dominated by the Great 
Powers and their exclusive Security Council.  
 
A Soviet lecture referred to the UNO in June 1950 as ‘a living corpse which no one could 
look upon as a means for ensuring peace.’452 This was probably largely a result of the, un-
acknowledged, constant manipulation and blocking of the organisation by the Soviet 
Union. The idea of collective security had turned into a nuisance for the Soviet 
government. Still, to challenge the UNO, to whose foundation Stalin personally had 
consented, was a bold act. This was a potentially dangerous proposition. The whole post-
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war order had been based on the premise of collective security and multilateral diplomacy. 
A return to Great Power or bilateral diplomacy would upset not only a multitude of 
countries but also seriously endanger peace and continued economic recovery.  
 
Many in the Northern Department agreed that the Peace Campaign had formed the most 
important campaign for Soviet interests since the formation of the Cominform in 
September 1947.453 It had staged conferences, formed a bureau with permanent staff, 
issued journals and made numerous declarations and appeals to the people, governments 
and organisations. Its propaganda, in contrast to its dissemination, was not terribly 
sophisticated but in its simplicity was appealing to many who wanted nothing more than 
peace.  That it failed had several reasons. While the vocabulary had been adjusted to suit 
Western ears, its methods had not. In addition, the constant targeting of the British 
government as a warmonger did not sit well with many who vividly remembered their 
government’s fight against Nazi Germany when no-one else did. Even though economic 
recovery in Britain was slow, the establishment of the NHS, the nationalisation of some  
industries and the real sense that much more was to come possibly reduced the potential 
attractiveness of Communism. Democracy it seems was an achievement that would not be 
given up lightly. 
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Chapter Seven: The ND and Soviet policy in Eastern Europe  
 
[There is now] an aggressive Communist controlled bloc in the East. 
 
                                                                                                           Hankey, 1.1. 1948454 
 
 
7.1. The Soviet orbit 
The Northern Department reviewed the events of the year and by January 1948 had 
clarified its position. ‘The Soviets’, they noted, ‘[had] ruthlessly consolidated their position 
in Eastern Europe.’455  Eastern Europe in contrast to the West ‘shows a uniform and 
melancholy picture of Communist infiltration, intimidation, gradual domination and finally 
complete control’, Hankey noted in October 1948.456 The Kremlin was using Eastern 
Europe, as the Germans had done, for economic exploitation.457 The Eastern European 
countries had been increasingly tied very closely to the Kremlin, effective control of them 
had been in nearly all cases achieved, manipulated elections, a ruthless administration and 
the elimination of opponents had reduced the formerly independent successor states to 
colourless servants of the Soviet Union.458 The Marshall Plan and the Tito dispute had 
resulted, according to Reynolds, in the Stalinisation of the satellite states.459 
 
This bloc had been cemented using ‘every form of pressure including undisguised 
terrorism.’460 In one of the most severe assessments to date the Northern Department 
effectively ended any hope of reaching an agreement with the Kremlin with regards to 
achieving a status quo in which some spirit of cooperation could still underline the Kremlin 
doctrine of Peaceful Co-existence. This doctrine would in the immediate future ensure 
peace in Europe but nothing more. By August 1948 this assessment had been adjusted to 
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state that a ‘military bloc is growing up in Eastern Europe.’461 This development had, not 
surprisingly, angered and upset the democratic countries in the West, and had reduced the 
options for their governments. In geo-strategic terms anyone looking at a map at that time 
had to be worried. The already extensive territory of the Soviet Union had been bolstered 
by the bloc on her western border while a potential ally was emerging in China as the 
Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-Shek increasingly struggled to control the Communist 
forces of Mao in the Chinese civil war. As a result of these developments the Foreign 
Office, Ann Lane has noted, ‘ became obsessed by the Marxist fusion of economy and 
politics’ as it seemed now focused on the building  of an economic bloc in Eastern Europe 
to be used for political objectives.462 The Northern Department reckoned that the Soviet 
preponderance in Eastern and South Eastern Europe might not be the last step in Soviet 
designs for that area. There were strong suggestions that a consolidated bloc, thoroughly 
infused with Marxist-Leninist doctrine and organised on strictly Soviet lines, might be 
eventually totally absorbed into the Soviet Union.463  
 
The Czech coup in February 1948 stunned the West and ensured that nearly undivided 
attention was paid in the Northern Department to developments there and in Moscow. 
Evidently planned for some time and brutally carried out, it showed increasing Soviet 
disregards for worldwide opinion.464 But the Kremlin had possibly either underestimated 
the outrage this coup would provoke abroad or simply disregarded any thought about the 
consequences; presumably judging the benefits to be derived from this course of action 
more important. Czechoslovakia was of vital importance strategically because it 
maintained routes of communication to the Soviet occupied zones in Germany and Austria. 
An overall estimation of events in February 1949 concluded that ‘the rape of 
Czechoslovakia was an outstanding example of Communist conquest by infiltration.’465 
The setting up of labour camps, reported in October, and of ongoing campaign against big 
farms confirmed the trend towards Sovietisation of the country.466 After Benes’s death in 
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1949 the Russia Committee concluded gloomily that ‘so far as can be seen here there is no 
resistance of any kind.’467 
 
Tito’s defiance of Stalin created not surprisingly problems for the building of a coherent 
Soviet controlled bloc. The resulting mutual abuse increasingly poisoned relations between 
the orbit states. But more importantly, this struggle brought to the forefront another 
worrying development for Stalin: nationalist tendencies brought out into the open during 
and after the war were starting to merge with Communist sentiments creating potentially 
strong regional forces which might not prove too amenable to Soviet interference. 
Orthodox Marxists and national Communists, both fighting for control in the post-war 
governments, could de-stabilise the orbit. This development was, in the eyes of the 
Northern Department, particularly likely in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.468 A few 
months earlier, discussing the implications of Tito’s expulsion from the Cominform, 
officials argued that there was the ‘danger of a very serious schism which threatens their 
[the Soviet Union] whole policy in Eastern Europe…a serious crack has developed in the 
monolith [and] may possibly widen.’469 This, with hindsight, proved an unrealistic hope. 
As long as the Kremlin was willing to directly intervene in satellite affairs hopes about 
even partial independence from Moscow remained unfulfilled. 
 
To deal with Tito, national Communism, varying economic difficulties, the ongoing 
blockade of Berlin, to name just a few of the issues that had to be resolved, the Kremlin 
resorted, possibly overwhelmed by the complexity of the problems and the geo-strategic 
extent of them, to tried and tested methods: show trials, secret police terror, the installation 
of absolute control by the Soviet Union over all aspects of their satellites’ administration, 
armed forces, economy etc.470 In October 1948 the Northern Department had enough 
evidence to suggest that ‘relations between the Soviet Union and the satellites are uneasy’ 
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and that as a result efforts to further speed up consolidation were accelerated.’471 So while 
the process of Sovietisation continued, tensions were growing; ‘in Poland the temperature 
is rising’, an official minuted the same month.472 The Kremlin ruthlessly repressed  
creativity and ideological idealism in the East, while, as a result, in the West the rosy 
picture of the Communist paradise in the East was slowly destroyed.  
 
Economic dependencies and quarrels among the satellite states were finally to be sorted 
out through the new Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), set up in January 
1949 in Moscow at a conference attended by representatives of the Soviet Union, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.473 The apparent intent was to counter or 
mirror the Marshall plan and to increase economic cooperation between the orbit states. 
The precise formal machinery for coordinating Soviet policy in the orbit remained unclear 
though a permanent secretariat apparently existed in Moscow. The Russia Committee 
speculated whether this development indicated some form of economic boycott of the West 
whilst there was also some speculation to whether the bloc could be expanded into a 
‘rouble area.’474 Though there was information about CMEA meetings across the orbit, the 
precise agenda or instructions of these remained obscure.475 In the absence of any formal 
organisation to coordinate economic policy throughout the orbit, the setting up of CMEA, 
representing the governments rather than just the party leaders, was seen by the Russia 
Committee as potentially closing this gap.476 That this in all but name described the 
consolidation of an actual empire was not lost on the Northern Department. Mayhew 
demanded that this fact be more prominently emphasised in future British propaganda.477 
 
The Northern Department found it difficult to fully understand the reasons behind these 
Soviet initiatives and to assess their long-term relevance. Why press for developments 
which would be hugely unpopular and alienate vital support when long-term control would 
always have to be based on a degree of local acquiescence? Seeing the Soviet Union as 
largely self-sufficient with regards to food stuffs and raw materials Kelly suggested purely 
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political motives behind Soviet economic policy.478  Political dependence of the orbit had 
to be increased while economic dependence was cemented in a number of bilateral trade 
agreements.  However, economically, at least initially, the orbit was a stone around the 
neck of the Kremlin.479 Most of the satellites were agrarian countries with little industry 
and little proper use of their natural resources. Any development would require substantial 
capital investment with little immediate returns and Soviet style agrarian reform would 
wreak havoc in the meantime.480 The enforced trade links between orbit and Soviet Union 
were also artificial and largely untested. Kelly drew two main conclusions from this 
assessment. Firstly, he re-iterated that political considerations appeared more important to 
the Kremlin than their economic implications. And secondly, he realised that the Kremlin 
would need and ask for capital goods which the Soviet Union obviously could not produce 
herself in sufficient amounts or procure from her satellites. Extending this problem to the 
orbit states, Kelly warned that if today the bloc was mainly an ideological opponent it may 
in the future well be ‘a bitterly hostile camp’. This issue created a number of problems 
between the USA and Britain which could not agree on the details of possible economic 
sanctions. It is fair to say that by this stage economic ‘Cold’-warfare had emerged as a 
tactic available to both East and West. The orbit was in essence lost to the West. All the 
Foreign Office could do was to increase diplomatic pressure, mainly through the UNO, and 
to continue with the IRD and BBC propaganda campaigns which exposed Soviet actions in 
Eastern Europe to the outside world.  
 
Of more immediate concern to the Northern Department was the apparent military 
consolidation of the orbit with Moscow establishing a more direct foothold over the 
military forces of her satellites. In November 1949 Konstantin Rokossovskii, Marshal of 
the Soviet Union and a victim of Stalin’s 1937 purge of the Army, was sent to Warsaw as 
Polish Minister of Defence and Commander in Chief of the Polish armed forces.481 
Rokossowskii was the first high profile imposition of a Soviet official on a nominally 
independent orbit government and the Northern Department speculated about the real 
reasons behind this appointment. Essentially there were two: either the Polish government 
was so confident in its position that it would be able to deal with any anti-Soviet feeling 
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triggered by the appointment, or the Polish government was so weak that it had to call on 
Moscow to send some weighty support. The care taken to deal with Polish affairs and 
control over it does suggest that Stalin saw the country as a vital part of his empire which, 
providing the only direct access to the SBZ in Germany, had to be totally loyal. In Bulgaria 
these developments were mirrored.482 Warner argued that the Kremlin, aware of a growing 
anti-Soviet sentiment in the orbit, was taking direct measures to control it.483 In any case, 
this further intermeshing of personnel made a direct command structure more likely and 
efficient while maintaining a close eye of the local Communists could function as an early-
warning system for various problems.  
 
The overall plan, the Northern Department suggested, was to ‘weld the satellites into an 
economic union by the coordination of their economic plans in order to increase the 
economic and war potential of the Soviet bloc.’484 Occasional information suggesting the 
meeting of high-ranking orbit military staff and rumours about a possible Eastern European 
defence agreement added to the sense of uneasiness.485 Even if one could accuse the 
Foreign Office and the COS by now of suspecting war preparations in most Soviet actions, 
one has to concede that the British government was in a very difficult position with regards 
to the Soviet Union and the orbit. The Iron Curtain, far from being a proverbial one only, 
was a nearly total and very effective news/information blackout that affected a large part of 
Europe and Asia. Unable to go and look for themselves, decision makers had to rely on 
sparse information collected by embassies and other government agencies. Little concrete 
information necessarily led to a more imaginative way of seeing the Soviet Union and, 
possibly necessarily so, to demands for more decisive policies and actions. Hankey argued 
in April 1949 that the focus of Soviet actions was still in Europe.486  This assessment, not 
surprisingly, led to further pressure on the Foreign Office to suggest possible action in 
Europe.  
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Harrison, in the same memorandum, explained what was at stake: ‘Stalin now had at his 
disposal a monolithic power bloc which can be used in a manner which his power politics 
and the interests of world revolution may require.’ Though not spelt out directly the 
implication was that the Soviet orbit had now become a fully fledged threat to peace. 
Effective control had been supplemented by an improved administration, increased 
coordination and cooperation. Propaganda themes had been established and with them a 
quite sophisticated network for their dissemination. And while the iron curtain became 
largely impenetrable from West to East, Communist parties in the West, through the 
Cominform for example, maintained a direct link between East and West. At the end of 
1950 the Northern Department, reviewing budget figures for the satellites, noticed that 
military expenditure in Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria was to increase 
substantially during 1951.487 However, it was agreed that this was a sign of Soviet 
confidence in its orbit and an indicator of its control over it and that ‘ no aggressive intent 
it to be read into this.’ This assessment was probably fair. The re-establishment of national 
forces after war, occupation and consolidation of Soviet influence was to be expected. But 
an armed Soviet orbit, supporting a still highly militarised Soviet Union, represented a 
clear danger to the security and interests of Britain and Western Europe. Only two 
anomalies still prevented this bloc from being totally cohesive: Germany and Yugoslavia. 
 
7.2. Germany, Berlin and the Soviet Occupied Zone (SBZ) 
Germany, militarist and aggressive throughout recent history, economically still strong and 
still possessing a bruised but intact national ego, proved the real challenge with regards to 
the post-war settlement and post-war diplomacy in central Europe. It, initially, could 
neither be neutral nor incorporated into either of the two blocs now emerging west of the 
Rhine and east of the Oder. The non-agreement over Germany’s future at Yalta and 
Potsdam now cost a heavy price as the way of the wartime alliance slowly turned towards 
the Cold War.488 As much as both sides made statements to the contrary, and bearing the 
haggling over its future during the year in mind, the suspicion remains that both sides 
realised early on that the country would have to be split in two. By 1946/47 Four Power 
control was obviously not working and both sides had started to make their own 
arrangements.  
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The American and British zones had merged in January 1947, and France joined them soon 
after. While Britain favoured a federal system, the Soviet Union insisted on a centralised 
government. In a divided Germany the Kremlin would have lost all influence over policy 
in the West and could then neither support nor veto specific initiatives.489 While the 
Western occupying powers stopped reparations through dismantling and out of current 
production very soon and actually economically supported their zones, the Soviet 
government ordered wave after wave of dismantling raids while East German industry was 
producing largely for the benefit of the Soviet Union. While in the West a rudimentary 
system of a democratic local administration was set up, the Soviet government pushed in 
the East the Communist Party to prominence and turned the SBZ into a ‘totalitarian police 
state.’490 The post-war CFMs had not managed to agree on a permanent settlement and so 
the issues of political control, the army and police, local administrations, supervision of the 
industrial areas of Saar and Ruhr etc. remained unresolved. Soon it became clear that 
despite all these problems the German question had to be successfully addressed as the 
discussion changed from an emphasis on the containment of Germany to that of the Soviet 
Union.491 The major European aggressor situated right in the heart of Europe thus became 
more and more a necessary prize to win rather then an oppressor to hold down.  
 
Berlin, the Foreign Office realised, was likely to cause future problems: control of the 
capital city of a country symbolised overall control and supreme power. While in the West 
of the country Soviet influence was minimal, despite huge propaganda efforts by the 
Kremlin, Soviet control over the SBZ was rapidly increasing. Berlin, sandwiched in 
between the two, was not only an uneasy compromise but a liability to both sides. Already 
in January 1948 the Monthly Review of Soviet Tactics concluded that: ‘it is not unlikely 
that the Russians will in fact try to force us to withdraw.’492  In March the Russia 
Committee stated that ‘the situation in Berlin was likely to come to a head within the next 
forty eight hours [and] that it had been decided by the Foreign Secretary that the object of 
our policy was to remain in Berlin.’493 Even if control over the West was secure, Berlin 
had slowly turned into a major headache for the West; unable to leave but equally unable 
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to continuously counter the petty administrative warfare of the Soviet organs in the city, 
the situation continued to deteriorate. In addition, as the Russia Committee worried, the 
fact that 1948 was an election year in the USA could impact on any American decision that 
might be required to deter Soviet aggression.494  
 
1948 had seen a definite intensification of the Cold War on both sides. The Office of the 
Military Governor (OMG) in Berlin reported to the Foreign Office in the spring of 1948 
that  
 
Soviet tactics in Berlin over the transport question suggest that they are pursuing 
a deliberate plan of gradual encroachment aimed at undermining our position 
while at the same time avoiding a direct challenge to ourselves or the Americans 
which might involve the risk of war. Intensification of the Cold War in Germany 
has been in fact in progress for some weeks.495  
 
Linking local and a more global Soviet foreign policy, the OMG, like the Foreign Office, 
recognised that opportunities, though present for some time, might only be exploited when 
overall circumstances were either right or simply demanded it at that time. The OMG 
report noted that ‘although the main Soviet strategy can be forecast with reasonable 
confidence, their tactics and timing are much more difficult to estimate.’ The Northern 
Department was well aware of the fact that one could not look at Soviet foreign policy 
anywhere without also casting an eye over developments in seemingly unrelated places and 
that timing for Soviet initiatives was always important. Perhaps not noted clearly at the 
time, Germany had become the catalyst for an increased East-West antagonism.496 
 
In the SBZ by 1947/48 the political process of Sovietisation made progress, although the 
Kremlin did not appear to have a proper plan with regards to the details.497 The SED, 
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forcibly formed out of SPD and KPD in February 1946, hinted of the SBZ becoming a 
‘fully fledged satellite power’, making the party extremely unpopular among large sections 
of the population.498 Officially, however, in usual Soviet fashion the Kremlin pursued a 
policy of establishing a People’s Democracy; representative of all sections of society and 
democratically elected. 499 The Northern Department anticipated that, when and if it would 
be clear that no agreement between the occupying powers could be reached about the 
control of a unified Germany, the SBZ would undoubtedly be turned into a Soviet satellite. 
Officials were equally convinced that the Soviet government would wait until the West had 
made the first step in this direction to pre-empt any criticism.500   
 
In Germany, as elsewhere in the orbit, pressing economic problems required attention and 
limited the policy choices available. The Northern Department thought that ‘Stalin’s 
attitude betrays certain signs of hesitation or lack of confidence in both the political and 
economic position in the Soviet zone.’501 It was confident that the Soviet policy of 
supporting the SED had not been successful and that the economic situation was 
deteriorating.502 Economically the SBZ remained a liability for the Kremlin and proved a 
real test for Soviet willingness to use whatever means to establish a stranglehold over the 
country in order to control all important aspects of it. Preparation for the occupation of its 
zone or, now after several years of peace, the entrenchment of Soviet influence had been 
inadequate. A lack of funds and of staff familiar with Germany and the Germans, and of 
staff trained to administer a country that was so different from their own, as well as the 
initial rampage caused by the dismantling squads and a real lack of ideas of what to do with 
their zone now that it was clear that they were here to stay, had left the SMAD with a series 
of unfocused initiatives that had failed to create a cohesive and sustainable momentum for 
internal developments. This resulted in an application of Soviet ideology and experience to 
a German state which was not really suitable for it.  
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Politically, the SMAD, as the highest Soviet organ in the East, supported Moscow’s plans. 
When those did not consider future cooperation as a viable means of administration 
anymore, Marshall Sokolowski on March 22nd, 1948 walked out of the ACC, effectively 
ending Four Power control of Germany and Berlin.  Seeing relations with the West part of 
a ‘war of nerves’ the Kremlin was determined to prove that they were not intimidated in the 
face of growing opposition from them.503 Communication and cooperation between the 
former allies was thus reduced even further. The dealing with the practical problems of the 
every day administration of the city became nearly impossible.  By August 1948 it seemed 
to the Northern Department that the Kremlin now considered the partition of Germany 
inevitable and that consequently the timetable for their plans in the eastern part of it was 
likely to be brought forward.504 These plans were to quite a large extent dependent on the 
actions of the Western allies who by now had made up their minds: there would be a 
separate German state in the West and it would, in the future, be part of the Western 
alliance of states in NATO. In the East, Stalin was still trying to stop the implementation of 
this plan through propaganda and frequent changes in tactics in his now frosty relations 
with the West.  
 
The Berlin Blockade, in effect from June 24th, 1948 to May 12th, 1949, was then and now 
regarded as a pivotal moment in the struggle between East and West and a demonstration 
of rather aggressive Soviet tactics.505 The Cold War contest, as Sean Greenwood has noted,  
had begun.506 Stalin, miscalculating the possible response in his attempt to force his former 
Allies back to the negotiating table, and willing to increase the political tension in Europe 
provoked the first crisis of the Cold War.507 It forced both sides to face up to reality. The 
subsequent haggling over the ending of the blockade foreshadowed some of the problems 
of the later Cold War: both sides, even if determined, could not in all circumstances force 
the hands of the opponent, and it was very difficult to extricate oneself from a conflict 
between two violently opposed sides. Realising that the West could not withdraw without 
losing face and influence in German politics, and confident that Stalin would not push this 
issue to the brink of war, an airlift was commenced to supply the city from the West. That 
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Stalin, after Bedell Smith’s warning, had sanctioned this action is surprising. Here, as in 
Greece and later Korea, Stalin directly precipitated an American response, with the 
stationing of US bombers on British soil, that actually contributed to his anxieties about a 
militarily strong encirclement by capitalist powers.508 
 
The blockade was a good example of the desperation of the Soviet government which 
faced an increasingly successful adversary in the West. The consolidation of West 
Germany had proceeded rather well and support amongst the population for those 
developments was quite solid. But a West German state would mean no chance of Soviet 
influence in or benefits from the industrial heartland of the country. It also meant that a 
future German state could join an alliance of Western countries or establish a new German 
army, both highly undesirable developments, without prior consultation with the Soviet 
Union.  
 
Stalin is strikingly anxious to get the Western allies to desist from establishing a 
government in West Germany, no doubt because in the long run it is likely to be 
the best if not the only defence against Communism in the West,  
 
the Northern Department concluded in August 1948.509 A month earlier it had been noted 
that the choice available to the Kremlin was narrow: ‘if they are to prevent us from 
carrying out our objective [Western consolidation and the formation of an independent 
West German state] …the Russians must ultimately choose between negotiation and 
force.’510 ‘It should be said here that the view among recent historians is that the Soviet 
leadership actually used force to secure negotiations on their terms.511 It is likely, some of 
these historians argue, that Stalin really wanted a neutral Germany. To achieve this, he was 
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willing to offer a unification of the country. But not all historians agree: for example, 
Harrison Wagner thinks that both sides considered Germany as too important to give up.512  
 
The issues involved were complex. The West was worried about Communist infiltration in 
their zones, future cooperation from the local minister presidents of the Länder and about a 
delay in the establishment of a West German state.513 It was now three years since the end 
to the war and a solution to the German question still had to be found or forced. That Stalin 
saw the foundation of an independent West German state as a threat to Soviet national 
security was appreciated by the Foreign Office; however, what to do about it and what to 
offer, if anything, was difficult to decide.514 This potentially, as the Northern Department 
acknowledged, could be the long decried situation which would ‘prove’ that (military) 
conflict between the two camps really was inevitable.515  
 
By October the airlift, after initial problems, had proven a resounding success both with 
regards to the supply of the city and the affections of its population. The bond created at 
that time was to prove extremely durable for decades to come. Apparently quite satisfied, 
the Northern Department concluded in August that ‘the Russians have not achieved the 
easy success in Berlin which they evidently anticipated.’516 When the conflict was taken to 
the UNO in September the Soviet government denied that there was a blockade in place 
while the acceptance of any offer to find a solution based on prior Soviet concessions was 
refused by the Soviet delegation out of hand.517 Nevertheless, the issue was debated in the 
Security Council much to the chagrin of Stalin. A month later the Russia Committee 
mused whether the Kremlin was now waiting for the outcome of the American elections 
before taking any further steps, even though they were now obviously interested to secure 
further talks with the Western allies.518  
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Trying to work out a solution to the outstanding problems in order to end the blockade, the 
Allies met in Moscow in September 1948. The Foreign Office, even if not actually 
hopeful, still expected actual negotiation. However, it became clear very soon that Stalin, 
still, was not ready to compromise on his demand for multilateral control of Germany, the 
end of plans to form an independent Germany in the West and overall control over Berlin. 
Apparently feeling that he had nothing to lose, he refused to compromise and ‘left for his 
annual holiday in the South.’519 While he could supply the East of the city and the West, 
should his help be asked, the West had no choice but to continue the airlift, at huge 
expense and, in worsening weather, to substantial risk for the crews. So Stalin simply 
decided to wait and see. When the city had survived the winter and the fronts had become 
so hardened as to seriously damage the relations between the former allies to breaking 
point, Stalin relented. At a meeting in New York in the spring of 1949 he agreed to end the 
blockade on May 12th; demands for the re-establishment of Four Power control and for a 
share in the Ruhr were flatly denied by the Western allies.  
 
Situating his offer within the Peace Campaign Stalin ostensibly emerged as a reasonable 
politician willing to compromise for the greater good. Extensive propaganda to publicise 
this idea in Europe had, as the Northern Department grasped early on, ‘enabled the Soviet 
government to make, without excessive loss of face, their proposal for the unconditional 
lifting of the blockade of Berlin.’520 Hankey, thinking about the wider implications noted 
that ‘the Politburo have not abandoned the communising of Europe and particularly 
Germany, [they have] merely failed to carry it out by assault.’521 Harrison, agreeing to this, 
recorded underneath that the blockade had had a ‘harmful effect on the Soviet position in 
Germany.’ Nevertheless, in the longer term he was well aware that Soviet policy was 
unlikely to change as a result of this episode. The agreement was in the end bought on the 
promise that trade between the two parts would be re-established and that the CFM would 
meet once again to discuss a final settlement to the ‘German question’. But Stalin had 
waited too long. On April 4th NATO was founded and on April 8th the three Western allies 
signed an agreement on the formation of a West German state which would be self-
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governing and benefit from the ERP. Elizabeth Barker has noted that after the blockade the 
priority of British defence planning had moved from the Middle East to Europe.522 
 
Overall, it was the West not the East that benefited from the blockade. The brutality of it, it 
was recognised, had crystallised Western opinion and smoothed the way for a separate 
West German state as well as for the formation of a Western defence alliance in NATO.523 
When the Federal Republic of Germany was formed, West Berlin became a proper enclave 
within the territory of a hostile power. Its inhabitants now found themselves surrounded by 
320.000 Soviet troops and 51.000 German militarised police.524 When in September 1949 
the Western commandants finally decided to suspend Four Power talks the writing was on 
the wall.525 Following the Western lead Stalin gave permission to form the GDR in 
October 1949. He had little choice but to follow the Western example. What had initially 
seemed like a good bargain, ready to be exploited at will without too much concern about 
repercussions, had now turned into an actual responsibility with, momentarily, few actual 
benefits. While the West had planned and implemented this step in quite considerable 
detail, the Kremlin appeared over run by events: ‘the actual decision seems to have been a 
very sudden one and the new state has been formed with all the signs of improvisation and 
haste’, the Northern Department noted soon afterwards.526 Four years after the end of the 
war the Iron Curtain had finally descended completely.  
 
Not unsurprisingly, this situation of a relative diplomatic stalemate in central Europe did 
not last. On September 19th 1950 the Soviet government handed a note to the Western 
powers suggesting talks to discuss German rearmament. A further note was delivered on 
November 3rd advocating a meeting of the Foreign Ministers to discuss the demilitarisation 
of Germany.527 Developments detrimental to Soviet prestige in the Far East with successes 
for the West in the Korean War had, not for the first time, triggered Soviet initiatives 
elsewhere. The Foreign Office admitted that there was a ‘perceptible hardening of opinion 
                                                 
522
 Barker, The British between the Superpowers, p. 232. 
523
 FO371/77613-N5696/1024/38, FO, ‘Soviet foreign policy: Estimate of future Soviet policy as result of 
Paris CFM meeting’, 25.6.1949; Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World, p. 97. 
524
 FO371/86760-NS1052/99, FO, ‘SWWPI’, 5.12.1950.  
525
 FO371/77607-N8917/1023/38, FO, ‘RST’, 24.9.1949.  
526
 FO371/77607-N8945/1023/38, FO, ‘SISFP’, 12.10.1949. 
527
 FO371/86759-NS1052/92, FO, ‘SISFP’, 20.10.1950;  FO371/86733-NS1023/49, FO, ‘RST’, 27.11.1950.  
 144 
in the FRG against remilitarisation.’528 It could not be pushed through against the federal 
government and certainly not against widespread resistance amongst the population. If 
done in this way, the Soviet inspired Peace Campaign would have had a field day accusing 
the West of aggressive intentions in the heart of Europe. 
 
7.3. Yugoslavia 
The Yugoslavian problem in Eastern Europe arose just as problems over Germany, and 
Berlin in particular, were becoming more pronounced. Internal dissent in what had become 
an increasingly monolithic whole could potentially have had huge consequences for 
dealing with Germany. When Zhdanov had declared the world to be split into two camps at 
the Cominform foundation conference there had been no hint that rather then consolidating 
it this new organisation with its demand for total subordination to Moscow would actually 
help to split the emerging Eastern Bloc. Strategically, Tito’s decision to deny Moscow any 
influence in foreign policy, defence and internal security matters, was highly significant; it 
was also wholly unexpected for Stalin.529 Bordering on the Soviet occupied zone of Austria 
and the contested Italian city of Trieste in the north and Greece in the south, control over 
Yugoslavia maintained a line of Soviet influence from Rostock at the Baltic Sea to 
Dubrovnic in the south of the Adriatic Sea.530  
 
Politically, the situation was ‘virgin soil’. Neither Marxism nor Leninism had really dealt 
very much with the matter of several underdeveloped Communist countries in close 
proximity, all with different histories, cultures and roads to Communism. Shared 
revolutionary ideals and the common experience of struggle were deemed sufficient to 
form the basis of close cooperation. The issue of how to deal with two, or more, strong 
Party leaders who, not even in their own countries very tolerable of criticism and 
opposition, could emerge as rivals in the interpretation and implementation of Communist 
doctrine seemingly did not arise. In September 1948 a FORD paper had concluded that  
‘the fact that the USSR seeks absolute control of the groupings she consents to join, and 
the extreme tactical flexibility of Soviet foreign policy, make friendship with her extremely 
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precarious.’531 This assessment applied to both the Eastern European bloc as well as to 
international organisations. The Foreign Office, not surprisingly, was cautious. Tito 
supported the civil war in Greece with detrimental results for the West: ‘[he] can 
effectively keep Greece in such a state of turmoil that reconstruction is virtually impossible 
and so far as Greece is concerned the Marshall Plan will fail.’532 Tito also still hankered 
after the security of the Communist East.  
 
Defiance of Stalin therefore, as the Northern Department realised, did not imply a pro-
Western approach and instability in the East could well lead to further problems in the 
West. But Yugoslavia was not just any orbit state. It was seen by the Foreign Office as ‘the 
leader of the satellites’ with an advanced idea of Communism already apparent.533 
Working behind the scenes, the Communist Party had started well before the end of the 
war to permeate vital areas of the economy, administration and military while initially 
maintaining the ‘fiction of the People’s Front.’ Not surprisingly, Tito, having achieved 
victory against the Germans without Soviet help, denied Moscow any say in that control 
and also, not surprisingly, Stalin did not take kindly to this decision.534 Internal quarrelling 
within the Eastern bloc between two sovereign countries offered few opportunities of 
direct intervention by the West and, anyhow, Tito did not make it easy for the West. Even 
after defying Stalin, he voted with the Eastern Bloc in the UNO and supported Soviet 
claims in the outstanding settlements in Europe, leaving the Foreign Office struggling to 
understand what the split meant and why Tito remained faithful to the Soviet camp535 Still, 
this situation did provide a vital opportunity to learn how the intricate system of 
Communist parties, personal relationships and specialised support networks, like internal 
security troops, across Eastern Europe was controlled and enforced.  
 
When in June 1948 Tito openly defied Moscow’s request for more control, the Cominform 
was quick to react. Stalin was testing his ability to actually create a unified front against 
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the capitalist West.536 Usefully in this case, it allowed the Eastern Bloc to portray a united 
front behind this organisation where there was possibly none. As usually, the attack was 
played out over several fronts: Tito’s apparent turning away from Marxism-Leninism, his 
identification with the capitalist/imperialist West, the false assumption of the continued 
existence of a Communist Yugoslavia without the support of the Soviet Union and a veiled 
call to those in disagreement with Tito’s decision to rectify the situation.537 In the West, it 
appeared initially as a ‘family quarrel’; presumably the sheer audacity of an actual attempt 
to defy Moscow was seen as unlikely.538 However, the situation quickly gained other 
dimensions. At the end of July Tito had emerged as a ‘hero not only to the Yugoslav 
Communists…but also to all those Yugoslavs who would prefer anything to outright 
control by Moscow.’539 But Tito by no means offered a democratic version of Communism 
and the repressions for both workers and peasants as well as a general loss of liberty were 
well pronounced.  The forced implementation of a planned economy coupled with the still 
only slowly recovering industry and agriculture had left the country in an increasingly 
difficult economic situation and the attachment of political conditions by the West to 
requests for economic aid was problematic.540  
 
Titos’s actions clarified Soviet intentions with regards to Soviet plans for Germany. With 
regards to control over ideology and the loyalty of Communists outside the Soviet Union 
there could be no debate and no divergences. The severity of the resulting purges, probably 
planned to be pushed through anyway but now brought forward, might have been an 
indication of this. ‘Titoism’ was not tolerated and, to illustrate this point, the accusation of 
it was incorporated in some of the trials in the orbit.541 Direct Western intervention was 
undesirable. First, Tito had made it clear that Yugoslavia would be Communist, not matter 
what, and would follow the Soviet Union on the path of fast industrialisation and 
collectivisation. The support of an openly Communist country was incompatible with 
British foreign policy intentions. Secondly, a Communist regime not associated with 
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Stalinist excesses and criticism, and thus ostensibly offering a better version of 
Communism, could lead to further interest in and adherence to this idea in the West.  
 
By the spring of 1949 unable to persuade Tito to return into to fold the campaign against 
him was stepped up: anti-Tito newspapers, the abandonment of Soviet support for Tito’s 
claims on Austrian Carinthia, a cherished Tito interest, and border skirmishes with 
Bulgaria and Romania increased the pressure on him.542 In October 1949 the Soviet Union 
announced the repudiation of the Soviet-Yugoslav Treaty just as Tass announced that the 
Soviet Union did possess atomic energy.543 The Soviet Union thus removed all her 
obligations to Yugoslavia. Diplomatic relations were essentially cut off, the Soviet 
ambassador was recalled and did not return while the Yugoslav ambassador had been 
recalled even earlier, but not formally broken off.544 Stalin had made it clear that Tito 
could return only on Soviet terms with no room for manoeuvre.545 Increasing instability in 
the Eastern Bloc was thus coupled with an increased military potential of the major power 
within it. In addition, it seemed likely that the Kremlin would permit a coup d’état to 
remove Tito and establish Soviet control over the country.   
 
The usefulness of this development to the Northern Department was only partially clear. 
The suggestion that the Soviet hold over the Eastern European countries was still tenuous 
even though accelerated consolidation might have suggested otherwise was an important 
indicator of overall Soviet strength. That the Kremlin proved unable to persuade Tito to 
relent while being equally unable to wrest control over the army and security services from 
him showed that Soviet influence in her satellites, should someone really stand up to 
Kremlin control, was far from total. With regards to the future, however, the Northern 
Department well recognised that ‘the Kremlin is unlikely to make the same mistake 
again.’546 The Tito heresy, the embassy maintained, was seen by the Politburo ‘as a poison 
capable of infecting the Communist movement throughout the world’, though there were 
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few sign so far that it had actually done so.547 Nationalist tendencies and hints of 
Nationalist Communism were repressed while the possibility of ‘forming a ‘fifth’ or 
‘titoist’ international’ was considered essentially nonexistent.548 
 
Tito himself sought contact to the West as some issues were increasingly causing concern 
to the Yugoslav leadership. The continuous flow of refugees from Bulgaria and Romania 
streaming into the country, where economic conditions were already deteriorating, was 
difficult to handle.549 By the spring of 1949 there were rumours about military intervention 
by the Soviet Union or one of other Cominform states against Yugoslavia.550 In August 
that year a Northern Department review concluded that ‘we can no longer exclude the 
possibility that the Kremlin may take more forcible measures against Tito in some form or 
other at an early date.’551 This would present the West with a difficult situation: a direct 
appeal for help by Tito could hardly be ignored, especially if it came through the UNO, 
while the prospect of war within Europe was as unappealing to all as ever. The Russia 
Committee, just a few weeks later, took up the issue again and noted that although the 
Kremlin was unlikely to wage war against Tito, it would continue to apply severe pressure 
to Yugoslavia.552 
 
In February 1950 Tito told the US ambassador to Yugoslavia that he had information that 
‘something was brewing for Yugoslavia in the Kremlin kitchen.’553 The Foreign Office 
remained sceptical of any overt Soviet intervention in internal Yugoslav affairs, partially 
because it was assumed that the Kremlin was well aware that Tito could defend his country 
against any attack that was not directly supported by the Red Army and Because Stalin 
presumably did not want to give ammunition to those who thought that his Peace 
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Campaign was a fluke by sanctioning Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia.554 Still, to support 
her policy calling for Tito to be removed, the Soviet Union in August 1950 claimed that 
Yugoslavia, in cooperation with the USA, was about to start a war in the Balkans. With no 
evidence of troop movements, and against the backdrop of North Korean aggression 
against South Korea which had started just five weeks earlier, the Northern Department 
rejected this rightly as propaganda.555 
 
Titoism and its possible use in an anti-Soviet Communism campaign remained interesting 
to the Northern Department. Discussing Anti-Stalinist Communism, the Russia Committee 
in January 1950 identified Titoism as one of the major strands of it. Unable to use it for its 
own ends as ‘we will kill Titoism if we appear to support it publicly’, the Northern 
Department nevertheless saw it as potentially valuable ‘as a useful weapon purely for its 
disruptive value’ in Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, however, they argued ‘Titoism 
could be used as a means of confusing and breaking down Communist loyalties.’556 The 
Russia Committee agreed, seeing Anti-Stalinist Communism as a third alternative between 
far left-wing Stalinism and more right-wing National Communism.  
 
In the autumn of 1950, reviewing the relations between Britain and the Kremlin since the 
end of the war, Mayhew argued that   
 
if they were merely pursing the traditional imperialist Russian policy…they 
would certainly not have made the crassly stupid errors of policy which have 
united the non-Communist countries against them, and also lost them 
Yugoslavia.557  
 
Hindsight is a great thing. At the time it was by no means clear that Tito would not work 
out a deal with the Kremlin or that no-one within Yugoslavia would take matters into their 
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own hands and do away with Tito from within. The broader implications with regards to 
the interpretations and possible forecasting of Soviet foreign policy had been clarified. As 
much as opportunism and realism were important aspects of Soviet decision-making, the 
ideological dimension just could not be underestimated. Risking a break with Yugoslavia 
will all the associated possible implications for the cohesion and strength of the Soviet bloc 
at a crucial time, the Soviet leadership demonstrated that, as much as changing tactics with 
regards to ideology and policy were possible, the lack of complete submission and the 
development of any form of national Communism within her sphere of influence would 
not be tolerated. The Northern Department as much as Stalin himself had realised that 
Titoism did offer an alternative between far left wing Communist and far right wing 
nationalist parties. An alternative meant competition and that meant possibly divided 
loyalties. In a totalitarian empire choice with regards to loyalty was simply not an option. 
The problem of the relationship between centre and periphery within the Soviet bloc 
remained unresolved; with serious consequences after Stalin’s death. 
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Chapter Eight: ND input into FO policy, 1948-1950   
 
In the deadly game of power politics, it is less difficult and dangerous for an 
expanding power to cease its advance than for a threatened power to retreat. 
                                   Mayhew memorandum ‘Must there be war with Russia?’558 
 
International diplomacy after 1945 had proven simply exhausting. The main areas of 
contention between the Allies had remained the same: Germany, European recovery, 
eastern and western consolidation; and the Northern Department thought that even if the 
next two years would ‘see a decisive trial of strength between the two camps’, Britain had 
to remain determined.559 The problem, a Northern Department lecture in 1950 stated, was 
that ‘we shall be faced with a problem of entirely new proportions in history, namely the 
continuation of a period of crisis and tension, of a ‘cold war’ of indefinite duration.’560 To 
prevent any deterioration, the lecture continued, would prove very difficult.  The Soviet 
Union, seen as powerful as well as fundamentally aggressive, would be increasingly 
difficult to handle and thus the outlook, in summary, was rather bleak.561  
 
Despite an actually impressive manoeuvring on Germany, NATO and Western European 
cooperation, the British government continued to struggle with its new post-war role of a 
declining power; a fact not necessarily apparent or admitted at the time. Policy makers 
found it difficult to adapt to the role of a great power with reduced abilities.562 Great power 
status, although much desired, was now tied to the maintenance of close relations with the 
USA and an increased economic and political coordination within Western Europe and the 
British Empire and Commonwealth. But a severe lack of funds and of superior 
technological and military capabilities led to the decline of British influence on the world 
stage and it has been argued that some of those who believed in Britain’s continued role as 
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a world power may actually have welcomed the Cold War.563  One result was a certain 
‘pretence and posturing’ in British foreign policy and an emphasis on ‘manipulating the 
symbols of power.’564 Although this could be criticised, it must be acknowledged that the 
British government and the Foreign Office had limited choices at the time. 
 
8.1. Evaluating Britain’s position in international politics 
Working increasingly on the assumption that the spheres of influence in existence would 
remain unchanged for the foreseeable future, the main focus of British policy returned 
more directly to issues of collective security and the continued progress of the ERP as the 
main guarantors of European recovery and Britain’s enduring Great Power role.565 This 
role, the Foreign Office knew, demanded that Britain gave a lead in Western Europe and 
helped strengthen its democratic forces.566 But that was easier said than done. Roberts 
noted in a memorandum in January 1948 that Soviet policy was ‘now on the offensive 
everywhere.’567 However, war on multiple fronts also offered multiple opportunities for the 
West. The increasing weakness of Communism in Western Europe could also be 
exploited.568 Hankey noted confidently that if ‘we played our cards right’ the prospect for a 
Communist victory in Western Europe could be reduced to such an extent as to not make it 
worthwhile for the Kremlin to even try.569  Interestingly, he also admitted that had Britain 
known what Soviet policy in Europe would really be like, the Potsdam agreement could 
well have looked very different.570  
 
Against the background of a Soviet Union which continued its stated aim of disrupting the 
ERP and of engineering a revolutionary situation to exploit, the Secretary of State made it 
clear that bullying by the Kremlin would not be tolerated anymore.571 It was helpful that  
                                                 
563
 Bartlett, British Foreign Policy, p. 90. 
564
 Girault, The Partition of Europe, p. 299. 
565
 See, for example, FO371/71687-N13016/765/38, RC, meeting notes, 25.11.1948.  
566
 FO371/71648-N134/31/38, notes of a meeting in Mayhew’s room, 30.12.1947;  FO371/71670-
N3962/207/38, Peterson, 24.3.1948; the same could not overtly be done for the Eastern European countries 
as the Red Army under those circumstances was  seen as likely to intervene, FO371/77601-N2632/1023/38, 
Rae, 7.3.1949.  
567
 FO371/71670-N207/207/38, Roberts, 1.1948.  
568
 FO371/71651-N9471/31/38, FORD, 21.7.1948.  
569
 FO371/71670-N1759/207/38, Hankey, 13.2.48; FO371/71670-N5182/207/38, FO, 29.4.1948.  
570
 FO371/ 71671-N10522/207/38, Hankey lecture to the CCG College Brunswick, 22.9.1948. 
571
 FO371/71670-N3962/207/38, Peterson, 24.3.1948; see also notes for the Secretary of State’s speech at 
Scarborough, FO371/71632C-N6141/2/38, 26.5.1948.  
 153 
when compared with 1945 Britain could sit back slightly more relaxed. Western 
consolidation, in the Western Union, the OEEC and NATO, had progressed well and 
provided much needed security, cooperation and exchange of information. As much as this 
was a real achievement, however, it was also an admission that Britain could not go it 
alone anymore.572 Unfortunately also, these developments had bypassed the original plan 
for collective security in the UNO. The future prospects of this organisation were by now 
seriously questioned.573 The success of Mao and his Communist Party had upset the 
constellation in the Security Council while the Korean War provided the first instance for 
the council to act decisively in favour of military action. When Malik, the Soviet 
representative, returned a few weeks later after having walked out over disagreements 
regarding the Chinese representative, the damage had been done and confidence in future 
cooperation between the Great Powers within the Security Council was low. Lingering 
doubts about Soviet commitment to the organisation remained.574 This was a worry as, 
according to Gaddis, the Soviet Union was the ‘only country that combined hostility with 
capability.’575 
 
The two countries maintaining a buffer zone between the two blocs, Germany and Austria, 
were not surprisingly seen as the most likely areas of conflict.576 Undoubtedly, the Foreign 
Office knew, the Soviet government would see the incorporation of Western Germany into 
a Western Union as a threat to its national security.577 Apart from stopping Western 
consolidation or acquiescing to Soviet dominance of much of Europe, the Kremlin could 
not be pacified over this issue. Britain had in essence already acknowledged Soviet 
preponderance in Eastern Europe; it had had not choice. To deny the obvious in the 
absence of means to alter this situation would be the opposite of Realpolitik. With this 
admission came the concession that, just like Britain, the Soviet Union did have legitimate 
geo-strategic interests and security needs.578 The problem was that the Soviet government 
was largely unwilling to negotiate these. The repercussions of this policy had increased 
every year and Western consolidation had increased congruently with the heightening 
conflict. Russian expansionism, viewed variously as aggressive-revolutionary, tsarist 
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expansionist or plainly militant imperialist, had spread the morally repugnant system of 
totalitarianism across wide areas.  This vast empire presented a considerable and direct 
threat to Britain’s national security and her imperial interests. Adding further potential to 
this threat, Communist ideology had emerged as a viable and attractive tool for the 
realisation of Soviet designs. The Russia Committee, rather alarmed about the prospect of 
a red tidal wave swallowing up Western Europe, argued in 1950 that ‘[Communism] is 
now such a threat to peace that we should make use of any force capable of disrupting 
it.’579  
 
A major problem remained the dearth of intelligence to forecast Soviet intentions and 
assess possible British counter-action.580 The implications were obvious: ‘crystal gazing’, 
very popular in the Foreign Office, was practiced to an extent that upset some of its 
staff.581 Although the Northern Department was mostly correct in its assessments, the 
inherent danger of this practice was clear. Jebb, concerned about Soviet intentions in the 
Middle East, demanded in August 1948 that British security and intelligence services be 
strengthened.582 To obtain any information from official sources proved equally difficult. 
Peterson, British ambassador in Moscow, in early 1948 stated his concern about the nearly 
complete absence of direct contact with high-ranking Soviet officials.583 The CFM in 
London in December 1947 had ended on a bitter note and even three months later relations 
had not recovered. Although desired, détente, he suggested, should not be forced; the 
Foreign Office had to wait until the Kremlin realised that it had overplayed its hand.584  
 
At the same time, in the Northern Department, Lambert noted that Bevin agreed that ‘the 
time has not yet come either to warn the Soviet government of the dangers of their present 
course or to try and work for a détente.’585 Détente, Peterson argued shortly after, could 
only work if the West felt sufficiently secure.586 If the Kremlin was to offer wide-ranging 
concessions now, the danger was that people in the West, not realising the tactical nature 
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of this step, would feel reassured and might demand an end to Western consolidation and 
rearmament.587 By late 1949 Kelly, the new British ambassador in Moscow, noted that a 
‘stabilisation of cold warfare’ could be detected, indicating a certain trough between Soviet 
foreign policy initiatives.588 The Berlin blockade had been resolved and Stalin had been 
left insecure by Tito’s continued refusal to bow to Soviet pressure. By the end of 1949 the 
foundation of the FRG, the GDR and the PRC had all helped stabilise the Cold War 
further; defined fronts were easier to deal with. However, Anglo-Soviet relations remained 
uniformly poor.589 That both the British and the American ambassadors had been changed 
in the spring of 1949 had possibly worsened this situation.590  
 
The Soviet Union remained Britain’s major opponent. Assessing its strengths and 
weaknesses, the Russian Secretariat in Moscow under Barker noted in a paper in January 
1949 that Stalin’s Communist dictatorship was now ‘solidly entrenched [after having 
passed] the supreme test [of World War II].’591 Confident and relatively strong, it was an 
adversary that would use this strength to secure and extend its position elsewhere to 
maximise its own security. The Kremlin used militant diplomacy as a weapon to achieve 
its aims. Britain, in comparison, was much less ruthless. As a result, satisfying outcomes of 
smaller policy initiatives were not guaranteed. However, this Soviet tactic, unintentionally, 
helped consolidate the West as country after country realised that only the old idea of 
‘strength in numbers’ would protect them from Soviet interference in their internal affairs 
through Communist parties, Fifth Column activity or direct pressure. This, in combination 
with patient firmness, had actually proved very effective in warding off a determined 
Soviet attempt to infiltrate Western Europe. Even more importantly, a FORD paper argued 
in March 1949, ‘Soviet diplomacy is responsible for the final demise of American 
isolationism.’592 Soviet aggression had achieved what the British alone had been 
impossible to obtain. This, however, was accompanied by the problem of how to handle 
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and influence the new partner.593 The post-war ‘special relationship’ was thus problematic 
from the start and even now the debate continues over its usefulness.594 
 
Increased coherence in the West led to increased confidence of its governments to claim to 
offer a good alternative to Soviet controlled Communism.595 This point was one of the 
most vital ones in Western propaganda to its populations: the threat of Soviet interference 
in the relationship between Western governments and their people had to be countered at 
all costs.596 National policies had to be shaped to support the foreign policy of the 
government and foreign policy, as Lucas and Morris have noted, was increasingly linked to 
an effective use of propaganda.597 But this took time and a lot of preparation. Coming 
indirectly to the aid of the West, Mao defeated the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-Shek in 
1949. Increased instability in the Far East with its potential opportunity to increase Soviet 
influence in the region reduced Soviet pressure on Western Europe momentarily and 
allowed governments to concentrate more on domestic affairs. The Soviet Union, Barclay, 
noted in January 1950, ‘will not make any fresh move in Western Europe until the issue 
between Stalin and the Chinese is settled.’598 
 
Adapting Kennan’s original idea of containment to the new circumstances Acheson, US 
Secretary of State, had in 1950 introduced his idea of ‘situations of strength’ which were to 
provide deterrence for the Soviet Union against any further encroachment of Western 
interests.599 Bohlen, US minister at the Paris embassy, in the spring of 1950, had stated un-
mistakenly that ‘the time had manifestly come when everybody must recognise the fact 
that the world is irretrievably divided in two.’600  Containment had been proven difficult to 
carry out as Soviet tactics varied and as points of Soviet pressure were widespread: these 
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had by January 1950 been identified as the SBZ, Austria, Greece, Finland, the Middle East 
and Far East but also included international organisations as points of frequent contact 
between the blocs.601 Perimeter defence, as World War II had just proven, was inefficient 
while strongpoint defence, ie situations of strength, required time to implement.  
 
While the USA was able to function properly, Britain, Western Europe including Western 
Germany, and Japan were all still in need of reconstruction and unable to support 
containment independently of the USA. Callaghan nevertheless argues that by 1950 Britain 
no longer needed Marshall aid.602 Although national foreign policies were determined 
independently, some issues, like containment, essentially based on economic strength, had 
to be organised in cooperation with other Western states. To rectify the ongoing economic 
weakness, initiatives like the Schuman Plan were implemented. Bevin’s idea of 
establishing Western Europe as a ‘Middle Power’ in world politics between the USA and 
the Soviet Union continued to be discussed against this background.603 
 
Particularly difficult, against this background of relative weakness, was the need to 
maintain and even increase rearmament. ‘The arms race continues with gathering 
momentum’, Mayhew worried in September 1950.604 Unremarkably the Kremlin, aware of 
this Western attempt to restrict its options for future foreign policy initiatives, was not 
pleased. Both the USA and Britain were dutifully subjected to a new barrage of Soviet 
propaganda within the ongoing Peace Campaign. Particularly harsh was the continued 
assessment of Britain as the handmaiden of American imperialism.605 The Northern 
Department realised that Western initiatives had alarmed the Kremlin.606 As much as 
Soviet policies had increased Western consolidation so Western responses to these policies 
had increased Soviet efforts to protect itself and its gains.607 Also, the idea of containment 
neglected the notion of conflict resolution through high-level talks.608 Although the 
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Kremlin put out feelers for a high-level meeting in 1950, not until 1955, ten years after 
World War II and well into the Cold War, would the leaders of the Great Powers meet 
again face to face.609  
 
8.2. The risk of war 
War, or more specifically the talk of it, took up a lot of the Northern Department’s time. 
The overwhelming presence of the Peace Campaign, the Berlin Blockade, the defeat of the 
Kuomintang army in China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War a year later, all 
contributed to a sense of impending doom. Even though the Foreign Office remained 
convinced, and was with hindsight proven right, that direct war would not break out 
between the Great Powers, the, however slight, possibility of it could not be neglected.610 
Jebb had warned that ‘a mechanised barbarian must never be underestimated if civilisation 
is to endure.’611 Appraising the foreign policy of a country and its future intentions did 
include, if relevant, the assessment of its military potential and possible foci of future 
aggression; undoubtedly the reality of the Cold War did imply a definite threat of conflict. 
It was impossible, Mayhew argued convincingly in December 1948, ‘to draw a distinction 
in practice between foreign policy on the one hand and Cold War on the other.’612 It is 
probably fair to say that the risk of war would have been reduced substantially if the 
Kremlin had refrained from using this threat in its propaganda, even though Communist 
ideology maintained that a clash remained a certainty.  
 
Stalin’s doctrine of Peaceful Co-existence from 1946, acknowledged by the Northern 
Department to be a tactic rather than a change of strategy, looked increasingly 
unconvincing.613 The doctrine from the start had a hint of falsity about it; to imply 
something is possible did not mean that it was considered normal or even desirable. A 
memorandum by William Barker, head of the Russian Secretariat at the British embassy in 
Moscow, from March 1948 summed up Northern Department thinking at the time stating 
that co-existence could not be trusted as this doctrine ‘means in practice that war is 
ultimately inevitable [and that the doctrine was] part of the preparation for the harsher 
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probability’ of eventual conflict.614 On the same day Peterson, British ambassador in 
Moscow, wrote that the ‘coming months are likely to see a decisive trial of strength in this 
phase of the conflict between the Capitalist and Socialist systems.’615 Only two months 
before the first endeavour of the Peace Campaign and only three months before the start of 
the Berlin Blockade, these proved to be quite prophetic words.  
 
The COS in late 1948 made it clear that ‘the chances of Britain surviving a war with the 
Soviet Union waged with weapons of mass destruction would be extremely slight [and] 
that the danger of such a war will increase after 1956’; they also pointed out that Britain 
now had to ‘wage Cold War.’616 The JIB, shortly after, agreed: ‘[we are] forced to 
conclude that Russia’s present military strength is vastly superior to that of the 
Commonwealth/ USA.’617 What this assessment was based on is not evident from the 
documents and thus it is difficult to pass judgement on it. The JIB did, however, point out 
that the combined economic strength of the Western bloc was much greater than that of the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc so that in a longer war the West would prevail; 
economic supremacy would make its weight felt during a longer war. The date of a 
potential war was eventually brought forward to 1954. The underlying assumption of the 
profound British weakness was serious and necessarily had to influence British foreign 
policy initiatives both to the West and the East.618 The COS finished by saying that ‘the 
danger [of war] is now so great that all steps short of war should be taken to avert it.’619  
 
It seemed that desperate times required desperate measures, although war should equally 
not be provoked. The Northern Department was not impressed but the options were 
limited: further, and unashamed, military consolidation, accelerated rearmament, pre-
emptive action, continued negotiation or the reality of a vastly expanded Soviet Union/ 
Communist movement which could potentially dictate the terms in world politics. If the 
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Foreign Office was just as worried about the war, they appeared more reluctant to admit 
their fears to the COS, though references about the lack of new information detailing 
Soviet plans for military action are scattered throughout Northern Department 
documents.620 Whatever the options the COS, like the Foreign Office, knew that Britain 
finally had to take a more aggressive stand vis-à-vis the Soviet threat. But Bevin, as the 
Foreign Office knew, would not make decisions on a whim. He wanted detailed analyses 
of the pros and cons of any future foreign policy effort.621  
 
The widely agreed notion that the Soviet Union would try to achieve her aims ‘by all 
measures short of war’ is a good example of the difficulties the Northern Department 
faced. While the basic idea appeared sound, the detailed implications were much harder to 
pinpoint. Another problem was that the war of nerves was finally taking its toll. Harrison 
pointed out in January 1948 that ‘it is not only the lunatic fringe that talks of a preventive 
war [in the USA] since comparatively responsible American politicians are apt, as Balfour 
says, to over-dramatise the Soviet menace.’622  Rash decisions by scared politicians could 
well have caused the war that the Soviet Union was apparently waiting for. The British 
knew that Western consolidation had not progressed far enough to undertake and win such 
a war.623 The Russia Committee, not surprisingly, pointed out, again, that the Soviet Union 
did not want a war.624  A recent high-ranking Czech defector had confirmed that the Soviet 
Union was momentarily unable to start an offensive war against the West, particularly if it 
would take her beyond her borders.625 Long lines of communication had proven more than 
once detrimental to the war effort of even a superior power. Questionable loyalties in the 
sovietised countries were equally difficult to assess. Nevertheless, a preventive war which 
the Kremlin might start out of fear was considered a real possibility.626  
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When Harrison noted that ‘it was essential to distinguish between the assessment of Soviet 
military strength or weakness and their capacity for expanding by means of political 
warfare through Communist parties’ he was pointing out the differences between 
conventional warfare and Cold Warfare. The newness of Cold Warfare, particularly 
extensive political warfare, made the assessment of Soviet means and measures very 
difficult. Just as the West was trying to find methods that could be used fairly safely to 
achieve precise aims, so the Soviet Union was using a trial and error procedure to find out 
how far it could go unscathed. What the Northern Department was sure about by early 
1949 was that it was not going to be distracted too much by supposedly sincere peace 
offers by the Kremlin. At the height of the Berlin crisis and with potential instability in the 
Eastern Bloc as a result of Tito’s nationalist policies, officials decided that the focus had to 
remain on speeding up Western consolidation.627 Although the Peace Campaign was in full 
swing at the time, military consequences to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 
April 1949 were seen as unlikely.  
 
The detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb, however, presented a new and much more potent 
threat than conventional or Cold Warfare had done to date. Regarded as the main deterrent 
against an adventurous Soviet foreign policy at the end of the war, it was now in the hands 
of a rather unpredictable and still inexperienced Superpower. Aldrich argues that it was 
this rather then the outbreak of the Korean War a year later which prompted a major 
reconsideration of British policy.628 The atomic monopoly had been broken much sooner 
than anticipated, and the Soviet Union had proven much more resilient and determined 
than many had thought.629 A lack of ideas of how to look at the implications of this afresh 
prompted Hayter, in March 1949, to admit that this matter should be dealt with by the JIC 
rather than the Northern Department.630 This issue was so secret that there just was not 
enough information available to the Foreign Office to have any useful discussions about it. 
Hayter did, however, raise an interesting point: foreshadowing the later MAD controversy 
he asked if ‘the Russians would be sufficiently deterred by the idea of the destruction of an 
atomic bomb to avoid war even if they thought themselves certain of winning it.’ Through 
rearmament, technological advance and bloc-building on both sides East and West had 
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achieved a situation were war could actually have been fought. But increased strength and 
confidence in its own position also made the Soviet Union more unlikely to risk it all by 
initiating a military conflict. The Soviet powerbase was restricted to a geo-strategically 
fairly coherent area in Europe and Asia. In late 1948 there were Soviet forces in Eastern 
Europe, Finland, the SBZ and Austria, and in Manchuria and Korea. The West, by 
comparison, had been building up its ‘strong point defence’ clusters across the continents 
and along the rim of the Soviet empire. 
 
The permanent suggestion that war was likely increased an already pronounced fear of a 
possible future war between East and West.631 This obsession with war and national 
security was not new but by using it to promote everything from Fifth Column activity and 
a Peace Campaign to world revolution, the Kremlin had created a problem for the West by 
encroaching on its vital interests and issues of national security. A controversial 
memorandum by the Northern Department, intended as an exercise of ‘devil’s 
advocacy’and colloquially named the ‘Kremlin memorandum’, made the rounds in the 
Foreign Office in May 1950. It tried to see the world through Soviet eyes and not 
surprisingly focused on the apparent aggressiveness of Soviet foreign policy.632 It argued 
that  
 
aggressive acts are often if not always prompted by feelings of weakness and 
inferiority [and that] Russian policy like that of most countries frequently 
subjected to invasion has in modern history been peculiarly characterised by this 
mood of ‘defensive aggressiveness’ and Marxist philosophy…[it] has so to speak 
sharpened it at both ends by the dogma of A – inevitable Capitalist hostility to 
Socialism and B – the corresponding duty of the USSR to promote world 
revolution.  
 
Rumours about Soviet intentions continued to spread. In a heavily sanitised document 
dated March 1950, it is alleged that the Soviet Union was planning a large scale military 
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move in Europe, possibly in France or Italy.633 Although this war scare proved to be 
without basis, any suggestion of impending military manoeuvres within Europe alarmed 
the British government. The source was seen as reliable by the Americans, who provided 
this information. But rather than a straightforward military threat, the US was always liable 
of seeing the implications for other areas as very severe as well. Tired of haggling with the 
Kremlin in the UNO in particular, an American diplomat was stated to have said that 
‘attempts to organise the world on a basis involving reliance on the good faith and 
cooperation of the Russians, such as the UNO, were no longer worth fooling for.’634  
 
For the Foreign Office this was problematic. Even with the Iron curtain down and spheres 
of influence now plainly signposted, and even with military competition increasing, Britain 
did not want a total break in relations with the Soviet Union. The UNO remained 
essentially the only direct point of contact between the countries and thus kept lines of 
communications open. Face to face contact between diplomats in other areas was much 
more low key. Mayhew, writing in September that year, pointed out that ‘fear and 
suspicion are constantly increasing between the two sides.’635 A further reduction in 
communications would only aggravate this situation. Kelly, writing from Moscow, agreed 
and stuck to his assessment that Stalin would not risk war.636 Jebb, who had worked in the 
Foreign Office for decades and had seen it through very difficult times before, was much 
more specific in his assessment. Realising that the time for talk was over and that action 
was required, he told the Imperial Defence College in a lecture in February 1950 what he 
though needed to be done:  
 
The Cold War in this sense can indeed only be conducted if the government 
as a whole is profoundly convinced of the necessity of combating and 
resisting Communism and consequently gives the necessary 
directives…what is required in other words is rather a constant act of will on 
the part of the politicians than bright ideas on the part of civil servants.637  
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Jebb knew that the Northern Department had done all it could to point the Cabinet in the 
right direction and that now it was time for the government to use Foreign Office advice 
and to take the initiative. Five years after the end of World War II he wanted the Labour 
government to start being tough with the Soviet Union in order to protect the interests of 
Britain and the democratic West. For those who worried, in his view too much, about 
possible retaliation by the Kremlin he added that ‘if, however, the policy of fear of war is 
seriously to influence our policy, then we might as well resign ourselves to having no 
policy at all.’ Foreign policy is inherently tricky and repercussion cannot often be predicted 
very accurately but in difficult times that still did not mean that the gloves had to stay on.  
 
The COS’s problems with the Foreign Office were possibly understandable against this 
background. The essential initial problem was COS unhappiness about what they 
considered an inefficient machinery to deal with the threat present. Jebb, in a note to 
Kirkpatrick and Sargent, argued in late 1948 that ‘unofficial war having, as they [the COS] 
would think, already broken out between the Soviet Union and Great Britain’ they were 
interested in having a dedicated planning staff to deal with the Cold War.638 The original 
Foreign Office minute detailing the complaints of the COS had been discussed over several 
weeks and Northern Department staff were seriously displeased with Lord Tedder’s 
complaint. Dening wrote bitterly that  
 
 
if we are to believe Lord Tedder, the COS think that because we have no 
planning staff as such in the Foreign Office we are so muddled and fuddled  in 
our conduct of international affairs and in any case by nature so defeatist that 
we are, however unconsciously, fertilising the seeds of the next war. Lord 
Tedder said that if we did not win the Cold War, the COS would have to fight 
the hot war and they did not want to. 
 
 
Mayhew minuted underneath that  
 
 
they are critical of us because we are not yet fighting this kind of war [without 
restraints or inhibitions] and because we have not setup the machinery to do it. 
But neither the Cabinet nor the Foreign Secretary has authorised this kind of 
Cold War. 
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As Jebb made clear shortly after, the Cabinet had to sanction the setting up of a special 
body dealing with policy discussion and particularly policy implementation.639 The 
problems were manifold: official authorisation was needed to set up a peacetime version of 
the PWE, staff had to be seconded, a command structure had to be established, terms of 
reference to be worked out, and funding had to be found at a time when the Treasury was 
proving increasingly reluctant to release new money. In actual fact, the Foreign Office had 
set up a sub-committee to the Russia Committee to discuss specific Cold War issues in late 
November. At its first meeting the objectives of a possible counter-offensive had been 
considered: to disaffect the Soviet orbit, to discredit the Soviet regime, to frustrate Soviet 
efforts, all to be achieved by means short of war and, bearing the JIC estimate of 1956 in 
mind, rather soon. At a meeting a month later Sargent, Jebb and Makins all agreed that 
more aggressive policies would indeed necessitate closer cooperation between 
departments. However, Sargent made it clear that Bevin would never agree to permit 
defence staff to determine foreign policy.  
 
Eventually all those concerned about war got involved in the discussion. Sir John Slessor, 
then commandant of the Imperial Defence College, supported the setting up of an inter-
departmental committee to deal with the Cold War. But just like Lord Tedder, he lacked 
intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the Foreign Office and the business of 
diplomacy. Foreign Office staff were quickly tiring of this interference in their affairs. 
Even Strang, not one to lose his temper easily, complained to Bevin in March 1949 that 
‘Sir John Slessor’s zeal has I think outrun both his discretion and his knowledge.’640 
Retaliating against this barrage of criticism and defending their organisation of the Foreign 
Office, an official wrote in a memorandum to Bevin that ‘we are adjusting the organisation 
of the Foreign Office to respond to the changes in the problems it has to deal with.’641 With 
the Russia Committee already in place for several years, the IRD and now the Cold War 
sub-committee fine-tuning actual planning and possible action to be taken, another new 
committee was set up to coordinate efforts at the top level of the Foreign Office.642 The 
Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee (PUSC), chaired directly by the Permanent 
Under-Secretary, was to consider questions of longer-term policies while the Russia 
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Committee would focus on short-term and medium-term issues. To pre-empt further 
criticism and forge closer links between the Foreign Office and the service departments the 
Foreign Office, in early in 1949, suggested tentatively that the service departments were 
best educated about the ways of the Foreign Office and the problems and option of 
diplomacy in the Cold War through the ongoing lectures at the IDC delivered by Foreign 
Office staff.643 
 
8.3. Rollback 
To make sense of all the different strands of ideas of how to interpret and fight the Cold 
War while trying to determine if changes in Soviet behaviour were caused by actual 
modifications in Soviet strategies or were just tactical deviations, was exceedingly 
difficult. The assessment of information and maintenance of an overview of developments 
in various countries and on several fronts, fell mainly to the Northern Department, and it is 
here where one is most aware of their crucial job and immense responsibility. The 
hardening of the Cold War fronts left no room for hesitation. Both the Kremlin and the 
White House had made their policies clear in stark terms. Beatrice Heuser has argued that 
from 1948 both Britain and the USA followed a policy of ‘rollback’ in order to reclaim 
Eastern Europe for the West although by 1950 it had become clear to the US 
administration that the Kremlin really was determined to hold on to its orbit states.644 
Within this discussion of how best to affect change or maintain the status quo the Northern 
Department was determined to make its voice heard. The Soviet threat could not be 
countered through small or tentative initiatives; there had to be a confident and pro-active 
approach. Harrison in this vein noted in January 1948 that ‘the gloves are off.’645 
 
But it was hard for the British government, now closer tied into and committed to a 
Western Defence system, to retain an individual voice; policy ideas on both sides of the 
Atlantic did complement each other but did not overlap on all points.646 Geographical 
separation from the USA was probably an important factor in giving the British 
                                                 
643
 FO371/77623-N171/1052/38, RC, 6.1.1949.  
644
 Heuser, ‘Covert Action’, p. 49; Garson, ‘American Foreign Policy’, pp. 347ff. 
645
 FO371/71648-N31/31/38, Harrison, 1.1.1948.  
646
 Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War , p. 59. 
 167 
government the breathing space it needed to make her own choices.647 The choices, 
however, were somewhat limited; as Mayhew noted in the chapter quote, retreat in 
diplomacy could be dangerous. Possibly against this background the Northern Department 
had made it clear that it had become increasingly urgent for the Cabinet to sanction a more 
pro-active foreign policy. As talk of war continued throughout Whitehall, ‘the question of 
peace or war’, as the Foreign Office knew, ‘is determined in the last resort by the balances 
of forces throughout the world, but especially in Europe.’648 Despite events on the Korean 
peninsula, during the late summer of 1950 Western Europe was re-affirmed as the ‘key area 
for the defence of the whole free world.’649  
 
In November 1948 Bateman had stated the Foreign Office’s ideas of containing the Soviet 
Union: the strong points along the Soviet perimeter had to be strengthened first, then the 
Foreign Office had to concentrate on ‘exposing, preventing and combating Soviet attempts 
to penetrate or divide the non-Communist powers.’650 Shortly after, the main aim in 
Europe was stated thus: to ‘disaffect the Soviet orbit, loosen the Soviet hold, discredit the 
Soviet regime, frustrate Soviet efforts.’ Europe and, in particular, the increasingly cohesive 
satellite bloc were be the immediate focus for counter-action. Just like during World War 
II it was presumably the idea of a second front which attracted the Foreign Office. To 
focus British policies on Eastern Europe, thus threatening the Kremlin’s hard won empire, 
would reduce potential Soviet action elsewhere. Tito had done the Foreign Office a favour 
by exposing the innate weakness of the orbit. The Russia Committee Cold War sub-
committee noted that ‘we already know that the quasi revolt of one satellite country has 
had profound psychological effects on the rest.’651 Possibly underestimating actual political 
and economic cohesion at the time as well as over-estimating the potential for internal 
resistance, they had based their points probably more on an idea rather than definite actual 
potential.  
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Nevertheless, the assumption that Soviet strength and prestige was intimately linked to the 
orbit and would suffer by serious problems within it was sound. History and the British 
experience had taught the Northern Department that no empire is indestructible even 
though it might require a sustained effort to destroy it. The Northern Department also knew 
that an empire would be defended. As a result Britain had to be strong enough to 
implement and defend its policies, and to offer help and moral support to those on the same 
side.652 The COS’s idea to try to undermine the Communist Party’s hold over the Soviet 
Union, for example through covert operations in the Soviet Union, in these circumstances 
was plainly dangerous.653 The focus thus remained on Eastern Europe, not on the Soviet 
Union itself.  
 
In December 1948 these ideas were fine-tuned in the Northern Department. In a draft paper 
the initial foci of future action were suggested as the SBZ, Yugoslavia and Albania. Action 
was to be mainly political warfare: anti-Soviet propaganda, aggressive publicity (overt and 
covert), ‘the spreading of rumours and the sowing of suspicion among Communists 
…bribery…defection and sabotage…encouragement of dissent’, in essence those tactics 
the Kremlin had used with varying success in Western Europe.654 The major underlying 
problem and the one which was to limit British retaliation against Soviet tactics initially 
very severely was the threat of war. Although Communist ideology and Soviet propaganda 
both stressed that the Soviet Union was not an offensive country, Dixon had pointed out in 
April that ‘it is true that Russia in history has never yet taken the offensive. But there was a 
time when Germany was a defensive country.’655 The same draft made it clear that ‘none 
of the above suggested measures should be taken if it is thought that it would involve us in 
a serious risk of hostilities with the Soviet Union.’656  
 
The JIB’s and COS’s assessments that Britain could not win a war with the Soviet Union 
quickly, if at all, and the severe lack of detailed intelligence assessing Soviet military 
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strength and preparations had left quite a mark in the Northern Department.657 National 
confidence was based on economic and military strength, and foreign policy was weak if it 
could not portray that confidence onto the outside world. Dithering would be noted and 
exploited, and could therefore not be allowed. Doubts had to be dealt with if Britain was to 
retain its worldwide role. Any smaller country, one with no empire or leadership 
ambitions, would have not found it so hard to adapt to post-1945 realities. Britain, 
however, as Wallinger minuted in mid-1948, ‘must go over to the offensive so that we do 
not have to lead from weakness.’658 That was easier said than done. In early 1949 a Foreign 
Office paper noted that Britain still refrained from ‘a policy of pure retaliation.’659 Patient 
firmness remained the order of the day. 
 
While the discussion about possible British foreign policy initiatives remained focused on 
political warfare, other tactics were discussed. Churchill, maverick of British politics, had 
suggested a showdown with the Kremlin. Surprisingly, the Russia Committee agreed that 
the idea warranted further discussion.660 Tedder and the COS were apparently convinced 
that something had to be done to prevent the Soviet Union from ever becoming a major 
threat; preferably before 1957.661 But, of course, any hint of preventive war could push the 
Kremlin to initiate the war that no-one wanted.662 In the absence of military action, the 
COS were very keen on re-instituting the political warfare machinery of World War II, 
thus enabling so-called ‘black ops.’663 The Russia Committee then debated the possible 
three branches of a political warfare organisation: an offensive branch unmasking 
Communist methods and realities, a defensive branch dealing with hostile propaganda and 
a ‘positive’ branch to promote the Western counter model to the Soviet model.664  
 
By the end of 1948 the discussion had progressed further: while Western consolidation and 
recovery had to be speeded up, counter-measures in Eastern Europe were to be initiated. 
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Since direct action against the Soviet Union would aggravate the Cold War when the West 
was still relatively weak and unprepared for retaliatory military action, and since direct 
intervention in Yugoslavia might kill off the still very fragile idea of an independent non-
Soviet Communism, Kirkpatrick, in a Russia Committee discussion, suggested Albania.665 
A civil war could be engineered although there was the danger that UN observers stationed 
there might find out. Tedder, also present, stressed the importance of letting the Americans 
know about any such intentions. They, however, were much less keen on sharing 
information about their intentions. Makins disagreed with the whole idea. The orbit was 
lost, he argued, and efforts should concentrate on areas that could be won: Berlin, Greece, 
China and South East Asia. Considering Britain’s severe financial difficulties, it was not 
remarkable that the resulting limitations for possible actions were well acknowledged by 
all those present. To fight on several geographical and political warfare fronts was just too 
expensive.  
 
A very interesting and untested idea about dealing with the Soviet threat was discussed in 
the Foreign Office in the summer of 1949: the appointment of an expert social psychologist 
to help decipher the personalities and intentions of the Kremlin’s residents.666 Although 
enthusiasm among several of the officials was initially rather muted, it was decided to try it 
out and see if the results would be worthwhile the effort. After weeks of discussion and 
vetting by MI5, Mayhew contacted Dr. Dicks who promptly told him that he had already 
been approached by the State Department with a similar request. He had decided to accept 
that offer though suggested to share, with American acquiescence, the results. The whole 
debate has a quite comical feel about it although the basic idea of it was very interesting. 
This was the other side of psychological warfare: to understand the leader meant a better 
chance of winning the war. The Northern Department was very much aware of this and 
diligently looked at every piece of information in order to gain more insight into the 
thinking and dynamics within the Kremlin. 
 
That propaganda, already being distributed low key through the IRD, was to be the main 
idea for an offensive, was thus understandable. It mirrored what the Agitprop department 
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of the Soviet Communist Party had sanctioned over the past few years. The results had 
proven disruptive, offensive and embarrassing but the actions had not triggered any 
military retaliation by the West, ergo propaganda was a relatively safe and potent weapon 
to use. It could also be used to take the Cold War into the Soviet Union itself by attacking 
its domestic weaknesses: its dictatorship, nationalities problems and class issues.667 This 
tactic entailed its own problems however. When the IRD published the personal account of 
experiences in the Gulag of a Soviet man without making relevant changes to dates and 
places, the man was arrested nearly immediately after publication. The Moscow embassy, 
which had sent the report to the Northern Department in the understanding that it would 
not be used carelessly, and the Northern Department itself, which had not been informed 
about the use of it, were outraged. 668 Mayhew himself, it was noted, had sanctioned the 
use of it for propaganda purposes.  
 
Tellingly, and pointing out another factor causing British policy to be still hesitant, just a 
month before Murray, working with Mayhew in the IRD, demanded that no action should 
be taken which would subject individuals to ‘severe repressive measures’ in response.669 
But if there were fears for a retaliatory war or about the prospect of the possible torture or 
killing of individuals, political warfare would be difficult to carry out effectively. Jebb, 
aware of these concerns, stuck to his guns. British foreign policy with regards to the Soviet 
Union had to be carried out more aggressively if it was to have any effect.670 Although he 
pointed out a few months later that the training of agents would require a serious long-term 
commitment.671 While bearing the apprehensions of some officials in mind, the idea to 
initiate a more aggressive foreign policy and tighten up the planning bodies for the 
execution of it was approved by most senior officials in the Foreign Office and thus 
became official Foreign Office advice to the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet.  
 
                                                 
667
 FO371/77560-N705/1013/38, FO, ‘Examination of the main internal weaknesses of the present regime in 
the Soviet Union from the standpoint  of its long-term durability’, 13.1.1949. 
668
 All notes for this are in FO371/ 77581-N2097/10113/38, ND paper, ‘‘Mr T’s account of his experiences in 
Siberia’, 24.2.1949.   
669
 FO371/77615-N103/1051/38, Murray, 4.1.1949.  
670
 FO371/77616-N2454/1051/38, Jebb note on FO draft paper for the Defence Committee, ‘British policy 
towards Russia’, 11.2.1949.  
671
 FO371/77617-N5232/1051/38, Jebb note on ‘Ways of organising resistance in the Soviet Union and other 
Communist states’, 24.1.1949 and 10.6.1949.    
 172 
Having decided to toughen British propaganda, a disagreement ensued about the initial 
focus of it. Sargent argued that it should be Western Europe and aim at the eradication of 
Communism there. The West would thus be strengthened and Britain could then initiate 
further action in Eastern Europe. Roberts, then Bevin’s Principal Private Secretary, 
conveyed Bevin’s ideas as saving Greece, helping Tito and initiating action in Albania.672 
He thus mirrored the ideas of the Russia Committee and Kirkpatrick from late 1948. This 
discussion incidentally also provided a good illustration of how long the gestation periods 
of policy ideas often were. Sargent, however, remained unconvinced. To him it appeared 
that the Secretary of State was trying to re-create the wartime SOE. The discussion ended 
with the instruction to discuss details in a special committee. What Bevin had made clear 
from the start though, was that he wanted the US to know about British plans and possibly 
to get involved as well; a courtesy not extended to the British with regards to American 
plans for overt and covert action in Europe. 673  
 
A pressing problem was that of constantly changing Soviet tactics. Although recognised as 
intended to confuse the West and divert attention from Soviet initiatives elsewhere, it had 
nevertheless to be assessed for potential opportunities these changes might offer. The Cold 
War, just like a conventional war, was a conflict in flux and even though basic fronts, aims 
and strategies were unlikely to change, small shifts in focus and tactics could produce 
some desired results. But shifting emphases made the assessment and planning of longer-
term initiatives difficult. The Russia Committee rather stoical pointed out in early 1950 
that ‘all theories on Soviet policy were only hypotheses and should not be regarded as 
axioms on which policy could safely be based.’674 Trying to think afresh about the main 
options for British relations with the Soviet Union an unidentified Foreign Office official 
noted in March 1950 that Britain had three main choices: the Kremlin would do what the 
British government wanted it to do, the world would stabilise by acknowledgement of its 
political division or the Cold War would continue with all the associated problems.675 The 
first two were seen as unlikely, the last as the most probable outcome. NSC 68, issued in 
1950, clarified American foreign policy parameters and aims, and as a result increased the 
stakes for the British as well as the Soviets.676 Viewing the Cold War through a strongly 
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ideological lens and placing it in a global context, the procurement of information, its 
quick analysis and use, and a measured and realistic response from the British side became 
even more important in order to prevent the US administration pursuing policies regarded 
as not in the British interest. 
 
Kelly had a suspicion that the Kremlin leaders ‘with their doctrinaire addiction to 
grandiose planning are working to a broad general timetable.’677 To ‘counter-challenge the 
Soviet championship of a Pax Sovietica’ the West would have to do a lot more in 
achieving Acheson’s aim to built up ‘situations of strength.’678 Bullying of the West by the 
Kremlin had been essentially stopped by late 1950 but for the bullying of Moscow the 
West just had not enough leverage or political willpower, yet. Western and Eastern 
consolidation was continuing, neutral and new countries were being wooed by both sides, 
an arms race was in progress, political warfare was once again used as a viable political 
tactic, covert activities were discussed seriously and direct contact between the leaders of 
the main camp was practically non-existent. 
 
By 1950 the Northern Department had achieved what it had desired since 1946: a more 
confident and targeted foreign policy and response to the ongoing Soviet propaganda 
campaign. While the efforts to consolidate the Western fight against the expansion of 
Soviet Communism had succeeded in the formations of NATO and an independent West 
Germany, these had largely been high-politics successes. At the grass roots level much 
more needed to be done to persuade the public in Britain, and elsewhere, that Social 
Democracy despite its problems, was the best and most viable alternative to Soviet inspired 
Communism. Thanks to officials in the Foreign Office the knowledge and expertise of 
Soviet affairs, her strategies and tactics was by now vastly better than they had previously 
been. Although, as noted in the introduction to this thesis, there is the charge of ‘cold 
warrior-ism’ against these men, detailed study of the sources suggests that they were in 
actual fact realists. Access to primary information and experience had given them a better 
platform from which to assess new information and they were thus often well ahead of 
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others in their discussion of options. In the end, they opted for realistic and pragmatic 
advice. For this they cannot be blamed. 
 
 
The testing of each others parameters of interests, for example in Berlin, was not 
surprising. While diplomacy proved unsuccessful to negotiate outstanding issues, the 
resorting to a more active approach was to be expected. Britain’s response, together with 
the USA, to forcefully pursue containment was an indication of the level of threat 
perceived by both governments as well as an indication of new realities of Cold Warfare: a 
more direct involvement through financial and military means worldwide in order to stop 
the expansion of Soviet inspired and led Communism.  
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Part Four.  Entrenchment, 1951 to 1953 
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The Foreign Office, alongside the US State Department and their Western European 
counterparts, had by 1951 decided on its course and secured the support of the Cabinet. 
Although there was now a Conservative British government, the broad course of British 
foreign policy remained essentially unaltered. While Churchill at times proved difficult to 
handle, the Foreign Office patiently defended their policy proposals. While the West could, 
relatively speaking, be confident that their plans would come to fruition, the concurrent 
development in the East centring on the Soviet Union was much slower to get off the 
ground; the country also was once again plagued by intriguing domestic developments 
which the Northern Department at times found hard to understand (Chapter Ten). As a 
result there was a flurry of diplomatic and propaganda activity initiated by the Kremlin to 
stall Western efforts for increased consolidation and more anti-Soviet propaganda (Chapter 
Eleven). In its relations with the Kremlin, Western European military consolidation and in 
particular German rearmament during these three years proved the most controversial and 
fought over issue (Chapter Twelve).  
 
 
In the Northern Department these developments were seen with a certain sense of calm in 
the knowledge that the USA through had made a definite commitment to Europe. Although 
the British position in world politics was as yet still fairly undetermined, the close 
relationship with the USA and the continued existence of an empire and Commonwealth as 
well as its leading role in Europe at the time gave it a political gravitas that brushed over its 
severe economic problems and the growth of nationalist movements which threatened the 
integrity of its empire. By now the way information was received, analysed and used had 
been perfected, and its use by different committees and agencies well established. Some of 
the main problems since the war had been dealt with if not solved and the focus was much 
more concentrated. A better focus, more confidence and an increased will to stand their 
ground meant that the department offered more confident and implementable solutions to 
present problems. One major diplomatic issue remained: how to determine whether Soviet 
conciliation moves were genuine, for example after Stalin’s death, and whether they were 
worth jeopardising the special relationship with America in order to take advantage of 
them. 
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Chapter Nine: Institutions and personnel: The FO, the ND, and the Moscow 
Embassy, 1951-1953  
 
 
 
 It is hard from the ivory tower of this embassy to say how the new [Soviet]  
 policies are being received. 
                                                                                             
                                                                                       David Kelly, Moscow, 6.4.1951679 
 
 
 
Of importance for British foreign policy but with surprisingly limited impact for the 
Foreign Office and the Northern Department itself was the change in the British 
government in 1951. The well-respected Bevin had died and the Labour government after 
six years in power was voted out of office and replaced by a new Conservative 
government. Churchill and Eden (Morrison who had replaced Bevin was himself replaced 
by Eden after a few months) as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary respectively took the 
helm. Eden, Reynolds has remarked, ‘returned to the Foreign Office like a man going 
home.’680 Having closely worked together previously during the war this was not a team 
that required a lot of time to establish a working relationship. Churchill, according to Klaus 
Larres, thought that the British Empire and the special relationship with the USA would 
secure the achievement of his foreign political vision.681 Bullock has argued that Churchill 
‘romanticized’ this relationship while Bevin was much more pragmatic about it.682  As 
before, Churchill attempted to make his mark very quickly. Against the advice of the 
Foreign Office, and against the preferences of the US State Department, he brought back 
the old idea of summit diplomacy to negotiate pressing issues. Although forever associated 
with the war effort of the British people, he was now beyond his prime and difficulties 
between the Prime Minister, his Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office soon 
developed.683 
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The Northern Department took these changes in their stride. Led by the dependable 
William Strang as Permanent Under-Secretary since 1949, he represented a continuity of 
organisation and interest that was very useful to officials. First Andrew Noble in 1951 and 
then Paul Mason from 1952, both experienced officials, supported Northern Department 
staff as superintending Under-Secretaries through this transition period. The two Heads of 
Department during these years, Geoffrey Harrison and Henry Arthur Frederick Hohler, 
were equally experienced staff with an in-depth knowledge of the intricacies of Soviet 
affairs and diplomacy. H.T. Morgan and K.J. Uffen completed the team as the specialists 
working at the Soviet desk during this time. All undoubtedly benefited from the knowledge 
and information accumulated by their predecessors since the end of the war which was 
now used extensively by the department itself, but also by FORD, the IRD and other 
Foreign Office departments and government agencies. 
 
 
The Moscow Embassy in 1951 was still headed by David Kelly who had arrived there in 
June 1949. On his retirement in October 1951 Alvary Gascoigne succeeded to his post. 
After extensive service abroad and an ambassadorship to Japan he was sent aged fifty eight 
to one of the most difficult posts within the Foreign Service. Trying to maintain his  
dignity vis-à-vis the representatives of the Soviet government who always noticed these 
things Gascoigne begged the Foreign Office for a new car: ‘the Rolls is off the road and in 
a very bad condition. You know now necessary it is for prestige reasons for the number 
one to have a really good car.’684 A very budget conscious Treasury and the unfavourable 
exchange rates for diplomatic personnel made the running of the embassy a challenging 
and expensive task. Ably supported by J.W. Nicholls and then Paul Grey as Ministers at 
the embassy, Gascoigne led a team of seventeen staff most of which were exchanged 
during 1951. J.L.B. Titchener and F.A. Warner provided continuous service during the first 
two years. Additional help and expertise was available from 1953 when the Russian 
Secretariat was reorganised under the leadership of Thomas Brimelow. Having worked at 
the Moscow Embassy between 1942 and 1945, and in the Northern Department between 
1946 and 1948 he knew the Soviet Union probably better than anyone else in the Foreign 
Office. In 1956 he became the Head of the Northern Department and ended his Foreign 
Office career as Permanent Under-Secretary in 1975. 
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While the Northern Department and the Foreign Office were by now very well organised 
and ready to receive, analyse and discuss information very quickly, the essential problem 
of the procurement of credible and up-to-date information remained. The ‘deepening 
Russian blackout’ had resulted, Kelly admitted, in a ‘large element of speculation in our 
assessment.’685 As Kelly noted in the introductory quote, relations between the Soviet and 
the British government had cooled and further exacerbated the difficulties faced by British 
diplomats in Moscow and the Soviet orbit. Travelling in the Soviet Union, although 
undoubtedly highly beneficial for the understanding of the country, could provide only so 
much detailed information. Cooperation between the Foreign Office and the Soviet 
Embassy in London were not much better. The Iron Curtain was hard to penetrate and the 
Soviet government had perfected its complex system of information control and targeted 
propaganda. One result was that it remained challenging to suggest and develop 
appropriate policies for the Cabinet to discuss. Guesswork and a limited information 
exchange with other friendly governments filled some gaps. Some low key reorganisation 
of the flow of information continued and concerns about missing important announcements 
in the Soviet press, for example, were also dealt with.686 The PUSC slowly overtook the 
Russia Committee as the main information and policy coordinating committee. Together 
with the JIC it was at the forefront of Britain’s Cold War fight against Soviet 
Communism.687 
 
 
The ongoing Korean War, the continued discussions about the integration of West 
Germany into the European Defence Community and the difficult sessions in the UNO 
dealing with the production and control of atomic weapons increased the tension between 
East and West. A new spy scandal, this time involving the ‘Cambridge Five’ who had held 
vital posts in the British fight against Soviet controlled Communism, did nothing to aid an 
easing of that tension. As Max Hastings noted recently, the real danger here was that by 
that time ‘British intelligence and diplomacy were deeply penetrated’ by these men.688 
Since Foreign Office and British intelligence efforts were known to the Soviet government, 
it was difficult to tell how much the British effort so far had been damaged. Nevertheless, 
the fairly well developed consolidation on both sides had stabilised the Cold War in 
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Europe. Clearly drawn battle lines meant that a war between the two sides was less likely 
and this resulted in a reduction in the talk of war.689 
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Chapter Ten: The ND view of the Soviet Union, Soviet foreign policy, and the 
likely succession to Stalin  
 
 
These [Soviet leaders] are hard-boiled fanatics. 
                                                     
                                                                                                        David Kelly, 5.7.1951690                                
 
 
The last two years of Stalin’s life were defined by several important events: the Nineteenth 
party Congress in October 1952, the long delayed second post-war (Fifth) Five Year Plan, 
and the preparation and partial carrying out of new purges. The Party Congress confirmed 
and increased domestic coherence while personnel changes in party and bureaucracy 
cemented the Stalinist system.691 Stalin, as Roberts Service has argued, was still a threat to 
his follow party members.692 By the time of his death on March 5th, 1953 the complete 
Communist Party hold on the country had been re-established after the upheavals of the 
war and post-war period.693 The famous grandiose schemes of Soviet engineers and 
architects fired the public imagination and convinced many in the West that the Soviet 
Union would only grow stronger.694 This increased concern in those who knew that 
increasing industrial strength would necessarily come with a more confident approach to 
the solution of internal and external problems. Stalin himself, the Northern Department 
agued, retained his absolute control of the country, a claim now questioned by some 
historians.695  
 
 
The Soviet population had by now recovered from its wartime losses and stood at about 
203 million, 39.2 million of whom where industrial workers.696 Tony Judt estimates that in 
1952 about 5.2 million were held in labour camps, labour colonies or special 
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settlements.697 But the reality of living in a totalitarian country may well have been less 
worrying for Soviet citizens at the time than many in the West thought. Embassy staff 
travelling the country in 1951 reported back saying that ‘the fact of living in a police state 
is merely an accepted background to normal life; it strengthens the desire to keep ‘out of 
trouble’ but is not felt as an oppression from which other happier races are free.’698 
Gascoigne, the new ambassador, wrote in his first letter that ‘while the people look 
adequately clad, they do not look happy…I get the impression that it is one of the 
gloomiest and saddest cities I have ever seen. The people all seem to be in mourning.’699 
Though deeply pessimistic this assessment reflected the views of the Foreign Office.  
 
 
The big news at the beginning of 1953 was the announcement of a wave of new arrests. 
Frequent purges and re-organisation in the bureaucracy, Party and local government bodies 
were nothing unusual. In 1951 a Northern Department official had noted that ‘this is a 
recurrent disease of the Communist mind and I do not think we should attach any great 
significance to the present campaign.’700 Arrests in the 1930s had served domestic as well 
as foreign policy purposes and the new purges were deemed to be a completely internal 
affair; possibly a sort of Soviet house cleaning.701 This time a group of Jewish doctors, 
among them very prominent Kremlin doctors like Vinogradov and Egorov, were accused 
of planning terrorist activities in the instructions of Western, in particular British and 
American, intelligence services.702 In 1953 after months of silence and expectations of a 
new show trial, the new leaders announced soon after Stalin’s death that the men had been 
wrongfully arrested by the Ministry of State Security.703 How far Beria himself was 
implicated and how much this affair aided his subsequent fall remains unclear. Amy 
Knight proposed that it may have been Khrushchev, who disliked Beria, who was behind 
this plot to discredit the security services.704 The Moscow embassy noted, slightly at a loss, 
that ‘the doctor’s plot remains a curious episode.’705  
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Despite the developments since 1945 and the possible realisation that he had a part to play 
in the cooling of relations between the erstwhile allies, Stalin was orthodox with regards to 
his world view. While he was willing to alter some strategies as well as tactics, his basic 
assumptions remained the same. Undoubtedly, Roberts has argued, the Soviet leadership 
believed in its own ideology.706 But Stalin’s attempt to view the post-war world through 
the prism of Marxism-Leninism, while providing him with explanations and opportunities, 
weakened his understanding of the changing international scene.707 Nevertheless, 
‘dogmatism was one of the most important pillars of Stalinism.’708 As new necessities 
merged with old certainties the export of the revolutionary movement into those areas 
deemed susceptible to it remained, apart from domestic and military strength, the main line 
of the defence of the Soviet Union.709 The problem for the Kremlin was how to reconcile 
the massive capital investment programme needed to achieve the basics of Communism 
while rearming at the same time and the Soviet government was undoubtedly aware of this 
huge problem at the heart of its domestic and international policy. 
 
 
When the staple of Soviet propaganda, the imminent economic slump in the capitalist 
countries, proved to take longer than anticipated and thus less useful as a threat, the focus 
shifted towards the impact of rearmament on workers lives in the West.710 The new mode 
of attack included frequent claims that Western aggressive policies were the source of the 
international tension and that therefore war in the future was likely.711 Soviet policy, the 
Northern Department argued, could not hope to attain its foreign policy aims with regards 
to the spread of Communism by inter-governmental practices. Therefore it was entirely 
dependent on grass roots support abroad. The moral high-ground was therefore important 
and the Kremlin worked hard to give the impression of occupying it alone. High-level 
diplomacy was designed to divert attention away from these efforts and to optimise the 
ground as much as possible while maintaining peace. To hope for any significant 
conciliatory moves, Gascoigne argued, was pointless.712  
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The Soviet bloc far from being a finished product remained very much a work in progress 
while, apart from Germany, the Korean War was item number one on the negotiation 
list.713 Soviet intentions were still unclear and Nicholls wrote  from Moscow that ‘the 
Korean campaign was more a limited exercise and one within the general strategy of 
plucking ripe plums were no great risk was involved, but there could be no certainty that 
the Politburo did not intend it as the opening shot of a general offensive.’714 Kelly argued a 
few months later that ‘the inability of the Soviet government to resist the temptation of an 
apparently easy prize in Korea was a turning point’ in Soviet policy.715 It had made a 
mistake that was now difficult to rectify. Dixon argued therefore not surprisingly that the 
next time the Kremlin might be more careful with regards to any foreign adventures.716 
Accordingly, Soviet confidence and propaganda wavered with military fortunes in Korea. 
When making progress the Soviet Union blocked all attempts to secure a cease fire. By late 
1951 it was clear that the Korean War was a liability to all sides. The main problem was 
that China appeared to be in charge of negotiations and the realisation of all Chinese 
desiderata for negotiation appeared impossible.  
 
 
A long memorandum in July 1951 summarised the British consensus about the aims of 
Soviet foreign policy.717 The Soviet foreign policy in Europe was characterised as 
nationalist imperialism aimed at the realisation of a Communist world order.718 Germany 
remained the key to success in Europe.719 The Kremlin would try to defeat both Western 
European recovery and Western consolidation of any kind. American and British influence 
in Eastern and Western Europe was to be eradicated. In order to achieve these it would use 
all methods of Cold Warfare.720 Since Soviet leaders did not have to pay attention to 
domestic pressures and thought that concern among foreign Communists and non-
Communists alike was being dealt with adequately through the Peace Campaign it was 
able to follow its foreign policy objectives fairly consistently. Although the West should 
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not appear weak it had to refrain from appearing too threatening. Backed into a corner it 
was impossible to say what the Kremlin might do. Not surprisingly, Gascoigne warned 
from Moscow that ‘the Soviet Union would fight rather than yield on any point which 
threatened sovereignty, either of Soviet territory, or of the territory of their satellites.’721 
 
 
Stalin’s death in March 1953 was a turning point: the end of an era and the chance for an 
easing of the Cold War. Although the new leaders would have to negotiate about the form 
of government and ensure the domestic stability of the country, and therefore were unlikely 
to make wide-ranging concessions quickly, smaller steps could well lead to bigger 
gestures.722 The embassy confidently declared that there were signs that the new leaders 
were keen to dissociate themselves from particular tactics of their predecessor and soon 
detected a moderate disengagement internationally.723 Some in the Air Ministry even 
wondered, in view of the continued calm and business as usual mentality, whether the new 
leaders ‘were working to a pre-arranged plan.’724 While toning down the severe anti-
Western content of their propaganda and expressing their desire for peace they maintained 
that the Soviet Union would continue to strengthen herself. The Northern Department 
thought that this reduction in aggressiveness was essentially due to a real fear in the 
Kremlin about what the West, and in particular the USA, might do.725 Many remembered 
the intervention after the revolution in admittedly different circumstances but nevertheless 
this idea was not entirely illusionary. The back door had been opened and no one was quite 
sure of what to do next. 
 
 
By the summer this very fleeting détente was essentially over. It had lasted only as long as 
the new leaders needed to secure their own positions. The unrest in GDR in the summer of 
1953 was dealt with in typical Soviet manner – decisively and ruthlessly. However, a ‘new 
look’ was being portrayed across the orbit: for example, in a tactical withdrawal the Soviet 
style collectivisation campaign was halted, local governments showed restraint with 
regards to the expression of criticisms of national governments. Overall nothing important 
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had been conceded; the most urgent international matter, the Korean War, would not be 
over until late July 1953. However, by offering small concession to minor problems the 
Kremlin had gained the upper hand and now the West, the Foreign Office feared, was in 
the defensive and would have possibly have to offer their own concessions next.726  
 
 
Those who succeeded Stalin in the period of government by committee presented a united 
front. While Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev knew that some reform was necessary, 
Molotov and Kaganovich disagreed.727 Beria even had, as Rayfield has argued, ‘lost his 
taste for blood.’728 However, as usual in Soviet history, a leadership contest had at some 
point to come out into the open. Although we still do not know exactly what happened and 
why, it was announced on July 10th 1953 that Malenkov had in a report to a plenary session 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party attacked Beria for alleged criminal 
attempts to ‘undermine the Soviet state in the interest of foreign capital and to set his 
ministry above the government and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.’729 
Although Stalin was dead his tactics still proved rather useful to the new regime. Beria was 
relieved of all his posts and expelled from the party. It is safe to assume that his 
involvement in the many crimes of the Stalin era as well as his undeniable power by way 
of his ministry frightened the other party leaders and that they took the first opportunity to 
get rid of him. Interestingly, the Foreign Office had at the beginning of the year argued that 
a purge of Beria’s ministry was in actual fact not unlikely.730  
 
 
International opinion in the summer of 1953 was divided between those who saw Beria as 
the architect of the Soviet ‘new look’ and those who thought he was the main opponent of 
it. Gascoigne argued that Beria may have been on the hit list since April.731 The result was 
that Malenkov appeared to be even more robustly in charge. Beria was arrested on June 
27th and not heard off again. It is still a mystery why he had not protected himself better.732 
Although it was later stated that he was executed at the end of the year, he had in fact 
almost certainly been shot during the summer. His arrest was concluded to be the result of 
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a power struggle at the top of the party at a time when the collective government façade 
was breaking down.733 The Foreign Office even speculated that the arrest of Beria 
illustrated the emergence of the Red Army as a major political force with the army leaders 
supporting the anti-Beria forces.734 What this assessment was based on is unclear from the 
documents and it is certainly surprising to see the Northern Department endorsing an 
opinion like this. 
 
 
Probably necessarily, bearing his high international profile even after the loss of his post as 
Soviet foreign minister in mind, Molotov was seen initially as the most likely successor.735 
However, while appreciating the importance of domestic politics for the Soviet leadership 
the Northern Department curiously failed to look for those in the party leadership who, 
even if lacking international profile, had a high domestic profile. Admittedly it was easier 
to speculate about those who were known in the West. A real succession contest was seen 
as unlikely. The Northern Department noted in May 1951 that ‘in all probability the 
mechanism for a smooth transference of power to Stalin’s successor is already in 
existence’, surprisingly underestimating Stalin’s grip on his Politburo.736 Although even 
today we have no information about a possible planned succession, it is unlikely that a 
leader like Stalin would willingly nominate a successor thus ostensibly weakening his 
power by admitting his own mortality. In actual fact he did everything in his power to 
dilute the influence of some of his potential successors. 
 
 
On March 3rd,1953 a communiqué was issued that Stalin had taken ill.737 Having had a 
supposed brain haemorrhage the day before this was an announcement without precedent. 
To take the decision to publish this information implied that Stalin really was mortally ill. 
Now, of course, the succession debate became a topic of hot debate. Then at 9.50 pm on 
March 5th,1953 Stalin’s death was announced. The longest serving Soviet leader had 
finally died and left no immediate successor. Stalin had, the Moscow embassy noted, 
‘when he died [been] czar in all but name.’738  
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The speed with which the succession changes were carried out suggests a certain degree of 
agreement among the senior party leaders or possibly a pre-arranged plan. No obvious 
power struggle was taking place.739 Malenkov appeared to be accepted as the new man in 
charge of the country and certainly portrayed that impression to foreign observers.740 
Malenkov, Hohler suggested, ‘is an adroit politician who may well succeed in riding the 
collective horse without falling off.’741 However, he continued, ‘totalitarianism and 
collective government cannot survive together for long and…a single leader must 
eventually emerge.’ The collective leadership practised at that time would sooner or later 
be replaced by the emergence of another supreme ruler.742 This, of course, was viewed 
with apprehension in the West as a new leader was an unpredictable entity. As it turned out 
government by committee worked until the changes that brought about Beria’s arrest and 
subsequent execution. By that time the struggle that everyone had been waiting for was in 
full swing.743 
 
 
Stalin’s funeral was by all means an odd affair. Arranged with haste but following set 
precedents, it lacked a sense of real loss.744 Gascoigne noted that ‘it was a mean, and to my 
mind a shabby, funeral cortege for so great a man.’745 The Hall of Columns, where Stalin’s 
body lay in state, was not very remarkable and ‘the entrance hall was full of soldiers 
behaving as if they were enjoying an interval at a theatre.’746 The indifference of ordinary 
people to this event was commented upon several times.747 Public displays of grief were 
very rare although Archie Brown has noted that many regretted his death.748 The party 
leaders obvious haste to get this funeral over and done with attracted not surprisingly some 
comment at the time.749 By April 1953 there even were rumours that ‘Stalin was assisted 
out of this world.’750  
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Chapter Eleven: The ND and ‘Cold Warfare’, 1951-1953 
 
 
The easiest way to capture a fortress is from within. 
                                                                              
                                                                                    Stalin, ‘Short History of the CPSU’751 
 
 
Cold Warfare, the aggressive and prolonged use of political and economic pressure 
through propaganda and trade sanctions, for example, had since 1945 become a recognised 
method of applying pressure on the West. In the absence of effective diplomacy due to the 
inability and unwillingness of both sides to talk and find ways to negotiate outstanding 
issues, it had become a tested Soviet means of putting the West under pressure and on the 
defensive in Europe and worldwide. The Cominform, the Peace Campaign and ceaseless 
propaganda as well as economic pressure and a very vocal policy in the UNO meant that 
the Foreign Office was faced with some form of Soviet attack nearly continuously.752 Even 
though the Northern Department was by now used to this tactic Britain was still relatively 
slow to respond. A fast, appropriate and targeted response required a policy change that the 
British government had not yet taken. The Foreign Office had, however, admitted a COS 
representative to the Russia Committee thus acknowledging the importance of defence 
considerations in foreign policy. Greenwood argued that this in actual fact constituted a 
victory of the COS.753 Although the IRD, for example, was now trying to disseminate 
information that set Soviet propaganda in perspective, this effort was still very much low 
key. It was more in the international institutions, like the UNO, were the British 
government felt able to take a more pro-active and aggressive approach. 
 
 
The Peace Offensive, which had run slightly out of steam but was still a formidable 
propaganda platform, continued to placate peoples worldwide with Soviet inspired slogans 
and campaigns. ‘The Western democracies are now once more the declared enemy’, a 
Northern Department paper noted.754 The Korean War, of course, proved a godsend for 
Soviet agitators. The first war since 1945, it caused anxiety among peoples and politicians 
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alike about the immediate future. It was a perfect opportunity and the Kremlin exploited it 
to the fullest. Apart from campaigning on a peace platform it also provided a further 
opportunity to speak to and engage peoples out-with the UNO and bypassing their 
democratic governments in the West. 
 
 
The Peace Campaign was an odd invention: propagating peace while using methods of 
political warfare. It was, apart from Communist parties and the Cominform, a main arm of 
Soviet foreign policy.755 On the other hand, the campaign restricted the Kremlin to those 
policies which fitted into its main concept. Further attempts to settle outstanding issues by 
military means, such as the Berlin Blockade, were difficult to justify. This possibly further 
supported a more stable Cold War at the time.756 Although calls for a final settlement of 
the German question continued, the Peace Campaign did not make much headway on this 
issue.757 Dixon, during a Russia Committee discussion, wondered whether the Kremlin 
really attached as many expectations to this campaign as thought.758 Others wondered as 
well, arguing that the campaign had been mostly only mildly successful.759 However, since 
the Soviet Union’s aim was to dissociate the people from their respective governments and 
to create and then exploit revolutionary situations, the attainment of this goal stood in 
direct relation to the amount of effort put into it.760 For this reason the Peace Campaign and 
its possible successors where here to stay. It was to remain, as a Northern Department 
memorandum argued, the ‘chief vehicle for Soviet political warfare.’761 The Russia 
Committee agreed; Soviet propaganda would use the ‘peace campaign as the main vehicle 
for their campaign of attrition against the West.’762 
 
 
Since Soviet propaganda had failed in its attempt to persuade the Western peoples that a 
catastrophic economic slump was on the way, it changed tactics and now concentrated on 
peace. This was very clever and possibly quite successful. Most of the vital diplomatic 
issues at the time could be incorporated into this: the Korean War, Western European 
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military consolidation, West German and Japanese rearmament, British policy in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, and the control of the atomic bomb.763 The underlying 
aim was, however, to affect actual political change. Regime change achieved through the 
disaffected in the West was a main concern of the Kremlin.764 A popular avenue for this 
was the colonial issue. In an attempt to further the problems the Western imperial powers 
were already facing in South East Asia and the Far East, the campaign to resist colonial 
suppression and exploitation, and to fan national liberation and independence forces was 
stepped up.765 But the campaign was also aimed at international bodies and variously tried 
to  increase Soviet influence in them or change them into tools of the Kremlin. The Peace 
Campaign, in particular the World Peace Council, in the West was aiming at setting itself 
up to replace the UNO when the time was right. To achieve its overall objective it 
propagated the idea that the people themselves could stop a possible future war if they 
‘take the cause of peace into their own hands.’766 While the Peace Campaign varied in 
intensity it was always present.767 
 
 
The Korean War was not surprisingly one of the main targets of the campaign. It allowed 
the spread of fear while ostensibly talking about peace; it also allowed frequent calls for a 
negotiated settlement in Korea through a Five Power Pact, something very much desired 
by the Kremlin. By offering to attend a conference to this end the Kremlin was again 
taking the initiative thus leaving the West in an awkward position.768 The Soviet 
government undoubtedly wanted the war to end as it had essentially exhausted its 
usefulness and was a drain on resources with the promise of only limited benefits. 
However, the Kremlin, just like the Chinese government, wanted peace on their terms.769 
This close linking of Soviet and Communist aims and tactics with the Peace Campaign was 
problematic and alienated those who saw through the rhetoric.770 But Uffen’s comment 
that ‘the Soviet Peace Campaign has been exposed with considerable success as a thinly 
veiled Soviet game’ may have been slightly too optimistic.771 Many were new to 
                                                 
763
 FO371/94800-NS1013/4, Moscow, ‘Soviet Union fortnightly summary’, 23.1.1951. 
764
 FO371/94801-NS1013/10, Moscow, ‘Soviet Union quarterly report’, 20.2.1951. 
765
 FO371/100831-NS1026/3, FO, ‘Indications from the 19th Party Congress of the All-Union Communist 
Party’, 6.11.1952. 
766
 FO371/94848-NS1071/4, Moscow chancery on a Soviet article about ‘The role of the masses in the 
defence of peace’, 6.6.1951. 
767
 FO371/94802-NS1013/18, Moscow, ‘Fortnightly summary’, 26.6.1951. 
768
 By the summer of 1951 430 million signatures had been collected in support of such a pact, 
FO371/94824-NS1021/61, FO, ‘SWWPI’, 24.8.1951. 
769
 For example, FO371/94824-NS1021/59, FO, ‘SWWPI’, 1.8.1951. 
770
 FO371/94821-NS1021/25, FO, ‘SWWIP’, 1.3.1951. 
771
 FO371/94825-NS1021/67, Uffen, 17.9.1951. 
 192 
propaganda and this use of it, and genuinely believed that the Soviet Union desired nothing 
more than world peace. Kelly, not usually taken to praising Soviet tactics, called the 
campaign a ‘stoke of genius.’772 All measures short of war were used and thus greatly 
expanded the possible scope of action. This, the Northern Department worried, included 
subversive agitation and sabotage in countries not under Communist control.773 Possible 
areas of conflict suggested were Greece, Finland, Germany or Persia. Particularly Germany 
and Japan were portrayed as becoming bastions of imperialist aggression that threatened 
world peace.774 With a well organised campaign on different levels continuously in action, 
the Northern Department was well aware that the Cold War with all its side-effects was 
here to stay. 
 
 
Europe had always had close trading links among its countries. The importance of trade to 
economic and social recovery after the war gained a new importance in the discussions 
about a possible division of Germany. With the sealing of the Iron Curtain and the actual 
division of Germany into two by October 1949 the discussion about the serious 
repercussions of this loss of age-old trade links intensified. Both sides were worried. The 
Soviet bloc needed Western imports to acquire high-quality industrial goods that would aid 
economic recovery while the West was interested in food stuffs and natural resources it did 
not have enough of. Restrictions thus hurt both. As a result both Britain and the Soviet 
Union spent a lot of their time looking for workable solutions to the East-West trade 
issue.775 An ongoing problem was that the Soviet government always achieved a positive 
trade balance while the British one tended to be negative.776 The British government would 
have liked to see a more even balance but Stalin’s trade discipline was well developed.  
 
 
The increasing references to trade in Soviet propaganda reflected a real concern that a 
reduction in trade could harm the Soviet Union and delay economic progress.777 The 
Kremlin even suggested an international conference to discuss worldwide trade.778 
Although this behaviour suggested that the Kremlin was worried about lacking 
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international, and in particular European, trade, the Russia Committee argued that this 
might not actually mean much.779 Assumptions in the West did not necessarily have to be 
correct. All this could possibly be a ploy to support the Peace Campaign with little cost to 
the Kremlin. Since direct evidence of the economic situation in the Soviet Union and the 
satellites was difficult to get, a lot of assumptions were necessarily based on insufficient 
information. It was, however, known that the Soviet authorities were unhappy with the 
economic progress made so far. 
 
 
Britain was in a difficult situation. Further restrictions of trade with the Soviet Bloc would 
seriously harm the already precarious dollar balance and make the country more even more 
dependent on American financial aid.780 Any such action therefore would only be instituted 
if there was a real chance of achieving results, ie retard Soviet economic and thus military 
progress, the likelihood of which was questioned.781 The US were, of course, in much 
better shape economically and could thus afford to contemplate stricter economic measures 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc. In response, the Kremlin did not sit back but took the offensive. 
As usual linking several issues to make their point, Shvernik, president of the Supreme 
Soviet, himself told Truman in a letter that an improvement in trade was of vital 
importance in order to improve international relations.782 Not surprisingly, the Russia 
Committee at the end of 1951 decided to take a closer look at this issue. The memorandum 
warned that  
 
 
to add further measures of control to existing ‘security export controls’ would 
mean economic warfare and would represent a fundamental change of policy on 
our part, which could be justified only if we believed that war was both 
inevitable and imminent.783  
 
 
This, of course, was an important point and the main problem. Although talk of war was 
essentially permanent, there was still no direct evidence that war on a larger scale than 
Korea was about to or would break out in the near future. War as a justification of 
increased trade controls was therefore of limited benefit. The implications of the 
imposition of these controls were severe: the Kremlin was likely to close off the Soviet 
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bloc to the West and may well also flex its muscles with regards to China and potentially 
other countries. The ‘strategic criteria’ devised by Western governments to restrict the 
trade of those goods seen as vital to the enhancement of Soviet war potential would have to 
be rethought. A connected issue was the trade with third countries that were known to trade 
with the Soviet Union. How to restrict trade to those in an attempt to prevent a possible re-
sale of imports to the Soviet Union was a politically highly complicated and charged 
matter. Overall, the Northern Department thought, all this talk of an improvement in trade 
relations was most likely to be an effort to pull wool over the eyes of the West. The Soviet 
Union, it was argued, would undoubtedly ‘try to accelerate the process of disintegration of 
the Capitalist West by economic warfare.’784 Stalin himself had stated that the division of 
the world market was one of the most important economic consequences of the war.785 He, 
however, took no responsibility but continued to exploit this idea when trying to persuade 
the West to keep particularly that trade open that benefited him most. 
 
 
While the Peace Campaign and the extensive discussions about the state of international 
trade took up a lot of the time of the Northern Department, proceedings in the UNO in 
New York were often even more important. This was the most high-profile platform for 
discussion and propaganda available and was duly exploited by the Kremlin. But unlike 
attacks and accusation elsewhere, here they had to be refuted vigorously by Britain if 
damage or the appearance of weakness was to be avoided. As a result it was here were 
information about the Soviet Union and about conditions in the satellite countries was used 
to counter Soviet claims and to raise the stakes in political warfare. While the Soviet 
representatives had for quite some time been able to use the UNO as a platform for 
attacking the West without an equivalent reply from the Western governments, this 
situation had changed by the late 1940s. As the British government sanctioned the use of 
information about the Soviet bloc in the UNO and elsewhere, the British representatives 
became more confident and more outspoken in their criticism of the Communist policies. 
 
 
The UNO was fought over by both sides. It was the personification of the new idea of 
collective security and responsibility, and just like the League of Nations after 1919, 
resulted from the desire to prevent another world war. It could also, due to is composition 
and voting procedures, not easily be exploited by the Soviet government. As a result Stalin 
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and other senior leaders attacked it for being a stooge of Western, and in particular 
American, imperialism. With the increasing effort put into the Peace Campaign, Soviet 
criticism became more outspoken in an attempt to clear the way for a transfer of peoples 
allegiance away from the UNO should the opportune moment arise.786 Criticism, of course, 
did not mean that the Soviet Union was likely to leave the UNO. It would only do so when 
absolutely certain that a large number of countries would follow this example and that the 
Peace Campaign and its World Peace Council could provide an alternative. 787 That this 
never happened is one indication of the transparency and actual political weakness of the 
Soviet Union. It may have also been partly due to the use of the veto in the Security 
Council to block those policies regarded as unwelcome by the Kremlin. As long as the 
Soviet government perceived some form of benefit from remaining in the UNO it 
continued to stay. The mistake to leave the UNO Security Council over the continued 
presence of the Kuomintang representative proved a costly mistake and was difficult to 
rectify. It was unlikely that the Kremlin would make that mistake again. At the same time, 
the inability of the UNO to secure a settlement in Korea had dampened hopes of its overall 
usefulness.788 
 
 
Britain supported the UNO for what it was: a meeting place to discuss matters and a way to 
keep contact with the Soviet government that had retreated further behind the Iron 
Curtain.789 It could not but benefit from the organisations continued presence even though 
the Soviet representatives often exasperated the West. It was, however, a difficult 
balancing act. The Soviet representatives continued to press for the control of atomic 
weapons while being aware of their superiority of conventional arms that did not fall under 
any such control. Progress was also slow in the discussion in the various councils dealing 
with social and economic issues and the ongoing problem of Germany. While the Soviet 
government flatly refused to allow a UNO commission access to the GDR to investigate 
political issues, particularly the new voting system, it continuously argued against the 
incorporation of the FRG into the Western bloc. One specific issue raised by Vyshinsky 
was the apparent incompatibility of NATO with the UNO.790 This was dangerous for the 
West and thus required very careful handling and precise preparation. The Soviet 
government, it was well known in the Northern Department, usually sent their best 
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diplomats to the UNO indicating the importance they attached to a good performance 
there.791 Increasingly Britain had to do the same, ensuring more staff and better 
preparations before important debates. Political warfare had thus permeated all layers of 
policy making and could not be ignored in the discussion of any matter regarding the 
Soviet Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
791
 FO371/100830-NS1026/26, Watson minute, 9.10.1952. 
 197 
Chapter Twelve: The ND on Germany and Western European defence, 1951-
1953 
 
 
 A Germany free to conduct its own affairs would be a most dangerous experiment     
 for either side. 
                                                                                       
                                                                               Gascoigne, Moscow, 3.5.1952792 
 
 
Germany remained at the heart of the conflict between the erstwhile allies: geo-
strategically too important at the heart of the continent to be conceded to the other side 
without a fight, economically too critical for western European recovery, politically 
potentially too independent to be left completely to its own devices. While 1949 had seen 
the end of the Berlin Blockade and the resultant foundations of two Germany’s, that 
settlement was, at least to the Soviet Union, not necessarily final and 1951 saw another 
attempt, initiated by the Soviet Union, to reach an agreement over Germany’s future. The 
West had been steadily integrating the FRG into the defence planning of Western Europe, 
some political control had been given to Adenauer’s government and while the war, the 
Holocaust and the resultant de-nazification were by no means forgotten or finished, slowly 
some normality began to emerge in the country. Unification remained important to the 
wider public but the threat of a Sovietisation of West Germany by guise had been averted. 
The GDR remained a pawn of the Soviet Union in the game of stalling Western attempts to 
consolidate Western strategic planning. Britain found it difficult to chose sides. Its 
problematic relationship with Europe and the reluctance to commit fully to it has long 
interested historians. Greenwood, for example, is rather critical about Bevin’s slipping 
interest in Europe while pursuing a closer relationship with the USA.793 
 
 
An exchange of notes commenced between the Soviet Union and the West in December 
1950. Complaining that German rearmament contradicted the Potsdam agreement, 
specifically agreements on the demilitarisation of Germany and clauses 2 and 7 of the 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942, the Soviet Government, on December 22nd 1950, requested 
the Western allies to halt further plans for German rearmament, hoping that France may be 
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susceptible to that argument. The West, by now well aware of this Soviet tactic of trying to 
cause divisions amongst  the Allies (particularly the French were not keen on German 
rearmament), replied by proposing a Four Power meeting to consider the grievances and 
offered an agenda for discussions.794  Shortly after the Soviet government in principle 
agreed to meet.795 A long period of haggling over the terms of the proposed meeting 
ensued. Britain denied that Western defence planning constituted a threat to peace while 
the Soviet Union slowly changed the focus of their interest in these talks from Germany to 
the wider issue of Western defence.796 Only the location of the meeting was settled fast: 
Paris. One area of contention was the insistence of the West to include the discussion of 
the sources of the international tension in these talks while the Soviet Union wanted 
initially to concentrate solely on Germany.797 It wanted, if possible, to sort out the problem 
of Germany without compromising interests anywhere else.798 To shore up support among 
the Germans for these talks the Soviet government increased propaganda emphasis on the 
two issues guaranteed to interest most of them: reunification and a peace treaty with the 
implications of an early end to both the occupation of the country and possibly 
reparations.799 In the West of the country this strategy proved only mildly successful.  
 
 
By March 1951 the Soviet government had agreed to meet in Paris to discuss an agenda for 
the foreign ministers to meet.800 Gromyko’s attempt to keep the discussion exclusively on 
Germany failed at the first meeting on March 5th, 1951. But while the Soviet Union was 
unwilling to discuss issues important to the West, it was not averse to press for a 
discussion of those topics important to herself: NATO, Western defence plans and US 
bases in Europe.801 The Kremlin was, as in this instance, obviously reacting to Western 
policies rather then coming up with new ones on its own.802 Gromyko fought hard to 
secure an agenda which acknowledged the significance of German demilitarisation. The 
usual stalemate duly arrived. Tiring of Soviet manoeuvres the Western Allies suggested a 
meeting of foreign ministers in New York in July. Gromyko remained unwilling to 
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compromise; eventually rejecting all three Western proposals for an agenda.803 Unable to 
secure an agenda on his terms his interest in the whole idea declined rapidly. Trying to 
salvage a possible high-level meeting for the first time in years the West compromised and 
agreed to put NATO on the agenda. A full discussion of Western plans, however, was not 
promised. Unwilling to see this as enough of a gesture and unwilling to suggest an agenda 
of her own, the Soviet Union stalled. Eventually after weeks of haggling an exasperated 
West finally ended discussions but made it clear that the invitation to a CFM remained 
open. Gromyko blamed the West for this breakdown of discussions but probably 
intentionally caused it.804 Not surprisingly, Soviet propaganda had a field day with this, 
claiming that the West was unwilling to negotiate to relieve intentional tension while 
building up NATO as an aggressive tool.805 These preliminary discussions broke down not 
because the issue of Germany was too difficult but because each side was unwilling to 
discuss those issues most vital to themselves: continued Western European integration and 
Western defence, including Germany, which left the Soviet Union facing a mighty military 
alliance on its door step, and those Soviet policies of Stalinisation, oppression and sedition 
which so worried the West. Both sides accused each other of causing the rise in 
international tension that was so palpable at that time.  
 
 
David Kelly, British ambassador to the Soviet Union, summarised the implications of this 
episode in a letter to Dixon: the Soviet focus on the rearmament of Germany had been 
overtaken by an even more intense focus on the Atlantic Pact. Even more importantly, he 
pointed out the problem at the heart of the Western European defence effort. Germany 
would only be rearmed once the Western powers had sufficiently armed themselves and 
that ‘the military strength of the Atlantic Treaty nations themselves was thus both the basis 
of Western policy and a prerequisite of German rearmament.’806 But he also argued that 
the Soviet Union must have realised by now that it was very difficult to retard the Western 
defence effort.807 The COS by then supported the rearmament of West Germany.808 
Germany remained the crux of the matter: vital for the Western rearmament effort but 
simultaneously also guaranteed to inflame the already oversized anxiety of the Soviet 
Union. Germany had to be a part of the Western defence effort if that was ever going to be 
a potent deterrent or actual weapon.  
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The resulting threat of a preventive war to prevent this fortified front from coming into 
existence was a well recognised issue in the West.809 However, the alternative, as the West 
and the Soviets well realised, was to leave Germany to its own devices. Both sides knew 
that the West at this stage in the Cold War was unable, even if willing, to do so. As 
Nicholls pointed out very clearly ‘peace in Europe largely depends on our ability to 
maintain stable conditions in Western Germany until a proper balance of military strength 
has been restored.’810 And that balance, as was argued by Harrison shortly after, would 
massively favour the Soviet Union if the Western defence programme was abandoned. 
That programme was, in his words, a ‘serious impediment to their overall programme of 
expansion.’ The Soviet leaders, he continued to argue, were interested in controlling the 
whole of Germany while simultaneously preventing it from re-emerging as a military 
force.811 While working towards this aim, a neutral Germany was foremost on the Soviet 
mind and Germany thus remained critical to both sides.812 In the absence of a neutral 
Germany, a divided one was the preferred option of the Soviet Union.813 A smaller 
country, in the Soviet mind, equalled a smaller threat. Divided resources and possibly 
divided loyalties would make the emergence of an independent and forceful German 
nationalism difficult. The British government, on the other hand, realised that cooperation 
with the Kremlin over Germany was only realistic on British terms. British interests in 
Europe, Deighton has noted, made that essentially impossible.814  
 
 
The Northern Department was well aware of these issues and debates. It also knew that 
time was of the essence. Without the inclusion of Germany the Western defence effort 
would stall. Without further British rearmament that effort would not get off the ground in 
the first place. The French, not keen on the idea of a remilitarised Germany, were difficult 
partners and any hint that Germany need not be rearmed had to be silenced immediately.815 
Other smaller countries were also not exactly overjoyed by that prospect. That is why the 
British and Americans had to be involved, as if to guarantee a safe administration of a 
remilitarised Germany, and why France had to remain in support of her allies. Once 
Germany would actually be rearmed all this support would be needed as Soviet counter-
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measures were widely anticipated, although the Russia Committee quite rightly asked what 
Soviet military action was possible that would not result in a European war.816 The Soviet 
apprehension of this scenario could not easily be countered. While fear of a renewed 
German militarism/expansionism could not be discounted out of hand, a strategic change 
in Western thinking was unlikely.817  
 
 
The value of Germany to the Soviet Union, however, also had another interesting aspect to 
it. There was a spirited discussion in the embassy and the Northern Department about 
whether the Soviet Union was willing to ‘give up’ the GDR in order to prevent the 
remilitarisation of the FRG. Although arguments flowed back and forth, the eventual  
consensus was that the Soviet Union would not be interested in this.818 The ‘safety 
features’ of such a deal were too slim. Even more importantly, as the Russia Committee  
argued, ‘to incorporate the manpower and industrial resources of the whole of Germany in 
the Muscovite Empire is one of the chief aims of Soviet policy.’819 To expect the Soviet 
Union to give up the hard-won half of that price was unrealistic. By the same token, the 
West would not give up its hard won half either. A demilitarised West Germany at this 
time was open to be manipulated through propaganda and political pressure by both the 
Soviet Union and the GDR; a resultant expansion of Soviet influence was a real possibility 
and would move the Iron Curtain even further towards the West. Foreign Office opinion 
faced with this prospect was unanimous in cautioning that the West should not fall into this 
‘Russian trap.’820 The threats to Western security should the Soviet government succeed in 
splitting Western opinion at the Paris talks were real. Soviet proposals to halt or end 
Western and German rearmament within a general drive to end the emerging arms race or 
a detailed attempt to enforce the Potsdam agreement on German disarmament could negate 
any progress the West had made by then in consolidating its political will and resources in 
the face of Soviet aggression.  
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Disagreements in the assessment of the purpose of Western rearmament could easily have 
led to further disagreements further down the priority list of the British and American 
governments, eg. further European economic integration, decolonisation, free trade and an 
end to preferential tariffs. Germany had a central place in some of these plans and its 
contribution to Western defence was deemed crucial. Disarmament was, as a ministerial 
meeting in Dixon’s room pointed out, in any case ‘such a complicated question that we 
cannot possibly expect an immediate solution at a single four power meeting.’ Although it 
was agreed that the possibility of serious talks with the Soviets should not be doomed from 
the start by a Western unwillingness to discuss the issue, it was equally important to 
project strength, not weakness, and not to leave West Germany open to Soviet penetration. 
The Soviet government was to be made to understand that ‘German contribution to 
Western defence is part and parcel of the whole problem of European security and …was 
forced upon us by Soviet policy.’821  
 
 
Whenever the issue of Germany came up or threatened to come up in conversations in 
Moscow, for example between the British ambassador and a member of the Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a change in topic was indicated.822 Britain and the West did 
not want a change in policy which would negate any progress made so far towards greater 
economic and military integration in Western Europe while concomitant progress in the 
easing of international tensions held out by the Soviet Union was highly likely to be 
merely a passing episode of mainly tactical significance. Germany was about to become a 
central part of the Western defence effort but the Contractual Agreements with Germany 
and the creation of the EDC still had to be finalised and ratified.823 Until that was done 
Germany was not to be a topic of conversation with the Soviets. With the increasing 
importance of the FRG another issue emerged: Adenauer and his government had secured 
a Western promise not to do deals behind his back.824 Although occupied by the Western 
Allies the FRG was not actually run as an occupied country. Much of the local 
administration, re-emerging industries and social security networks were build up and 
operated by the Germans themselves. As a large populous country in the middle of Europe 
it could not be treated as dice in a board game. Adenauer was well aware of this. He knew 
that his country was needed to provide a counterweight to the GDR and that 
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remilitarisation was in effect only a matter of time. Therefore, in the FRG the government 
and its people could sleep slightly more relaxed when the foreign ministers of the western 
occupying powers openly stated their intent to support the defence of the country and 
explicitly acknowledged the FRG’s right to defend herself. Later this was broadened to 
include the decision to admit Germany to the European army.825  
 
 
The possibility of a remilitarised West Germany essentially backed by the military might 
not only of Britain but also of the USA was a serious worry, and one that could not be 
easily brushed aside by the Foreign Office.826 The concern to the Soviet Union, they well 
realised, was legitimate. Nevertheless, in the absence of a genuine willingness on the part 
of the Soviet government to reach an agreement that was acceptable to both sides the 
options were extremely limited. The Soviet government continued to press for Four Power 
talks in order to prevent the ratification of defence agreements and the full integration of 
West Germany into the Western European defence mechanism but did not offer 
significantly improved suggestions to secure top level negotiations.827 In August 1952 
Roberts commented during a Russia Committee meeting that ‘the Soviets seemed to have 
given up all hope for a German settlement with the West.’828 
 
 
The dogged haggling over German remilitarisation was not surprising. The tactical and 
practical implication of an effective Western European defence system demanded the 
stationing of troops on German soil. In order to be able to proceed uninterruptedly on the 
Western side, Soviet intervention leading to possible doubts in the minds of the more 
wavering of the European allies had to be silenced, preferably from the start. The whole 
defence of this Western defence system was based not on a common aim as such but on a 
common threat. The public as well as the political establishments had to be convinced that 
the massive effort to rearm their countries so soon after a world war was worth the effort. 
Once the suggestion of a common enemy was gone, that effort would be nearly impossible 
to sustain. For that reason any hint of a relaxation of the Soviet Cold War tactics in Europe, 
the UNO or in bilateral diplomacy had to be carefully monitored. Another issue of 
importance here is the, justified, feeling on the part of the Western allies that any 
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discussion about the future of Germany which they had defeated, was foremost their 
responsibility.   
 
 
Stressing that the EDC would not be an instrument of aggression, the British nevertheless 
pointed out that the result of the ongoing negotiations would lead to ‘powerful armed 
forces of NATO …entrenched all along the Western front of the Soviet world.’ While the 
Soviets were alarmed the Northern Department knew that the West had few choices: ‘if the 
Allies are obliged to withdraw their armies from Germany there is absolutely nowhere else 
where those forces can be stationed.’ The implications would be severe: ‘a withdrawal 
from Germany therefore means the crumbling of the whole American position in Europe 
and the consequent abandonment by European countries of any concerted policy of 
resistance to Soviet expansion.’829 Thus the stakes in the Cold War game of international 
diplomacy were extremely high. Stalin himself intervened at the international stage when 
he chose to reply to several questions put to him by American newspaper editors in April 
1952. Being aware of the Western apprehension of discussing German matters outside the 
camp of the Western allies he, in typical fashion, addressed the issue directly. When asked 
whether he considered the present moment to be right for the unification of Germany he 
replied ‘yes, I do.’830  
 
 
Unification would mean potentially less Allied and more Soviet control and possibly a 
swift peace treaty with the resulting withdrawal of occupation troops. The moment might 
then be ripe for the SED, the Communist Party in the West, trade unions etc. through local 
activities, intimidation and propaganda to secure the whole country for the Eastern Bloc. 
Tactical withdrawal, the use of local communist forces, propaganda and sedition, all well-
known Soviet tactics, would thus give Stalin the victory he craved through the backdoor. 
That could very possibly lead to Western intervention and war in Europe.  
 
 
Stalin embodied the growing confidence of the Soviet regime not only to have an opinion 
on world affairs but also to make it known internationally. The focus of the Soviet 
government had since 1949/1950 shifted from a concentration on German remilitarisation  
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to efforts to prevent the ratification of the German Contractual Agreements and the EDC, 
and to a more conventional Communist effort to weaken the resolve of the Western 
European allies and erode their trust in their transatlantic ally. This new Soviet confidence 
however did not ignore the fact that Stalin and his Politburo had twice failed to read the 
international signs accurately before, once in June 1941 and once again in June 1950. If 
war were to break out again, it was not clear how confident they would be this time in 
reading the signs correctly to take the appropriate action. Grey, visiting Germany, Austria 
and Poland in February 1952, noted that Soviet policy towards Germany was possibly an 
‘equal measure of hope and fear…I suspect that fear predominates.’831 To negotiate from 
fear was bound to be more difficult than to negotiate from strength; the Soviets had shown 
several times before that they would not be backed into a corner and surrender. 
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Chapter Thirteen: ND input into FO policy, 1951-1953  
 
 
Partial war. 
                                                                                                      G. F. Kennan, 1.10.1952832  
 
  
13.1. Assessing Britain’s interests and policies 
The British government had long realised that it did not have enough political gravitas on 
the international stage to pursue a fully independent foreign policy. As a result the 
importance to form a special bond with the USA and bring Western European nations 
closer together and closer to Britain, particularly against the backdrop of increased tensions 
with the Soviet Union and China, had become a priority. A leading role in Europe and a 
close second to the USA in the world were what the Foreign Office was aiming for. It 
would safeguard British interests and ensure a place at the top table should the 
international situation deteriorate. The Foreign Office agreed with the American concept of 
containment as a doctrine of foreign policy and set about implementing it. In Europe, 
however, the undecided state of Germany made that implementation difficult. The 
consensus with France to rearm West Germany was rather fragile and amidst growing 
pressure to curb the increasing rearmament in Britain, the Foreign Office had to take a 
more active role to educate both Britain and Europe about the danger of allowing the 
Soviet Union to retard the Western European defence and recovery effort.833 
 
 
Two developments had greatly improved the Western bargaining position and Western 
confidence: military strength had increased substantially and the West had demonstrated in 
South Korea that attempts to militarily intervene in the national affairs of a sovereign 
country would be met by force.834 Other developments too had allowed an increased 
Western firmness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China. Although a Germany peace treaty  
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was a distant hope, the Japanese peace treaty had been signed San Francisco in 1951.835 In 
Europe, the Italian peace treaty was under re-consideration to permit the rearmament of the 
country while both Greece and Turkey were in talks to join NATO thus increasing Western 
military muscle as well as its geo-strategic extent.836 Against this backdrop a short note by 
Hohler is revealing. Commenting on a letter by Kelly he minuted that  
 
 
he [Kelly] then goes on to suggest that, if the Western powers play their cards 
right, a state of equilibrium may be reached – in some ways comparable to the 
19th century balance of power – which may endure for an indefinite period. This 
is certainly a thesis to which we would subscribe…it is fundamental to the 
policy being pursued by HMG.837  
 
 
This effectively argued against the relatively new idea of collective security and 
responsibility. A balance of power implied, as in the old days, great power diplomacy, the 
dominance of a few great powers over smaller countries. The UNO, as the face and means 
of the new collective idea, had not yet really proven itself. So it is not surprising that it was 
difficult for any government to put its faith in it completely. Kelly, in his letter, went on to 
explain that ‘it is highly probable that it is at least as much thanks to this doctrine [Stalin’s 
doctrine that time is on his side] as to the Atom Bomb that Western Europe has not been 
already overrun.’ If the Soviet Union was not needlessly provoked, for example by 
adhering to ‘supple and tactful diplomacy’, a war could hopefully be avoided.838 By the 
same token, a balance of power that would guarantee the West’s security had to be secure 
and include as many Western European countries as possible to balance the Eastern 
European Soviet bloc. 
 
 
While the West could sit back a little more easily, the Soviet Union, as the Foreign Office 
well recognised, had had a series of reverses over the past few years. The Marshall Plan, 
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Tito’s defection, increasing Western consolidation and rearmament, and a failure of 
Western European Communist parties to make a significant impact had left the Soviet 
government on the defensive, often apparently reacting to Western initiatives. As a result 
of this and unless specific proposals were put forward, the Kremlin was unwilling to 
negotiate to reduce international tension.839 It was the substantially higher level of 
conventional armaments that the Soviet Union possessed which made her unlikely to 
succumb to Western pressure, although some argued that these was intended mostly as a 
deterrent.840 One point of the accelerated Western rearmament, the doctrine of containment 
and efforts to establish situations of strength was to balance that superiority to be able to 
negotiate from strength and achieve local or limited settlements. The downside to that 
argument, as a Northern Department memorandum reveals, was that while the West 
rearmed and consolidated, the Soviet Union was likely to put all effort into achieving 
economic parity with the West which was likely to lead to a deterioration rather than an 
improvement in Soviet attitudes towards the non-Communist world.841 Gascoigne, the new 
British ambassador in Moscow, thus rightly discussed the possible success of a high level 
meeting in these circumstances and found that it was unlikely to lead to an easing of that 
tension. British policy towards the Soviet Union, he argued, should continue to be firm and 
consistent.842 The Northern Department agreed but acknowledged that Britain should still 
be prepared for this eventuality.843 Essentially, however, Strang argued in a note in August 
1951, Britain had to continue what had emerged as a path since 1945, that is to say that the 
West was going ahead in international affairs without the Soviet Union.844 
 
 
Soviet foreign policy, defined by a nationalist imperialism and the intent to create a 
Communist world order, was ambitious. Although direct intervention in Western European 
affairs was rare (for example, the Berlin Blockade), indirect intervention through 
propaganda, national Communist parties, and international organisations and campaigns 
was frequent and tenacious. Aimed, in Europe, at preventing further Western integration 
particularly in NATO, at stalling the Western European recovery effort and at bringing 
Western European Communist parties into positions of power, it betrayed a determined 
effort to subject the West to direct Soviet influence and move the global centre of political 
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and military gravity East.845 ‘The Russians’, as Dixon so eloquently noted, ‘are 
expansionist, flowing like the tide into any area where the dams are down.’846 If confronted 
by concerted and firm reaction, as in Berlin, the Soviet government would probably 
retreat.847 Overall, however, the Northern Department assessment of likely Soviet reactions 
was more subdued: ‘it thus remains our estimate that the Soviet government still does not 
want a global war. But we believe it will run greater risks of war then hitherto in the face 
of growing Western resistance rather than modify its objectives.’848 This risk was likely to 
increase if the four former Allies should not at some point reach an agreement on some of 
the most pressing points of the early Cold War: Germany, Korea, disarmament and the 
control of atomic energy.  
 
 
The British fear was that the Soviet Union would succeed in pushing the West towards a 
point where it had no choice but to declare war.849 A united West was the best insurance 
against this eventuality and precisely this was a problem. Britain and the USA were 
dependent on each other in the event of a war against the Soviet Union and thus foreign 
and military policy discussions on both sides had to take this fact into consideration.850 The 
British enthusiasm for NATO, Bartlett has argued, was partly a result of the perception that 
Britain would now be able to subtly influence American foreign policy.851  This, of course, 
was a complicated matter and fraught with difficulties.852 The Soviet government 
relentlessly tried to divide the Western governments and thus reduce opposition to its plans 
while at the same time trying to reassure them that they were not interested in a new 
war.853 Soviet proposals of what to do with the Germans threatened to reduce the resolve of 
particularly the French to continue on the planned path. The COS, just like the Foreign 
Office, were worried about this possibility, arguing that a ‘calming campaign’ by the 
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Soviet Union would present a real danger to Western unity.854 However, the Soviet 
government, in the opinion of Kelly, had severely underestimated the strength of European 
recovery and the progress of consolidation as well as the moral strength of the Western 
populations.855 To sustain a consistently high pressure on the governments and peoples in 
Western Europe while trying to balance a massive capital investment programme and 
increased rearmament in the Soviet Union was a hugely difficult task. To keep the 
emerging worldwide Communist movement from fracturing was another immensely 
difficult task. As a result, Western opportunities to fight back were only going to increase. 
 
 
Trying to stay focused while reassuring allies and fostering new relationships, the Northern 
Department periodically reassessed the international situation to test new ideas and 
incorporate new developments. Just before the ministers of the four allied powers met in 
Paris to discuss a possible solution to the German problem the Northern Department 
produced a paper to prepare the delegates. Much of the focus is on Cold Warfare, 
presumably because the Soviet government was unlikely to make real concessions but 
would try to use the meeting to further its aims of division and procrastination. While the 
opportunity to reach an agreement could not be dismissed out of hand, the real risk that the 
talks would break down and result in a propaganda victory for the Soviets was all too 
real.856 ‘Political aggression’ covers, the paper argued, ‘all those aspects of Soviet policy 
which make up the Cold War…[it] is the chosen instrument of the Soviet leaders for 
bringing about world revolution.’ The main techniques in this were ‘propaganda, support 
of subversive elements in active rebellion or aiming at a coup d’état, diplomatic and 
economic sanctions, aggression by proxy.’ Propaganda furthermore included the 
Cominform, the Communist parties and the World Peace Movement.857   
 
 
Reacting to possible intervention and manipulation on so many different levels was truly 
challenging and the delegates had to be aware of these potential problems. The objective 
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for the Soviet Union, as the Northern Department saw it, was to ‘exhaust all possible 
diplomatic, propaganda and subversive means of preventing West Germany’s inclusion in 
the NATO defence system and to secure a neutralised Germany which might later be 
brought wholly under communist influence.’858 Kelly shortly after persevered with this 
point, writing that in his opinion there was a good chance that Soviet foreign policy was at 
a watershed.859 In a memorandum to NATO ministers the Foreign Office argued that it was 
absolutely vital that Europe was defended as far East as possible and that this, necessarily, 
had to include Germany.860 Vigilance in negotiations with the Soviets therefore had to be 
high. 
 
 
Mirroring the Soviet attitude to world events, here mainly having the confidence, based on 
a prescriptive ideology (or in Britain’s case a well defined foreign policy doctrine), to take 
a longer-term view, Roberts urged the Northern Department to do the same. He declared 
that ‘if we are to survive…we must take a similar long term view of the road ahead.’861 It 
would broaden the horizon and reduce the tendency to get over-anxious at every particular 
event. Since the West now had its own ‘ideology’ of containment it could afford, while not 
neglecting to react to certain events, to stand back and concentrate on progressing its 
overall plans rather than to be constantly held back by concerns over individual matters. 
Dixon agreed, noting that there ‘must be no change in our basic policy’, particularly with 
regard to the fact that the progress of the Soviet Union in Europe had been halted.862  
 
 
Months later, just before the 19th Party Congress of the CPSU in October 1952, Morgan 
reiterated that argument, confirming that the Soviet leadership still envisaged a ‘long 
period of Cold War.’863 In the absence of any promise of a relaxation in the international 
tension Britain had to remain determined. This was even more important against the 
background of increasing problems in implementing the agreed doctrines of Western 
foreign policy. Containment was more a theoretical concept than a doctrine that could be 
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flawlessly executed. Just like the Soviet government with its longing for world revolution 
and worldwide Communist control exercised by Moscow, so the West found that its policy 
ideas looked better on paper than in the real world. Democracy, protected at such a huge 
cost only a few years earlier, now came at a significant cost. To persuade the political 
establishments and populations alike, Western governments also had to resort to 
propaganda and the release of compartmentalised information. To provide a balanced 
picture which gave full attention to both sides was considered harm-full rather than 
politically necessary. The situation was therefore in flux and needed very careful attention.  
Gascoigne, writing from Moscow in the spring of 1952, came right to the point:  
 
 
outside the NATO area there are wide gaps in our containment policy which 
show no signs of being filled…NATO itself is showing signs of considerable 
stress in attempting to convert political unity into military effectiveness.864  
 
 
 
Disarmament, another area of intense Soviet interest, had captured the public imagination. 
Dixon, not mincing his words, proclaimed that ‘to me [the purpose of] rearmament is that 
it places the club in the hands of a defenceless man threatened by thugs.’865 Two world 
wars and the effects of two atomic bombs had demonstrated how far the developments in 
the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction had come and how easy the practical use 
if them was. The emerging arms race, the relentless talk of war and peace, and the notable 
effects these developments had on public finances streamlined the public imagination. 
Although Western populations did by and large support their government’s policies, the 
next crisis as well as the next elections always seemed just around the corner.866 The newly 
established UNO Disarmament Commission at once became a target for Soviet political 
warfare and manoeuvring. Particularly difficult to analyse and counter was the Soviet 
tactic of merging political demands with propaganda and ideological pronouncements.867  
 
 
Should the Soviet Union succeed in banning atomic weapons, it would be a step further 
towards achieving overall Soviet military superiority as her conventional arms still 
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outnumbered those of the West.868 In return for a reduction in and inspection of atomic 
weapons and facilities, the Foreign Office worried, the West might get nothing.869 ‘The 
main argument in favour of rearmament’, the Russia Committee argued, ‘was not that we 
expected the Russians to start a war…but that we were frightened of Russian policy 
creating a situation from which war could result.’870 If the most potent available deterrent 
the West possessed was effectively worthless the defence of the West would be 
substantially weakened.871 An early end to this an all-out arms nuclear arms race would 
also, as the Northern Department was well aware, be hugely beneficial to the domestic 
capital investment plans of the Soviet government.872  
 
 
A higher budget for the Soviet military and a lessening threat from the possible Western 
use of atomic weapons would also greatly enhance the fighting strength and confidence of 
the Soviet forces. In the Soviet Union internal and foreign affairs were arguably much 
more interlinked than in the West. Appeasement in the face of the various opportunities 
was unlikely and the 19th Party Congress had not really altered this picture or promised any 
significant relaxation in international tensions.873  There was still no fundamental change 
towards the governments of non-Communist countries and tactical cooperation was all that 
could be expected.874 Stalin, as Grey wrote during the 19th PC of the CPSU from Moscow, 
was confident that the Cold War so far had brought rewards and would continue to do 
so.875 He noted that ‘we must learn how to stick out a protracted struggle for predominance 
both in the economic and in the psychological field’; again demonstrating how far British 
foreign policy making still had to go to achieve its overall aims.  
 
 
In these circumstances to anticipate, correctly interpret and manipulate, if possible, 
American foreign policy was an important strand of work in the Northern Department. 
Although mainly occupied with Soviet affairs, the American angle had become 
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increasingly important. Although the State Department included well-regarded experts like 
Kennan and Bohlen, there was no real confidence that it would choose policies which the 
British government favoured or even that it interpreted events with an open, well-informed 
and far-sighted mind. In the past, the US government had occasionally paid too much 
attention to Stalin’s manipulative interviews or Molotov’s poisoned diplomatic olive 
branches. When during the 19th PC of the CPSU some speeches hinted that the prevention 
of war was an aim of Soviet foreign policy and that the Soviet government was going to 
concentrate increasingly on internal affairs, the State department apparently was positively 
surprised. However, coming soon after the expulsion of Kennan, the American ambassador 
in Moscow, over an unfortunate comment in Berlin, Acheson was curiously over-
optimistic.876 This was one example of the problematic ongoing capacity of even seasoned 
American politicians to elevate Soviet comments to policy announcements despite of a 
lack of concurrent actions.  
 
 
In the other extreme, Kelly argued, the disappointments of Cold War diplomacy and the 
cost of rearmament led some in the US government to a very negative assessment of 
possible future policies which could require much emphasis on war in American internal 
propaganda and lead to a professed unwillingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union.877 
The point was an important one: the West was now involved in a war on two fronts, at 
home and abroad. More worryingly for the experts in the Foreign Office, the British Prime 
Minister, Winston Churchill, had taken to making statements that suggested that Russia’s 
aggression could now be countered much better despite their expressed doubts.878 That 
these statements could seriously weaken the determination to continued the British defence 
effort was a worry in the Northern Department.879 
 
 
Kennan, well known and well regarded, nevertheless suffered in his policy analysis from 
the same problems as the Northern Department, namely the occasional lack of actual 
evidence for his conclusions. Kennan’s views of NATO’s importance, of the problems of 
implementing containment partly as a ring of NATO bases on the Soviet Union’s outer rim 
and of the probable future course of Soviet foreign policy did ring true in the Northern 
Department. However, he was criticised for underestimating the ability of the Soviet 
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leadership to put themselves into Western shoes and for arguing a case too theoretical to be 
completely persuasive.880 Acheson, argued Makins, ‘did not regard Kennan as an oracle in 
general policy but he might regard him as an oracle on the Soviet Union.’881 However, his 
real importance, argued Watson from Washington, was that Kennan’s view had real 
gravity in Congress, the Pentagon and elsewhere, and as a result he had made sure that the 
views of the State Department were heard. Kennan’s recall as American ambassador to 
Moscow thus weakened both the State Department and Acheson himself.882 At a time 
when the USA had taken over from Britain as being the country most consistently attacked 
by Soviet propaganda a weakened State Department could well mean an ineffective or 
delayed foreign policy response to Soviet actions or provocations.883 That could potentially 
be hugely damaging to the whole Western defence and consolidation effort. 
 
 
A real watershed moment, some in the Northern Department thought, may have arrived on 
March 5th, 1953 when Stalin finally died.884 If this opportunity for both sides would 
amount to much nobody could foresee. Jebb, the veteran British diplomat, noted that ‘I am 
sure that something is stirring on the other side of the curtain though what exactly it is I 
have no idea.’885 Only a few weeks prior to Stalin’s death Gascoigne had written that the 
Soviet government had ‘slammed all doors to the West’, after Vyshinksy had treated the 
UNO to another of his venomous speeches.886 Nevertheless, this was an opportunity 
unlikely to return any time soon. As a result there was a pronounced willingness on both 
sides to at least listen to any proposals the other side had to make. Churchill’s proposal for 
a high-level conference, however, met with a lukewarm response not by the Soviets but by 
both the Americans and the experts in the Foreign Office.887 They argued that there was 
real doubt if the new leaders could or even wanted to make concessions which would 
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demonstrate a new Soviet foreign policy.888 Malenkov’s statement that ‘at the present time 
there is no question…which cannot be decided by peaceful means on the basis of mutual 
agreement of the interested countries’ did not persuade the British ambassador that a real 
change in Soviet foreign policy could be expected.889 All the talk was simply a matter of 
calming the tumultuous waters of international diplomacy. The main danger, argued 
Gascoigne, here again revealing the deep-seated anxieties about the strength of the new 
‘special relationship’, was that the American government would give up on the idea of 
containment.890 Without the USA, it seemed, there would be no effective resistance against 
Communist expansion in East and West. 
 
 
For the British caution was to be the word of the day. The attitude of hoping for the best 
while planning for the worst remained intact. Nevertheless, the opportunity to settle 
outstanding issues and thus permanently reduce international tension could not be ignored 
completely. In 1952 Connelly had warned that there was a danger to overlook real chances 
of negotiation because of the Soviet ineptitude to tailor its vocabulary to its ideas when 
looking for even a slight détente.891 Although hopes to achieve anything meaningful and 
worthwhile appeared slim, the Northern Department did not neglect this opportunity.892 
The consensus was that the Soviet government should take the initiative and let the West 
see its hand before the West would reciprocate. Gascoigne, eloquently, noted that ‘the 
Russians can easily make further gestures of they really mean business – they are not dumb 
and we are not deaf.’893 Any lessening of the Cold War, however grudgingly afforded, 
would be appreciated by both sides. The defences in the West, nevertheless, should not be 
lowered. Believing that Molotov was ‘pulling the wool’ over the eyes of the West, 
Gascoigne warned that the Western defence and rearmament effort had to continue 
unimpeded. These olive branches, he went on to warn, were poisoned. But while 
acknowledging the inherent danger of a relaxation of the Western defence effort, he 
nevertheless admitted that opportunities presenting themselves for negotiations should not 
be neglected.894 It was to be a case by case analysis of motives, costs and benefits for each 
side. This would invariably take time when there might not be any but it would also 
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safeguard British interests and future plans. The Northern Department had already advised 
to exercise caution: ‘we should show great reserve in our dealings with the new Soviet 
regime…at the same time we do not wish to add to their suspicion and self-created 
isolation.’895 One may doubt here whether the Soviet government regarded themselves to 
be in diplomatic isolation. The balance sheet in East and West could well be adjusted to 
suit different occasions. Stalin, after all, had been the supreme master of political 
manipulation. 
 
 
What could be achieved were, as before in times of fleeting détente, small scale or local 
agreements. Bigger issues such as Germany, Korea or disarmament were unlikely to 
benefit from this cooling of tensions. Austria, on the other hand, was a much simpler and 
therefore possibly more worthwhile case and, if there was a choice, Korea was more urgent 
than Germany.896 Once the new government was able and ready to negotiate a list of 
specific issues could be advanced to test the water. For Britain this meant problems such as 
the Anglo-Soviet fisheries agreement, the George Bundock case, the case of the last Soviet 
wife Mrs Hall, a reduction in the restriction of movement of foreigners in the Soviet Union 
or a new Sterling-Rouble exchange rate.897 As banal as this list may appear now, these 
were matters of real importance to Britain and matters which would relatively easily show 
how far, if at all, the new Soviet government was prepared to make concessions. Strang 
noted in a slightly defeatist tone that ‘the list of topics is indeed very thin. This is because 
Anglo-Soviet relations, in their bilateral aspect, are themselves very thin.’898 Here, in a 
short few words, was the admission of the severity of the problems of diplomacy with the 
Soviet Union. Even if Britain had wanted to, the basis for immediate expansive 
negotiations just was not there anymore. As it turned out, Mr. Bundock was allowed to 
leave the Soviet Union, Mrs Hall was refused an exit visa, the fisheries agreement was 
extended and movement of foreigners was, for a short time, less restricted; the exchange 
rate, however remained for the moment unchanged.  
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Churchill’s call for a Four Power meeting might well have been an attempt to test this 
apparent good-will a little further and with higher stakes.899 The Northern Department 
consistently argued that the German question with regard to Western European defence 
and the German Contractual Agreements had to be dealt with first in order to have a solid 
basis for British policy prior to any further agreements on Germany with the Soviet 
Union.900 A possibly very fleeting détente was not enough to alter this basic assumption. It 
was true, as Hohler argued, that ‘a few swallows do not make a summer.’901 A draft 
message from the Prime Minister to President Eisenhower was more direct: ‘the basic 
determination of the Bear to bring us down remains unaltered.’902 
 
 
The flurry of excitement and busy-ness that followed Stalin’s death did not immediately 
add up to actual or important advances in Anglo-Soviet relations. Apart from the issues 
mentioned above, it became clear that the Soviet government was very wary of being 
‘ganged up’ on by a united USA and Britain. Colliers, the American magazine, had not 
helped when it had published, in November 1951, a whole issue devoted to an imaginary 
attack on the Soviet Union. The pictures in particular had probably sent shivers up of most 
of American and British, and possibly Soviet, spines.903 While smaller agreements could 
still be reached, more difficult negotiations bearing that risk were much difficult to get off 
the ground.904 Since any discussion on Europe was beset with difficulties, more agreements 
could possibly be reached with regards to South-East Asia, in particular the Korean War. 
Here was a genuine opportunity for both sides to withdraw from a conflict that had 
exhausted all potential benefits.905 
 
 
13.2. Discussing options  
The assessment of Britain’s position and future options provided a mixed picture. Western 
strength and consolidation had undoubtedly increased and would continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future. However, it had come at the price of sacrificing a fully independent 
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British foreign policy to the whims and national obsessions of other nations. It had also and 
would continue to demand a massive financial effort at a time when the population was 
getting used to new ideas of social security and a partly nationalised managed economy. 
Furthermore any important moves in the diplomatic sphere had to be discussed if not 
agreed with the United States.906 ‘At all costs’, Dixon wrote in May 1953, ‘must we avoid 
a break with the USA such as would be brought about by HMG going it alone.’907  
 
 
The bout of international meetings, discussions and negotiations reflected the fact that the 
Korean War with all its problems and implications had provided an opportunity to come 
together and finally agree on a common Western policy towards the Soviet Union. Of 
course, the more countries were involved and the more ideas were floated, the more 
difficult this task became. Nevertheless, there was possibly a new confidence that the first 
steps had been taken and that from now on the constant bullying by the Soviet Union could 
be countered in unison. The successes of not only integrating both West Germany and 
Japan into the Western group of nations but also rearming them while clearing the way for 
Greece and Turkey to join NATO were major foreign policy successes for Britain and the 
US. The theoretical rivalry between the blocs enshrined in Communist ideology had 
become a practical rivalry now taken very seriously by both sides. Not surprisingly Grey 
wrote in a letter in September 1951 that ‘we must in any case recognise that we have 
approached a crucial and possibly dangerous period when the Soviets are fully alive to 
what is happening and we are not yet fully prepared.’908 The line between confidence, 
over-confidence and recklessness was a thin one and had to be watched at all times. 
 
 
The basic assumption of British foreign policy makers remained negative on the 
assumption that the Soviet government was not interested and would not invest in a real 
improvement of Anglo-Soviet relations.909 Firmness and consistency in British foreign 
policy would only be matched by a similar attitude on the Soviet side. The status quo 
appeared to be to sit in a trench and peek out occasionally to see if the air had cleared. 
Some argued that the old Soviet idea of creating revolutionary situations to exploit them 
was still intact. NATO, it was thought, had forced Stalin to be more cautious but 
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essentially no less opportunistic.910 A more active approach was needed. Containment on 
the American side had been paired with the Western idea of situations of strength. While 
the gap in conventional armaments was still so large (atomic weapons were expensive, 
could be used only in very serious circumstances and were likely to fall under UNO 
inspection at some point in the future) these situations of strength could be built up to 
allow the negotiation of limited local settlements.911 These would take time to build up but 
would equally be part of a longer-term view of the Cold War. To concentrate exclusively 
on defence arrangements was anyhow unlikely to be useful in most circumstances. 
Moreover, Britain’s financial situation left little room for manoeuvre.912 A more varied 
Western response was needed, in particular with regard to the Foreign Office assessment 
that the Soviet leaders tended to underestimate rather than overestimate their strength.913 
Co-existence provided an overall concept that was flexible to suit various circumstances 
and as much as this idea lacked a really positive note, was seen as the momentarily only 
realistic way of conducting international relations in the Cold War. 
 
 
Peaceful-coexistence as a concept was not new. It has in essence been in place since 1945, 
or even 1917 as some would argue, and although it offered not much apart from the 
prevention of a global war, this lowest common denominator in international relations 
would prove enough in the long run. Recognising that this rhetoric without costing much 
could sway the public and political imagination, the Soviet government in another episode 
of minimal détente opted to publish a new journal. News was to concentrate on two vital 
issues: Peaceful Co-existence and the importance of East-West trade. By taping into the 
anxieties of various groups in different countries the Soviet government hoped to capitalise 
on any potential slackening of the increasing anti-Communist and anti-Soviet feeling in the 
West.914 Peaceful co-existence, however, was highly sensitive to changes in the 
international balance of power. When, during the Korean War, Chinese troops achieved 
well-publicised victories, the tone was inadvertently downgraded to suit the new 
confidence. By the end of 1951 Connelly not surprisingly noted that it was time to review 
the use of that concept by the Soviet leadership. Commenting on an article by Deborin, 
which discussed Soviet foreign policy, she argued that the article ‘confirms the aggressive 
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implications of the Soviet connotation of ‘peaceful co-existence’ and means in effect that 
the Kremlin claims the right to immobilise resistance to its policies within foreign 
countries through the paralysis of their man-power, disaffection, civil war etc.’915  
Gascoigne, writing from Moscow, agreed. ‘When the Soviet authorities talk of peaceful 
co-existence’, he argued, ‘they mean not co-existence without conflict but only co-
existence without major wars.’ Still, the only alternative according to him was World War 
III.916 With such an analysis of a political concept it could be assumed that it would mean 
the end of it. However, it had captured the public imagination and without a workable 
alternative the Foreign Office had not choice but to pay attention to it.  
 
 
To tie up loose ends and provide a coherent argument Brimelow, of the Russian Secretariat 
of the Moscow embassy, drafted a memorandum on Peaceful Co-existence.917 Reiterating 
the points above he argued that as a tactic it was of doubtful usefulness but in the absence 
of an alternative it was the only concept so far to form the basis of a non-aggressive 
international diplomacy. The Russia Committee went a step further and noted that ‘the 
peaceful co-existence of the Socialist and Capitalist systems means …a period of active 
rivalry and competition.’918 Several months later this point was boiled down to one basic 
assessment when Morgan argued that the Cold War itself essentially equalled peaceful co-
existence.919 The Soviet government would only accept this concept and promote it if other 
avenues of political or subversive activities had either been exhausted or where 
momentarily unavailable.920 Thus it was a stale-mate rather than a genuine wish to use 
time, effort and money to rebuild the world after the last war. In actual fact, Brimelow 
argued, Peaceful Co-existence was ‘the advocacy of provisional non-belligerence.’921 Even 
the concept of peace could not get away from the vocabulary of war. 
 
 
In the absence of progress in Europe the signing of the Japanese peace treaty in 1951 
signalled a final end to the post-war settlement in the Far East. The signing, alongside of 
the peace treaty, of a bilateral American-Japanese defence pact reignited Soviet and 
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Chinese fears about Western, and in particular American, intentions, in the Far East.922 
While Germany was divided, the Western part of the country was now well on the way 
towards complete integration into the Western political and defence system and now Japan 
had also chosen a side. Thus the two most important aggressors of World War II were 
firmly attached to the West. As a result NATO would have access to air and naval bases on 
the outer rim of the Soviet Union. Soviet policies with regards to Korea and Japan had 
decidedly failed. The repercussions were immediate and prolonged. Local wars and the 
stirring of national sentiments against colonial oppression were assisted by both the Soviet 
and the Chinese governments. As the opportunities for overtly offensive action was slowly 
reduced the West still had to fear subversive and covert fifth column activity. The Foreign 
Office concentrated on keeping all the strands of thought together. It prepared memoranda 
for important meetings of Western governments and advised NATO on Soviet history, 
ideology and foreign policy. Importantly, the Northern Department also reiterated its basic 
objective: ‘we stand firmly by the principle of settling our differences by negotiation.’923 
However, not at any cost. Pure propaganda exchanges were of no interest to the British and 
neither were very public meetings with unknown outcomes. They held onto their belief that 
more could be achieved in private.  
 
 
The old idea of a psychological offensive against Stalin and the Soviet Union was in the 
light of this new Western confidence revisited. Particularly the State Department was 
interested in implementing it. A long US draft on the ‘Psychological offensive vis-à-vis the  
USSR: Objectives, tasks, themes’ was circulated in the Foreign Office in early 1951.924 
While many welcomed the idea of a much more active, and offensive, approach to dealing 
with Soviet propaganda and Soviet inspired propaganda there was widespread 
disagreement particularly about specific objectives and the detailed implementation. The 
American view that the Soviets did not understand the nature of propaganda and admired 
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Stalin as a demi-god was discounted in the Northern Department. But even more 
importantly there was real hesitation about whether the USA, and Britain for that matter, 
would have the political will to match the Soviet style or to find a new equally powerful 
one. According to Morgan one major problem was, as the IRD had also found in the 
previous years with regards to British policy makers, that ‘if it is argued that the Americans 
are simply proposing to fight the Russians at their own game, then my reply would be that 
even American publicists are too gentlemanly to have any success at that.’ The use of 
political warfare as an actual weapon was still in its infancy in the West and the 
willingness to ‘get dirty’ was very low. So rather than attack Stalin, or any other leader, it 
was important, Willetts pointed out, to ‘attack the scientific pretensions of Soviet 
Marxism.’925  
 
 
Since Soviet foreign policy was openly based on Marx’s ideas of historical materialism it 
made sense to attack this basis and thus withdraw the much claimed legitimacy of Soviet 
foreign policy from the Soviet government. The British, however, were still rather 
reluctant to sanction overt, aggressive and offensive propaganda to deter Soviet and 
Communist propaganda. Many, like Churchill, favoured the softer option of a return to 
great power top level meetings. As discussed previously, the Foreign Office was not in 
favour of this approach. However, an idea by the head of the government could not just be 
discounted. Strang suggested the alternative of a discreet meeting presumably under the 
auspices of the UNO.926 A lengthy discussion followed but in the end no such meeting took 
place. The icy relations between the former allies were the single most important brake on 
progress in the UNO and post-war European reconstruction but by 1951 no government 
was willing to pay a big price for an improvement of those relations.  
 
 
To understand those problems better from the point of view of the Soviet government a 
new ‘Kremlin memorandum’ was written by Nicholls.927 The first, written in May 1950, 
although heavily discussed and by no means accepted unequivocally, had been a 
success.928 Now there was another attempt to see the world through Soviet eyes. As usual, 
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evidence was in short supply but guess work was a well-worn and accepted path in the 
Northern Department. The Russia Committee, in charge of shorter-term policy analysis, 
endorsed the paper.929 Whether or not the committee conclusions would be proven to be 
right, it argued, was irrelevant. What was important was to take a step back and imagine 
how the Soviet leadership could possibly view certain events and which actions they might 
take. The view was that the Soviet government would use all means at her disposal to 
achieve her aims. It saw the UNO as an American tool and would probably be much more 
careful in sanctioning or starting wars in the future. Western resistance had not changed 
but modified Soviet strategy and tactics. 
 
 
About a year later Brimelow, then in Moscow, wrote a similar paper discussing Soviet 
resistance to NATO.930 One of the most experienced Soviet specialists in the Northern 
Department he took on a topic of vital importance to both the US and Britain. NATO was 
the centre piece of the Western resistance and rearmament effort and was likely to find 
itself permanently in the Soviet firing line. The better the detailed Soviet concerns and 
likely accusations could be worked out in advance, the more time the West would have to 
tailor specific responses to Soviet allegations. Brimelow argued that Stalin’s 
pronouncements on present and future Soviet policy could be taken at face value and that 
NATO would not stop the eventual worldwide triumph of Communism. Agitation and 
propaganda, revolution and civil wars would be the main instruments of Soviet and 
Communist policy. According to him the Soviet leadership believed that the tide was 
slowly turning in favour of more revolutions and that the only two reasons for Soviet 
hesitation to take full advantage of the situation was the American atomic bomb and the 
continued rearmament of NATO. In the absence of any real hope of a negotiated 
settlement, essentially precluded by Soviet ideology, the West had to remain active and 
determined since the maintenance of the present policy of firmness and of consensus of 
opinion in the Western countries would be just as big a problem as dealing with any 
military problems. Eden, possibly not surprisingly, complained that Brimelow had been too 
negative in his assessment of potential progress but agreed that the hopes for a settlement 
were slim. A final, important, word of warning came from Connolly and it is worth quoting 
her in full as she pointed out one of the major problems of the later Cold War:  
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Soviet theoretical pronouncements on foreign policy are on the whole so 
dogmatic and uncompromising that there is a danger, especially in the present 
period of intransigence, that spectacular compromises possible to the Kremlin 
when they have seen the red light, either at home or abroad, may be 
momentarily overlooked.931  
 
 
Compromises on both sides required a certain confidence that the other side was willing to 
negotiate honestly and in the thick haze of Eastern and Western propaganda that 
willingness might well be overlooked. 
 
 
13.3. Implementing British foreign policy 
The British government had no problems justifying its policies to itself but acknowledged 
the necessity to pay attention to educate the public. She was a great power, possessed a still 
impressive empire and Commonwealth, she had remained undefeated on the victorious 
side in both World Wars, she had been pivotal in the organisation of post-war Western 
European recovery and thus had to remain strong and armed.932 Without Britain the 
Western European defence effort would falter. Western rearmament, as an IRD pamphlet 
argued, was not the end but the beginning. In rather Churchillian sentiment it reassured its 
readers that ‘we…will survive long after the present menace has gone the way of all 
tyrannies and become an evil dream.’933 With this status, however, came huge 
responsibilities and significant financial commitments. In addition, Britain had to avoid 
any suggestions that rearmament was necessary for an unavoidable war. Negative 
propaganda was dangerous. Britain therefore had to appear positive and confident that the 
much talked about war was never going to break out. Importantly, as the Moscow chancery 
noted, confidence was good ‘provided we keep our powder dry and have enough of it.’934 
British foreign policy therefore had not only to protect Britain and her achievements but it 
also had to be sustainable in the longer term. As a result the stakes really were very high 
and there was little room for mistakes or for uncomfortable manoeuvring with someone 
else’s (ie. American) foreign policy.935 
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Containment and rearmament were not only designed to impede further Soviet progress at 
the expense of Western freedoms but were also intended to build up what Acheson called 
situations of strength. By the summer of 1951, Harrison argued, the idea was already 
proving promising.936 Others disagreed; Uffen noted that ‘in my opinion we are not yet 
really practising a policy of containment – or rather are not yet able to do so.’937 He 
thought that what the West needed first of all was to sufficiently counter-balance Soviet 
military strength; a view also held by Gascoigne.938 The British expanded the American 
concept of containment and strong point defence by starting to concentrate on Soviet ‘sore 
spots’. The idea was to analyse Soviet foreign policy and identify potential problem areas. 
Those areas could then either be targeted through specific pressures to elicit a Soviet 
response or they could be essentially protected from any such intervention so as to make 
sure that disagreements in those areas did not escalate into a wider conflict. A meeting in 
Strang’s room on February 22nd, 1952 discussed the first paper on this idea.939  
 
 
Six years on from the Long Telegram Kennan had essentially been proven right. The 
Soviet Union had emerged as the main opponent to the US and containment now had 
become official American and British policy. The debate was quite fierce. There was a real 
disagreement between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Office. Eden worried that the 
conclusions increased the risk of war. Strang argued that one point of the paper was to 
inform and warn the COS about these particular danger points. He knew that high-level 
politico-military talks with the Americans were needed and that Britain had to identify, 
prior to any such talks, potential areas of disagreement as well as those areas where 
agreement was most likely. Detailed strategic planning within and out-with NATO 
following the doctrine of containment would necessarily need to take into account any 
areas where implementation would prove either problematic or outright dangerous.940  
 
 
The memorandum itself started with one simple proposition: the West, under the 
leadership of the US, would soon be in a stronger position to push a more forward policy 
vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.941 Since this would restrict independent British moves, the 
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Foreign Office should assess the situation and its potential implications while there still 
was a chance to influence the State Department.942 The second important assumption was 
that any pressure applied to these sore spots was likely to increase the risk of war but that a 
more forward policy towards the Soviet Union could not afford to avoid these spots. Since 
Western military consolidation was to increase and since that would act as a deterrent to 
and brake on Soviet expansionism, the amount of pressure applied could progressively be 
increased.943 However, although the Soviet Union did not want war, it might resort to it if 
sufficiently provoked and exactly that remained the worry of Eden. So, as if to justify 
Western policies, the Northern Department again made a point of labelling them as 
‘defensive and non-aggressive.’944 The sore spots specifically identified included 
Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, with Afghanistan being 
the only one where foreign intervention of any kind was unlikely to be tolerated under any 
circumstances. As opposed to these actual geo-political sore spots, other problematic areas 
highlighted were the atomic bomb, and economic and psychological warfare.  
 
 
A major problem in assessing these issues was not only the dearth of reliable evidence but 
also the ongoing paucity of actual face-to-face diplomatic relations with Soviet diplomats. 
The less contact there was the less British diplomats were able to gage Soviet sensitivities 
and intentions. How to deal with this was a difficult issue. Grey suggested to reduce 
contacts with the Soviets even further so as to reduce the ability of the Soviet government 
to harm the British. Hohler argued that this would be highly dangerous.945 His argument 
was not new. Reduced contact made it more likely for the Soviet government to draw the 
wrong conclusions with regards to Western intentions. Further isolation of the Soviet 
Union was not beneficial to anyone. Isolation would only increase paranoia and the 
willingness to sanction desperate policies. Grey summarised the argument in a 
memorandum discussing the issued of how to deal with the Russians in the future in 
February 1952. Advocating a tougher line he argued essentially against Northern 
Department opinion. Britain, according to him, should use the methods of the Soviet 
government against them. He noted that ‘basically our containment of the Soviet Union 
will work, not by making the Kremlin ready for concessions, but by inducing them to 
adopt a more cautious and conservative policy.’946 Implying that a reduction in 
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negotiations could be a viable alternative to Soviet diplomatic games, he implicitly 
suggested that armed strength was the only way to make the Cold War safe; a ‘policy of 
unconcern’ he called it shortly after.947 
 
 
Many, however, in the Foreign Office agreed that as tiresome as dealing with the Soviets 
was, in the UN for example, the alternative was in actual fact dangerous. Dixon argued that 
‘I believe that we ought to employ precisely the opposite technique.’948 Channels of 
communications had to be kept open in all circumstances. An end to negotiation could well 
spell the end to a safe Cold War. Zarubin had even told Eden that it believed that 
diplomacy could well lead to an improvement in international relations.949 Roberts felt that 
Grey had been too negative in his assessment and that the paper therefore lacked 
confidence.950 All in the Northern Department agreed on one issue, however, whatever 
tactics were chosen to best pursue British foreign political interests, continuity was vital. 
British policy had to remain focused on the two main issues: to provide a military deterrent 
against Soviet aggression and to ensure that the Soviet idea of Western collapse in the Cold 
War would not occur. Britain had to remain open to discussion and negotiation, and aim 
for the settlement of local problems. Patience, continuity and unity as well as 
psychological warfare were the means to achieve this end. Even then, a Northern 
Department paper noted, ‘it will probably be years before there is any chance of going over 
from ‘containment’ to active ‘compression’ without undue risk.’951 The Soviet Union, of 
course, faced similar problems. Morgan noted quite rightly that ‘the Soviet government 
like ourselves have to walk along a razor’s edge.’952  
 
 
The whole discussion has to be understood against the background of Western military 
consolidation, especially NATO. With the increase in NATO’s capabilities and extent 
Western governments felt, not surprisingly, safer and more confident; peace through 
strength, as some put it.953 Military security, however, was likely to reduce the willingness 
of some to solve problems the old-fashioned route, through diplomacy. A deterrent was 
unfortunately not the best means to produce a longing for détente on either side and further 
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concentration on the extension of Western strategic capabilities would reduce the 
probability of that happening even further. Brimelow discussed this important point in a 
paper.954 It was essentially a catch 22. He argued that there was  
 
 
no prospect that, when the NATO rearmament has reached its peak, it will be 
possibly to negotiate a settlement with the Communist bloc. The hope of a 
settlement is precluded by the Communist ideology of conflict…There is no 
prospect of the NATO powers being able to negotiate from strength with the 
Soviet government…the latter…will not be intimidated.  
 
 
One might wonder why then rearmament was see as so important not only for self-defence 
but also for negotiation. Eden, not surprisingly, disagreed with Brimelow, feeling that he 
had been too negative. Interestingly, however, he agreed with the near impossibility of 
negotiating a lasting settlement with the Stalinist government. According to him all that 
could be hoped for were, again, local and limited settlements.955 The Soviet Union had 
certainly noted the increased Western defence abilities which had greatly enhanced 
military and psychological strength to resist further Soviet encroachment. Overconfidence 
on the part of the West, nevertheless, as the Russia Committee noted, was to be 
discouraged.956 Military intimidation, as Kennan had noted in a long memorandum, was a 
vital part of the Kremlin’s forcefulness with regards to the West.957 Without it a major 
pillar of Soviet foreign policy would be gone; another reason why the Soviet government 
possibly continued the arms race against all the odds and perhaps against better judgement. 
 
 
Propaganda, as a relatively inexpensive but efficient means of political warfare, was often 
discussed in the Northern Department. The more the Soviet Union and other Communist 
countries and international organisations used this means to full effect, the more Britain 
had to come to terms with the use of it. To leave the initiative completely to the Soviet 
Union was lazy and, in the long term, damaging. Educated populations might well start to 
wonder why their governments did not reply in kind to the continuous barrage of Soviet 
accusations. Equally importantly, Western populations had to be brought solidly on board 
with regards to their governments policies, their imaginations had to be fired and the Cold 
                                                 
954
 FO371/100868-NS1192/1, Brimelow, ‘The Communist answer to the rearmament of the NATO powers’, 
10.3.1952; see also the naval attaché’s letter in FO371/100900-NS1691/1. 
955
 FO371/100868-NS1192/1, Eden letter to Gascoigne, 10.3.1952. 
956
 FO371/125006-NSZP15/1, RC, 17.4.1952.  
957
 FO371/ 125006-ZP15/3, Kennan, ‘The Soviet Union and the Atlantic Pact’, despatch to the State 
Department, 1.10.1952. 
 230 
War explained in a way that would retain their allegiance in all eventualities. As an 
unnamed official in the Northern Department noted ‘the free world badly needs to be 
shown some light at the end of the rearmament tunnel.’958 Therefore a positive, more 
aggressive and more offensive propaganda campaign was needed. Although this was never 
going to be more important than actual foreign policy initiatives, it was an important 
secondary tool.  
 
 
What was needed was a great idea that would capture the imagination of the free world and 
that exactly, as already discussed, was the problem. Propaganda by definition is rather 
boring, lecturing and prescriptive and thus not entirely suited to the educated and free 
minds of the West. A more offensive and manipulative propaganda was advocated by the 
British Naval Attaché in Moscow Captain Fitzroy. Arguing that the Soviet Union was 
trying, through false propaganda, to portray a picture of Soviet strength onto the West thus 
forcing the West to rearm, he suggested that Britain through clever propaganda 
provocations could possibly force the Soviet leadership to reveal more about their 
preparedness and actual strength than it initially wanted to.959 Noting that a possibly 
unnecessary Western rearmament could potentially cripple the West economically, in his 
view one of the main reasons for this projection of Soviet strength, he called for a review 
of what British propaganda should address and how it should be done. 
 
 
Stalin’s death on March 5th, 1953 in these circumstances was both a problem and an 
opportunity. Although Soviet foreign policy was not entirely predictable a certain pattern 
had emerged since the war in Soviet responses to certain situations and problems. Stalin 
had essentially guaranteed that a specific level of hostility would not be increased and had 
thus helped to stabilise the Cold War. Even if Berlin and Korea had shown how thin the 
international consensus on wishing to avoid war was, military opportunism had remained 
confined to very localised areas. Although the discussions about factions in the Kremlin 
and questions about Stalin’s mental abilities had continued, he had remained the 
figurehead of both the Soviet Union and worldwide Communism. It was unavoidable that 
as a result of this a certain predictability had also been cemented. Problematic now was 
that the new men arriving on the international scene were, mostly, not recognised as 
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prominent Soviet faces. All had been central to Stalin’s policies of the previous years but 
none had, in Western eyes, either real leadership potential or Stalin’s iron will and 
determination.960 To govern a country with such an immense variety of nationalities as 
well as to push through a capital investment programme and to continuing to engineer a 
social revolution on a massive scale while keeping the international Communist movement 
together required undoubtedly an outstanding leader.  
 
 
To reflect the increasing Soviet self-confidence and Soviet foreign political ambitions 
against an ever more consolidated Western opposition demanded even more specialist 
skills. With Molotov lacking the absolute will to power, Malenkov and Beria both possibly 
restricted by their experience in a field too narrow for broad appeal and support (in the 
Party and the NKGB respectively), and with Kaganovich and Khrushchev seen as rough 
trouble shooters rather than leaders, the Northern Department necessarily resorted to 
speculation. Junior men like Kosygin, A. Kuznetsov, Popov, Suslov or Ponomarenko were 
deemed even less likely to climb the dangerous Soviet leadership ladder any time soon. 
Older members of the Politburo, men like Mikoyan, Voroshilov or Bulganin, had not really 
been at the forefront of national policies for some time. In the end, Malenkov emerged in 
the Foreign Office as the most likely candidate to lead the committee that was likely to rule 
until a supreme leader had emerged. New leaders potentially meant new policies or at least 
a modification of existing policies. The Western excitement about this prospect, however, 
was very limited. It appeared unlikely that Stalin’s death would in the intermediate term 
offer spectacular opportunities. Nevertheless, even a limited settlement in Korea, Austria 
or in the international disarmament talks would be well worth the effort.  
 
 
Gascoigne, not surprisingly, reported that the second quarter of 1953 was of ‘vital interest’ 
to Western observers.961 A certain tension had arisen not because of actual problems with 
the new Soviet leaders but because many in the West argued in different directions about 
potential Soviet moves and their motives, and thus split the previously fairly coherent 
Western thinking about them. One certainty, Gascoigne argued, was that the Soviet Union 
had entered a probably limited period of collective leadership and that the ‘cult of the 
outstanding individual’ had ended. In order to consolidate their power and ensure a safe 
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transfer of responsibilities it was likely that the new leaders would actively aim for a 
détente and would offer limited solutions to outstanding problems. When Churchill, on 
May 11th 1953, argued in a speech that the ‘security of the Soviet Union was not 
irreconcilable with the freedom and safety of Western Europe’ and, again, suggested a 
Four Power meeting the door had been opened a little further for a return to traditional 
diplomacy negotiating solutions to the benefit of all participants. 962 
 
 
The ambassador made his thinking about the disappearance of Stalin from the international 
scene very clear: ‘I do not, repeat do not, look with satisfaction on Stalin’s disappearance’, 
he wrote on the day Stalin’s death was announced.963 He, like others, was extremely 
worried about potential instability within the Soviet Union which could spread across the 
globe. Stalin, he noted, had understood the West and had provided a point of contact 
should it be needed. Others were more optimistic with regards to both Western and Soviet 
abilities to deal with Stalin’s death calmly and make the best use of opportunities were 
they arose. Wahnerheide, in Germany, argued that ‘the illness and death of a potentate 
might become the turning point in the Cold War.’964  
 
 
Anxiety, opportunism and optimism were therefore clearly visible in East and West. The 
situation was not completely surprising, Stalin had been seventy four at the time of this 
death, but speculation about a particular event, his death, and dealing with it when it 
actually arrives proved two completely different matters. British fears about American 
resolve vis-à-vis the Soviet Union immediately resurfaced, although there was no real 
evidence that the State Department considered a change to the policy of containment the 
Northern Department was worried.965 The Soviet leaders, by the same token, were in 
reality unlikely to make substantial concessions.966 Any détente was seen as probably 
short-lived and very limited. ‘All our actions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union’, Gascoigne 
warned, ‘should be tempered with great caution at this delicate moment in Soviet 
history.’967  
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Coherence and determination in foreign policy remained a vital basic ingredient for the 
Foreign Office. In any case, it was argued, it was unlikely that the new leadership was able 
or willing to offer anything new while they were consolidating their hold and, presumably, 
figuring out who was to be supreme leader. Soviet policy would not change overnight, and 
neither would Western policy. Despite all this caution there were real opportunities to ease 
the Cold War tension. With Stalin’s death, a change in the administration in the US and an 
explicit willingness of the British Prime Minister to talk all sides kept their options open. 
This first sense of hope of a possible easing of the Cold War tension was quickly squashed. 
In late April, assessing Soviet foreign policy and possible intentions Gascoigne wrote from 
Moscow that unmistakably ‘the Soviet government will not accept threats, reproaches or 
preliminary conditions and that they remain true to their previous policies.’968 The much 
wanted détente was possibly nothing more than a figment of the Western imagination. Real 
concessions, so far, had not been made and with no new supreme leader in place, were 
unlikely to be made in the near future. ‘The Soviet leopard has not changed its spots’, as a 
Northern Department official noted.969 
 
 
Two months after Stalin’s death the Russia Committee moaned that a rapprochement had 
not been achieved.970 Concessions, in general, are made from a position of strength and 
confidence and neither West nor East was sufficiently convinced that such a position had 
been achieved on either side yet. The flow of low-level conciliatory moves by the new 
Soviet leaders, such as the release of Bundock, the signing of the Anglo-Soviet fisheries 
agreement etc, had by May slowed down considerably. Although diplomatic relations 
between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as well as Israel had been re-established, really 
significant moves had not been made on either side. The Northern Department advised to 
wait and see but to be prepared; the Soviet leadership would still do anything short of war 
to improve its position and secure its hold over the country and the Eastern bloc.971 Britain, 
just like the Soviet Union, had to remain firm, realistic and willing to negotiate if that 
situation arose. It also had to be aware that any increase in Soviet suspicions or her 
isolation were not only unwanted but could also negate any opportunities for new talks. 
Gascoigne summarised the situation: ‘I think that great patience, deliberation and astute 
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diplomacy will be necessary in the future if we are indeed to profit at all by the ray of 
sunshine which the new administration has shed upon the scene.’972    
 
 
The lack of a prime Soviet contact remained a problem. Now that there was a choice, 
although Malenkov as chairman of the Council of Ministers was the senior Soviet party 
leader, foreign diplomats and governments were in uncharted waters. Even more 
problematic was the low-level discussion in the West on a possible power struggle. This 
made the choice of a first contact even more difficult. The US State Department was 
certain that such a struggle was taking place. The British were more hesitant.973 In the end, 
it was all speculation with no actual evidence. That evidence only arrived with the arrest of 
Beria and the shuffling of positions between the leaders afterwards. A long Northern 
Department minute from May 1953 discussed this issue.974 Whether or not there was a 
power struggle going on behind the scenes, Churchill was, as always, not afraid to voice 
his opinion. Talking to Gromyko, who was now Soviet ambassador in Britain, he noted 
that ‘I felt much safer while Stalin was alive. I was five years older than he was and sure 
old men were not likely to make war.’ Referring to his visit to Moscow in October 1944, 
the scene of the infamous ‘Percentages Agreement’, he stated that he regarded that time as 
the ‘highest level we ever reached.’975 Reading these words now, one cannot help but be 
surprised by both Churchill’s naivety and his still obvious love of great power diplomacy. 
Backroom deals with other leaders had always been a particular love of his. 
 
 
Long expected and now widely evident, the Cold War had by the early 1950s definitely 
arrived. Several low key military struggles as well as the first war after 1945 raised the 
stakes for the British Foreign Office. Long debates and some bitter experiences during the 
years since 1945 had substantially reduced Britain’s choices in international relations. 
Close relations with the USA as well as a formal alliance in NATO became the 
cornerstones of British foreign policy. They also, however, limited the options should the 
Kremlin choose to pursue détente. Stalin’s death and the ensuing discussion in the 
Northern Department demonstrated how far this deadlock had actually proceeded. Trying 
not to give anything away while continuing to look strong meant no side was really going 
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out of its way to make the first substantial step towards an indication that renewed 
negotiation was in fact very much desired. 
 
 
Some in the Foreign Office found these developments puzzling. Germany, the old enemy, 
was now the new friend, while possibly fruitful relations with the former wartime ally, 
were reduced to a minimum as the assessment gathered momentum that the Soviet Union 
was now the new enemy. At the time of Stalin’s death, although there may have been 
opportunities, this seismic shift in Soviet domestic affairs proved of limited impact to the 
outside world. Although many by no means were friends of the Soviet Union, some 
realised that low key cordial relations would have been the cheapest option for Britain to 
maintain peace and avoid being dragged into a very expensive and highly disadvantageous 
arms race with both the USA and the Soviet Union.  
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Part Five.  Conclusion  
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Proximity to information gave Northern Department staff a prime opportunity for 
suggesting those policies to the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet they regarded as most 
beneficial for British interests at the time. Often things were, however, not that 
straightforward. Information had to be accurate, up to date and relevant to pressing issues 
in order to be useful. But the collection of it from the Moscow Embassy and various 
departments outside the Foreign Office, such as the JIB, took time. Extensive debate in the 
department and the Foreign Office in general with papers moving up and down the 
hierarchy took time as well. While British foreign policy up to May 1945 had been geared 
towards winning the war and securing some basic planning for a pacified Europe, after 
1945 there were a large number of issues all of which were urgent and had to be addressed. 
The Soviet Union was, although very important, initially only one of them. Problems 
regarding the Empire, and imperial security and communication as well as financial 
discussions with the USA were of equally pressing importance.  
 
 
Only with the slow breaking-down of the CFMs and the resulting stagnation in the settling 
of important post-war issues did it become clear that the Soviet Union had become central 
to the achievement of workable settlements in Europe and elsewhere. Massive efforts on 
part of the Foreign Office to be prepared and potentially flexible in these negotiations met 
with only limited results and the realisation that actual negotiation with the Kremlin, the 
offering of deals, for example, was seen as a weakness to be exploited by Soviet 
negotiators. As in the absence of war between the former allies the use of military power 
was essentially impossible, this reduction in the use of old style diplomacy was a major 
hindrance in achieving a post-war settlement that was acceptable to all sides. The 
movement towards a close cooperation with the USA, also in the wake of an increasing 
financial dependence on the country, hinted at the formation of a bloc perceived to be 
threatening to the emerging Soviet empire in Eastern and South Eastern Europe by Stalin. 
To a surprising extent both sides mirrored each others moves with each side occasionally 
taking the lead. 
 
 
The historiography of these crucial early years after 1945, during which some Cold War 
patterns were set and slowly solidified, is extensive and divided. Mostly focusing on the 
higher level of policy formation in the Cabinet it has largely neglected those Foreign 
Office departments, like the Northern Department, which have played a crucial role in the 
initial process. When officials are mentioned the argument usually follows the main 
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historical debates. While orthodox historians have been lenient with the foreign policy 
establishment in the wake of putting most of the blame for the deteriorating international 
relations on the Soviet government, revisionist historians have argued a different case. 
Seeking to balance the discussion by attributing some deserved blame for these problems 
mostly on the USA but also Britain, they necessarily had to be more critical of Foreign 
Office suggestions and attitudes. Most importantly it was the resurrection of the British 
role in the context of the Cold War which put the Foreign Office firmly in the spotlight. 
Here criticism has been severe with some post-revisionists arguing a very critical case 
against the Foreign Office.   
 
 
Officials in the Foreign Office in general and the Northern Department in particular have, 
as this thesis has shown, not received the respect that they actually deserve. Far from being 
narrow minded ‘Cold Warriors’ or ‘russophobe’ officials these men through diligent 
analysis of the available information proposed those policies they regarded as most 
efficient to achieving British foreign policy ambitions and most suitable to Britain’s 
undeniably weakened position vis-à-vis her two former wartime allies. Although the 
impact of personal opinions and experiences on these decisions is very difficult to quantify, 
it is much more likely and obvious in the sources that eventual suggestions were based on 
good analysis, extensive discussion and a good dose of pragmatic realism. In-depth 
knowledge of previous relations with both the Soviet Union and the USA was another 
important factor in decision making. 
 
 
Information here was key. Despite unsurprisingly significant gaps in the availability of 
information on several issues, the overall knowledge of Soviet domestic affairs was good. 
The basis of the regime, its ideology, its mechanism for maintaining its power and 
extending it to its new empire in Eastern Europe were well understood. Knowledge of 
Soviet industry and agriculture was despite the occasionally shaky interpretation of data  
equally good. It was a great help that these two issues in particular were widely reported 
and debated in the Soviet press. Here, as on other occasions, it is clear that the Soviet 
government underestimated the extent to which important information could be gleaned 
from relatively mundane press reports. There were problems with this way of gathering 
information, of course. Information vital to the Soviet military and atomic energy research 
effort, for example, were not addressed in the press. While there was a debate in the 
Northern Department as to the extent of this research and possible people involved, this 
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was necessarily guess work. If more detailed intelligence was available at the time, it was 
certainly not accessible to staff in the department.  
 
 
Overall it is clear that new policy suggestions, like Warner’s ‘defensive-offensive 
strategy’, the increasing push for more firmness vis-à-vis the Kremlin or a more confident 
and determined British propaganda campaign towards Soviet inspired Communism, were 
only advanced after long and detailed discussions in the Northern Department and the 
Foreign Office. All eventual policy proposals were always backed up by evidence and the 
reasons for these proposals were made clear throughout. While the COS were less than 
impressed with Foreign Office efforts at the time and historians have at times argued that 
the institution was too slow to adapt to new times, it is clear that this was in actual fact not 
true. Officials were keenly aware of the changed and still changing international scene and 
they adapted accordingly. They also realised that if the information relevant to British 
foreign policy was to be used in a way that would benefit Britain, it had to be the Foreign 
Office that needed to be in charge of the initial process of policy formation. The MOD and 
the Treasury, for example, argued their cases from a different point of view and were not 
privy to all the information the Foreign Office had. They could thus not be allowed to 
advance dangerous policies or hinder those that were seen as most suitable to achieve 
British aims. 
 
 
The debate about the likelihood of war was a good example. While Churchill in his last 
days as Prime Minister had demanded a plan to deal with a possibly dangerous Soviet 
Union after the war, Operation Unthinkable, and the COS were understandably reluctant to 
let go of their newly found influence within the Cabinet, the Foreign Office realised from 
the start that these plans and attitudes were not only not implementable but potentially 
dangerous for British interests. While the role of foreign intelligence in Soviet decision 
making is still under researched and unclear, it is possible that Stalin, had he found out 
about Operation Unthinkable, would have had grave concerns and necessarily would have 
had to ensure a higher than planned military presence in the Soviet Union and the orbit. 
 
 
Against this background of possibly questionable assumptions and perceptions the rise of 
an ideology such as Communism in an already anxious international sphere could not but 
aggravate existing problems. Although discussion of this ideology was extensive and much 
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information was available, there can be no doubt that because of its less tangible nature this 
threat was possibly over-estimated. Any hint that people could be turned against their 
democratically elected governments in the West as a result of extensive indoctrination 
through propaganda proposed a new kind of danger. While counter measures were being 
discussed and slowly implemented, it is rather understandable that Western governments 
sought to bring all their resources to bear in addressing this issue. Communist witch hunts 
as in the US in the early 1950s were not replicated in Britain. But the discovery of Soviet 
agents in the heart of the Foreign Office and the existence of a sizable group of Communist 
sympathisers in Britain meant that the threat of a Third Column could not be disregarded 
out of hand. 
 
 
The edging of Communism closer to British borders with the successful building of a 
Soviet empire in Eastern Europe brought this threat very close to the British border. In the 
Foreign Office this necessarily caused concern. The determined and well argued demand 
for an effective British counter strategy, Western consolidation and propaganda, 
demonstrated the efforts of the Northern Department to make use of their information, 
expertise and policy suggestions. The difficulty in persuading first Bevin and then the 
Cabinet shows that major changes in British foreign policies were not taken lightly. Both, 
the Foreign Office and the British government, knew that new policies had to be solid as 
they would be difficult to change. Frequently changing foreign policies would have 
conveyed a sense of British dithering and weakness, an impression the Foreign Office was 
trying to avoid. 
 
 
That the British government succeeded in persuading Western governments to take the 
threat emanating from Moscow seriously was partly based on the diligent work of 
Northern Department officials and Moscow embassy staff. Detailed analysis of often 
minute pieces of information yielded results that proved very usable for discussions in 
Cabinet, CFMs, meetings of NATO representatives or UNO General Assembly meetings. 
The more details emerged about the nature of the Soviet regime, and its occupation and 
consolidation policies in Eastern Europe, the more precise predictions of future Soviet 
policy aims and actions could be taken. Although the Korean War was unexpected, the 
problems arising out of the joint occupation of Berlin had long before the actual blockade 
indicated that such a move was likely. Outspoken Soviet demands ostensibly situated 
within the Peace Movement and the Cominform further enhanced understanding of the 
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Soviet regime and its ideology. Once the idea took hold that it was in actual fact following 
a pre-determined ideology which was intrinsically hostile to the Western world and its 
governments, foreign political choices for Britain were even more limited. 
 
 
Faced with various Soviet actions across multiple fronts the Northern Department was one 
of the departments urging the establishment of a closer relationship with the USA and 
made huge efforts to solidify this relationship into a more formal alliance. Staff had 
realised soon after the end of World War II that any new international system would be 
based on strength, in particular military and economic power. The UNO was new and still 
had to prove its usefulness. In these circumstances British officials fell back on the old and 
trusted idea of alliance building to secure British interests. Rather than a move backwards 
it was a necessary move to maintain Britain’s world role while she was trying to gather her 
strength after the exertions of the war. But Northern Department staff knew that rather than 
putting all their eggs into one basket, efforts had to be spread out. Between the UNO, 
NATO and a closer Western European cooperation British interests were much better 
served than would have been possible if the British government had solely concentrated on 
one idea alone.  
 
 
Because the Soviet Union crept up in many policy discussions at the time, the Northern 
Department and its expertise were of vital importance in ensuring that appropriate and 
realistic policies were chosen to secure British interests. While they were as well informed 
as could be expected at the time, the information used by them to advance their arguments 
was not distorted to support arguments but rather in a matter of fact way. Of course, 
officials were interested in making sure that they were heard and that their views mattered 
but it is wrong to assume that policies advanced for consideration to the Foreign Secretary 
or the Cabinet were personal opinions. Foreign Office staff were servants of the state and 
understood their role as such. While they may have voiced their opinions in private notes 
and conversations, they were professional when giving advice to those who did not have an 
expertise or in-depth understanding of Soviet affairs. They were as much concerned with 
Britain’s new role in the world as with maintaining as cordial relations with the Kremlin as 
possible. When facing the ultimate choice between aligning Britain with either the USA or 
the Soviet Union the Northern Department advocated the right and only choice, a closer 
relationship with the USA. Although staff recognised that the Soviet Union had legitimate 
security concerns, these could not be allowed to infringe on British concerns. 
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The Northern Department and its staff warrant much more research. Their dedication and 
vitally important work as well as the dearth of available literature on specific Foreign 
Office departments reveals an imbalance in the historiography on the Foreign Office. 
Taking and getting little credit for their work, officials worked tirelessly towards their aim 
of securing a continued world role for Britain. A very heavy work load, many hours of 
reading through at times tediously detailed reports in order to extract the most important 
and relevant information, and the willingness to use information and ideas that had come 
from outside the Foreign Office meant that Attlee and Bevin as well as Churchill and Eden 
could confidently argue their cases in debates with their foreign counterparts. British 
foreign political successes of the early post-war years were to a significant extent the result 
of the work of those much lower down the hierarchy in the Foreign Office, as well as other 
government departments. To resurrect these men, and some women, from obscurity greatly 
enhances our understanding of the Northern Department while making the reading of 
British foreign policies during the post-war years much more interesting. 
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Bibliographical information on Foreign Office staff 
 
 
Staff at the Foreign Office served abroad as well as in London. The focus here is on their 
experience abroad, on positions relevant to the ND and the Moscow Embassy, and on 
senior positions in the FO. It is very difficult to secure details about more junior staff and 
the information provided here is therefore necessarily limited. All information was taken 
from The Dictionary of National Biography, the Foreign Office List and Who’s Who. 
 
Roger Allen 
Born 17.8.1909, educated Repton, Corpus Christi, Cambridge 
Entered FO April 1940 
Served in Moscow 1946 to 1948 
UK Deputy High Commissioner at Bonn 1954  
AUSS September 1953 
 
Sir John Balfour 
Born 26.5.1894, educated at Eton and New College, Oxford 
Entered FO April 1919, retired September 1954 
Served in Budapest, Washington, Madrid, Sofia, Belgrade, Lisbon, Moscow 1943 to 1945 
Ambassador Buenos Aries 1948 to 1951 and Madrid 1951 to 1954 
 
William Barker   
Born 19.7.1909, educated at Liverpool University 
Based with the Intelligence Corps in Bletchley Park 
Served in Prague 1945 
In Moscow 1947-51 as Head of the Russian Secretariat 
Ambassador to Czechoslovakia 1966 
AUSS 1965 
Slavonic linguist, 1956 acted as interpreter when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Britain 
Retired from FO 1968 
 
Sir Charles Harold Bateman 
Born 4.1.1892 
Entered FO 5.1920 
Served in Santiago, Bagdad, Lisbon, Cairo 
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Ambassador in Mexico City, then in Warsaw July 1950 
SUS of the ND 1948 to 1950 
AUSS January 1948 
 
Thomas Brimelow  
Born 25.10.1915, educated at Oxford 
Entered FO 1938 as the first in the examination, retired November 1975 
Served in Danzig, Riga 1939, New York, Moscow June 1942 to June 1945, Havana 1948-
51, Moscow October 1951 to September 1954, Ankara 1954-1956, Washington 1960-
1963, Moscow 1963-1966  
Ambassador in Warsaw 1966-1969 
Clerk in the ND 1946 to 1948 
Head ND August 1956, DUSS 1971, PUSS 1973-1975 
 
Sir Alexander George Montagu Cadogan 
Born 24.11.1884, educated at Eton and Balliol, Oxford 
Entered FO 10.1908, heading the list 
Served in Constantinople, Vienna, China, UN 1945-46 
DUSS October 1936, PUSS January 1938 to February 1946 
 
Violet Connolly 
Born 11.5.1899 
Entered FO April 1943 
Served in Moscow 
Joined FORD November 1946 
Advisor on Soviet affairs in the ND 1953 
 
Sir Pierson John Dixon 
Born 13.11.1904, educated at Cambridge 
Entered FO 1929, as the second of the group 
Served in Madrid, Angora, Rome 
Personal Private Secretary to Bevin 1945 
Ambassador in Prague January 1948, UK representative on Brussels Treaty Permanent 
Commission with rank of ambassador until November 1952 
DUSS June 1950 
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Joseph Alfred Dobbs 
Born 22.12.1914 
Served in HM forces 1939-1945 
Served in Moscow October 1947, appointed head of Russian Secretariat October 1950 
 
J. Galsworthy 
Born 19.6.1919, educated at Emmanuel and Corpus Christi, Cambridge 
Entered FO August 1941 
Served in Vienna, Athens 
Clerk in the ND 1945 to 1946 
 
Sir Alvary Douglas Frederick Gascoigne 
Born 6.8.1893, educated at Eton 
Entered FO 3.1919 
Served in Budapest, Paris, Peking,  Madrid, Oslo, Teheran, Tokyo, Budapest, Tangier 
British Political Representative to Hungary 1945 
Ambassador to Japan 1946 and to Moscow October 1951  
 
Paul Grey 
Born 2.12.1908, educated Charterhouse and Christ Church, Oxford 
Entered FO October 1933 
Served in Rome, Rio de Janeiro, The Hague, Lisbon, Moscow 1951 to 1954 
AUSS September 1954 
 
Hon. Robin Maurice Alers Hankey 
Born 4.7.1905, educated at Oxford 
Entered FO 25.11.1927 
Served in Berlin, Paris, Bucharest, Cairo, Teheran 
Charge d’affaires in Warsaw 1945 and Madrid from 49 
Head of ND from March 1946 to 1949 
 
Geoffrey Harrison 
Born 18.7.1908, educated at Cambridge 
Entered FO 20.10.1932 
Served in Tokyo, Berlin, Brussels, Moscow 1949  
Head of the ND 1950 to 1951 
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Sir Oliver Charles Harvey 
Born 26.11.1893, educated at Cambridge 
Entered FO 10.1.1910, retired 1954 
Served in Rome, Athens, Paris 
Seconded to the Ministry of Information August1940 
Ambassador in Paris January 1948 
AUSS November 1943, DUSS February 1946 
 
Sir William Goodenough Hayter 
Born 1.8.1906, educated at Oxford 
Entered FO 10.1930 as the third of the group, resigned 1958 
Served at the League of Nations 1932, Vienna, Moscow 1934 to 1937, China, Washington 
At the Potsdam Conference, then in Paris 
Ambassador to Moscow October 1953 to February 1957 
Chairman of JIC of the COS 
AUSS February 1948 
 
Henry Arthur Frederick Hohler 
Born 4.2.1911, educated at Eton and the Royal Military College in Camberley 
Entered FO October 1934 
Served in Budapest, Berne, Helsinki and Moscow December1949 to 1951 
Head of ND October 1952 to 1953 
 
Rt. Hon. Lord Archibald John Clark Kerr Inverchapel 
Born 17.3.1882 
Entered FO 22.3.1906, retired March 1948 
Served in Berlin, Buenes Aires, Washington, Rome, Teheran, Tangier, Cairo, Guatemala 
Santiago, Stockholm 
Ambassador to Bagdad 1935, China 1938, Ambassador Moscow February 1942 to 1945, 
Washingon May1946 
 
Sir Hubert Miles Gladwyn Jebb 
Born 25.4.1900, educated at Eton and Oxford 
Entered FO 1924?, retired 1960 
Served in Teheran, Rome 
Private secretary to Robert Vansittart and Alexander Cadogan 
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Chief executive of SOE 1940-42, Head of the Economic and Reconstruction Dept. 
Present at Teheran, Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta and Potsdam 
1945 executive secretary of preparatory commission of UN, acting Secretary General 
of UN at first UN meeting in February 1946 pending appointment of Trygve Lie 
In June 1950 succeeded Cadogan as Brit rep at UN 
Ambassador to Paris 1953-60 
AUSS March 1946, DUSS February 1949 
 
Sir David Victor Kelly 
Born 14.9.1891, educated at Oxford 
Entered FO 4.1919, retired October 1951 
Served in Buenes Aires, Lisbon, Mexico, Brussels, Stockholm, Cairo, Berne 
Ambassador in Buenes Aires, Ankara, and Moscow June 1949 to October 1951 
 
Sir Ivone Augustine Kirkpatrick 
Born 3.2.1897, educated at Balliol, Oxford 
Entered FO 10.1.1919, retired 1957 
In 1945 ran network of British agents operating in German occupied territory in the 
Netherlands 
Served in 1940 in the Ministry of Information 
Served in Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Berlin  
Seconded to BBC October 1941,  British High Commissioner in Germany 1950-53  
AUSS August 1945, DUSS January 1948, PUSS November 1953-1957 
 
A. E. Lambert 
Born 7.3.1911, educated at Harrow and Balliol, Oxford 
Entered FO October 1934 
Served in Brussels, Ankara, Beirut, Stockholm, Athens 
Clerk in the ND 1947 to 1949 
 
J. Y. Mackenzie 
Born 13.1.1914, educated Kelvinside and Christ Church, Oxford 
Entered FO October 1938 
Served in Montevideo, Beirut, Chungking, Baghdad, Sofia, Athens 
Clerk in the ND 1949 to 1950 
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Paul Mason 
Born 11.6.1904, educated at Eton and Cambridge 
Entered FO 11.1928 
Served in Brussels, Prague, Ottawa, Lisbon, Sofia  
SUS of the ND 1952 to 1953 
AUSS April 1951 
 
Christopher Paget Mayhew 
Born 12.6.1915, educated at Oxford 
Served with the SOE during WWII  
Elected as MP in 1945, lost seat 1950 
Under Secretary of State 1946 
 
H. T. Morgan 
Born 3.8.1919, educated Winchester and Magdalene, Oxford 
Entered FO November 1945 
Served in Moscow 1948 to 1950, Mexico City 1954 
Clerk in the ND 1951 to 1953 
 
J. Nicholls 
Born 4.10.1909, educated Malvern and Pembroke, Oxford 
Entered FO October 1932 
Served in Athens, Moscow 1949 to 1951 
AUSS July 1951 
 
Sir Andrew Napier Noble 
Born 16.9.1904, educated at Eton and Balliol, Oxford 
Entered FO 12.1928 
Served in Rio de Janeiro, Rome, China, Buenos Aires, Helsinki 
AUSS September 1949 
 
Sir Maurice Drummond Peterson 
Born 10.3.1889, educated at Rugby and Oxford 
Entered FO 30.12.1913, retired June 1949 
Served in Washington, Prague, Tokyo, Cairo,  Madrid, Sofia 
Ambassador in Bagdad 
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Controller of Foreign Publicity at the Ministry of Information July 1940, resigned 6.1941,  
Back in FO January 1942 
Ambassador in Ankara November 1944 and Moscow January 1947 to 1949 
SUS of the ND 1951  
 
J. Pumphrey 
Born 22.7.1916, educated at Winchester and New College, Oxford 
Entered FO August 1945 
Clerk in the ND 1946 
Assistant Private Secretary to PUSS October 1946, assistant private secretary to Prime 
Minister October 1947 to 1950 
Working for the Control Commission for Germany 1950 to 1953 
 
E.A. Radice 
Born 2.1.1907, educated at Winchester and Magdalene, Oxford 
Entered FO January 1946 
Served in Copenhagen 
Clerk in the EID 1946 to 1948 
Transferred to MOD 1953? 
 
C.R.A. Rae 
Born 20.2.1922, educated at Eton and Trinity, Cambridge 
Entered FO July 1947 
Clerk in the ND 1948 to 1950 
Served in Rome 
 
Sir Frank Kenyon Roberts 
Born 27.10.1907, educated at Rugby and Cambridge 
Entered FO 10.1930 
Served in Paris, Cairo and Moscow January 1945 to 1947 
Principal Private Secretary to Bevin January 1948 
Deputy UK High Commissioner in India April 1949 to August 1951 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia November 1954, to NATO February 1957, to the Soviet Union 
1960 to 1962, to Germany February 1963 to May 1968 
AUSS February 1949, DUSS October 1951 
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Sir Orme Garton Sargent 
Born 31.10.1884 
Entered FO 16.3.1906, retired February 1949 
Served in Berne, with the Peace Delegation in Paris 1919 and in Paris 
SUS of the ND 1945 
AUSS August 1933, DUSS September 1939, PUSS February 1946 
 
William Strang 
Born 2.1.1893, Educated at UCL and in Paris 
Entered FO 19.9.1919, retired 1953 
Served in Belgrade, and in  Moscow July 1930 to October 10.33  
Acting AUSS November 1939, Joint PUSS German section October 1947, PUSS February 
1949 
 
Sir Christopher Frederick Ashton Warner 
Born 17.1.1895, educated at Oxford 
Entered FO 11.1920 
Served in Constantinople, Teheran 
Ambassador to Brussels February 1951 
Head of the ND 1945, SUS 1946 to 1947 
AUSS February 1946 
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‘Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy’ 
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